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JAN 21 2009 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
LUIS J. GUZMAN, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, and 
JENNIFER SUTTON, individually, 
Defendants. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CANYON COUNTY, LUIS GUZMAN, 
individually and JENNIFER SUTTON, 
individually, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-2005-4848 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND JUDGMENT IN BIFURCATED 
PORTION OF TRIAL 
This litigation comprises a civil matter that possesses a bifurcated bench trial 
portion. In this part of the trial, the parties ask this court to determine whether the 
Canyon County Commissioners in 1982 followed the procedures mandated by Idaho 
Code to create a herd district and/or to consolidate pre-existing herd districts into one. 
The essence of what the parties ask this court to find centers on whether Dale Piercy 
(Piercy), denominated the plaintiff for this portion of the trial, has overcome the 
presumption of validity of the "1982 herd district" or, in the alternative, the consolidation 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT IN BIFURCATED 
PORTION OF TRIAL - 1 
959 
• 1 ( , 
,J 
of several herd districts into one in Canyon County (County) that year. For the reasons 
set out below, the court finds that Piercy has overcome the presumption of validity of a 
herd district consolidation attempted by the Canyon County Commissioners in 1982. 
Essentially, the County has simply elected to rely upon the presumption of 
validity of its 1982 Herd District Ordinance.1 The County failed to produce even one 
document showing the Board of Commissioners followed the statutory requirements for 
creating or modifying herd districts in 1982. Put another way, after Piercy sufficiently 
established that the Board failed to follow the procedures of the Idaho Code, the County 
failed to show affirmatively that a factual basis exists for the court to adhere to the 
presumption of validity. The election to rely solely on the presumption of validity is fatal 
to the County's cause. The County's (together with Guzman's and Sutton's) scheme of 
simply relying on the presumption of validity falls well short of the mark.2 
The court gave the County every opportunity to show how its county commission 
complied with the statutes in 1982. The County failed to do so. The court informs all 
parties that it bases its finding upon what it perceives as a clear showing on the part of 
Piercy. The court further informs the parties that it finds Piercy introduced substantial 
evidence of the nonexistence of the fact that the Canyon County Board of 
Commissioners failed to follow the statutory procedure in relation to herd districts. No 
one should consider the court's decision as a critical or negative view of what the Board 
1 See Idaho Code§ 31-857. 
2 This is not to say that Guzman's counsel did not conduct a cross examination of Piercy's witnesses that 
should be preserved for law students covering how cross-examination should take place. Indeed, 
Guzman's counsel is an extremely talented advocate and practices at a high level. He found every "hole" 
in the testimony of Piercy's witnesses. Nevertheless, the court, in its "fact-finding mission," is clearly more 
persuaded by their testimony on direct. The court has no doubt whatsoever that no landowners 
petitioned the Board to consolidate or "fix" the Herd District dilemma in Canyon County in 1982. 
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attempted to do. Indeed, the record supports the notion they perceived a problem and 
attempted to "fix it" with regard to confusion over the county's "crazy quilt" of herd 
districts, including overlapping issues. Nevertheless, the record also clearly supports 
the fact that not one landowner in the area affected, let alone a majority of the 
landowners in the area affected, who also happened to qualify as electors of the state, 
petitioned the county commissioners to "fix the problem." In other words, the court is 
clearly convinced that Piercy has overcome the presumption established in Idaho Code 
§ 31-857, and which Rule 301 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure addresses for 
purposes of how presumptions may be overcome. Here, then, the court, as the trier of 
fact determines that the presumed fact does not exist without regard to the presumption, 
in accordance with Rule 301 (a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.2 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
Piercy well states the facts in his Closing Memorandum; hence, the court adopts 
them as restated herein. Piercy ranches and farms near Parma, Idaho, a small 
community located in Canyon County. He has followed this profession for most of his 
life. In March 2005, Piercy pastured several bulls in a field north of the Boise River, 
south of Parma, and immediately to the east of Wamstad Road. One of the bulls got 
out. Defendant Jennifer Sutton (Sutton) struck the bull as she drove down the road, 
injuring her passengers. 
2 This follows because the court finds that Piercy met the burden of going forward. 
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For purposes of this portion of the bi-furcated trial, based upon the depositions 
submitted and the live testimony offered at the bench trial conducted by the court on 8 
October 2008, the court specifically finds the following: 
A. FINDINGS OF FACT ESTABLISHED BY A CLEAR SHOWING 
• That at the time the Canyon County Board of Commissioners adopted their 
"ORDER ESTABLISHING HERD DISTRICT" they did so without the benefit of a 
petition by "a majority of the landowners in any area or district described by 
metes and bounds not including open range," who resided in the area or district 
described, and who were qualified electors at the time of making their petition to 
create a herd district. 
• The following deposition testimony provides evidence in support of the finding 
immediately above: 
(1) The RESOLUTION PASSED REGARDING HERD DISTRICTS IN CANYON 
COUNTY found in the minutes of the Board of County Commissioners in Book 27, Page 
207 in the Canyon County Recorder's Office, and adopted on December 2, 1982, does 
not refer to any petition. Instead, the resolution simply refers to confusion existing due 
to over-lapping lines of herd districts and open range, and the desire of the 
commissioners to make all of Canyon County to be herd district as of December 14, 
1982. 
(2) The deposition of Bill A. Staker, the elected Clerk of Canyon County at the 
time of the adoption of the referenced resolution and subsequent "ORDER 
ESTABLISHING HERD DISTRICT," which he gave in Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
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September 22, 2008, read as a whole, demonstrates he has no independent 
recollection or knowledge of any petition for consolidation of herd districts or the 
creation of a county-wide herd district in the years 1980, 1981, or 1982.3 
(3) The deposition of Linda Landis given on July 7, 2008, shows that she has been 
a secretary in the Canyon County Prosecutor's Office since October 2005; that she 
maintains the records in the prosecutor's office; but it adds little to the record except for 
Exhibits A, B, and C,4 which are attached to her deposition.5 
(4) Similarly, the deposition of the current Canyon County Clerk, William Hurst, 
given on July 7, 2008, brings little to the table other than the same Exhibit A, complete 
with a black-and-white "survey map" referenced in the ORDER ESTABLISHING HERD 
DISTRICT attached to the deposition of Linda Landis as Exhibit A, conforms to a larger 
map that hangs on a bulletin board somewhere in the Canyon County Courthouse. 
(5) The deposition of Glenn Koch, a former Canyon County Commissioner, and, 
apparently, the only surviving Commissioner voting on the 1982 Herd District 
Resolution, also amounts to a "nothing" insofar as his independent recollection is 
concerned on the 1982 Resolution creating a Herd District. Nevertheless, at least one 
3 Lacking an independent recollection means it neither helps nor hinders the presumption: it amounts to a 
"nothing." 
4 Landis Deposition Exhibit A corresponds to Joint Exhibits 2 & 7; Exhibit B corresponds to Joint Exhibits 
8 & 9; and Exhibit C corresponds to Joint Exhibit 3. All Joint Exhibits comprise a part of the trial record. 
5 As already noted, the resolution mentions nothing about a petition. The court believes this is because 
no petition creating the 1982 Herd District exists. Instead, in 1982, the Board, reacting to an apparent 
perceived need, solved the problem by Resolution, not by petition. Nothing in the "ORDER 
ESTABLISHING HERD DISTRICT," as set out in Exhibit A to Linda Landis's deposition suggests a 
petition. Yet, Exhibit C (Joint Exhibit 3), has attached to it minutes from Books 3 and 4 of (presumably) 
the Board's record of minutes. This clearly shows that in the early part of the Twentieth Century the 
Board created Herd Districts based upon petitions as contemplated by the Idaho Code, not based upon a 
"review" and determination "by resolution." 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT IN BIFURCATED 
PORTION OF TRIAL - 5 
963 
of the exhibits attached to his deposition corroborate the lack of a petition as the "driver" 
to the last Herd District Ordnance. Exhibit 36 to Koch's deposition, a copy of the 
minutes of how the Board passed the 1982 Resolution regard herd districts in Canyon 
County, makes no mention of a petition. 
(6) The deposition of E. G. Johnson, taken on October 6, 2008, shows he owns a 
parcel of land primarily north of, but also on, the Boise River in Canyon County. Mr. 
Johnson's deposition further shows that at the time of the County's 1982 Herd District 
"Order," he served as the President of the Idaho Cattle Feeders Association and further 
enjoyed membership in the Idaho Cattlemen's Association (now consolidated at the 
Idaho Cattle Association). He is certain that no questions arose in either Association 
regarding Canyon County's intent on placing his property (which, according to the map 
attached to his deposition as Exhibit 2,7 would also have included Dale Piercy's 
property) into a Herd District. According to the 1982 Order with the map referenced, 
neither Johnson's nor Piercy's property had been a part of any herd district before 
December 1982. Their land comprised part of the 5% not within a Herd District 
referenced in the "ORDER ESTABLISHING HERD DISTRICT" set out in Joint Exhibit 4. 
B. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the forgoing Findings of Fact, the court concludes as follows: 
6 The trial record has this exhibit as Joint Exhibit 4. 
7 This exhibit is the same as Joint Exhibit 2 in the trial record except for the notation "my property" in the 
deposition exhibit indicating Johnson's property (Section 25), which is only "circled" on the Joint Exhibit. 
Furthermore, Joint Exhibit 2 shows Dale Piercy's property in question with a yellow sticky attached thereto 
containing an arrow pointing down to the section in question owned by Piercy. 
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• That the Canyon County Commissioners in 1982 did not follow the statutory 
procedures in creating or consolidating Herd Districts in Canyon County, and 
specifically, the Board took action without the benefit of a majority of the landowners 
affected by the proposed district, who are also electors, signing a petition and 
presenting it to the Board asking for the creation of a Herd District. 
• That since the County Commissioners did not follow the statutory procedures, 
the purported ORDER ESTABLISHING HERD DISTRICT is illegal, hence void, and the 
"presumption" upon which Canyon County, Luis Guzman, and Jennifer Sutton rely, does 
not overcome the proof presented by Piercy. 
• That since the court finds no petition existed for the establishment the 1982 
ORDER ESTABLISHING HERD DISTRICT, the court need no dwell on the other 
objections raised by Piercy regarding the insufficiency of the order. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
Although the court covered much of this material in its order that denied Piercy 
summary judgment in October 2007, for context to how the court arrives at the decision 
it has, it bears repeating. 
A. THE STATUTES 
At the time the Canyon County Board of Commissions entered its purported 
ORDER ESTABLISHING HERD DISTRICT in December 1982, the 1968 version of 
Idaho Code §25-2401 et seq. established the criteria for creating a herd district. This 
set of statutes gives the board of county commissioners in a particular county the right 
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to create herd districts, setting forth procedures by which the board would create such 
districts. The three relevant statutes follow: 
l.C. 25-2402 Petition for district 
A majority of the landowners in any area or district described 
by metes and bounds not including open range and who are 
resident in, and qualified electors of, the state of Idaho may 
petition the board of county commissioners in writing to 
create such area a herd district. Such petition shall describe 
the boundaries of the said proposed herd district, and shall 
designate what animals of the species of horses. mules. 
asses, cattle, swine, sheep and goats it is desired to prohibit 
from running at large, also prohibiting said animals from 
being herded upon the public highways in such a district; 
and shall designate that the herd district shall not apply to 
nor cover livestock, excepting swine, which shall roam, drift 
or stray from open range into the district unless the district 
shall be inclosed by lawful fences and cattle guards in roads 
penetrating the district as to prevent livestock, excepting 
swine, from roaming, drifting. or straying from open range 
into the district; and may designate the period of the year 
during which it is desired to prohibit such animals from 
running at large, or being herded on the highways. 
Provided, any herd district heretofore established shall retain 
its identity, geographic definition, and remain in full force and 
effect, until vacated or modified hereafter as provided by 
section 25-2404, Idaho Code, as amended. 
Idaho Code §25-2402 (1968) (Emphasis supplied). 
l.C. 25-2403 Notice of hearing petition (1968) 
It shall be the duty of the board of county commissioners, 
after such petition has been filed, to set a date for hearing 
said petition, notice of which hearing shall be given by 
posting notices thereof in three (3) conspicuous places in the 
proposed herd district, and by publication for two (2) weeks 
previous to said hearing in a newspaper published in the 
county nearest the proposed herd district. 
Idaho Code §25-2403 (1968) 
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l.C. 25-2404 Order creating district (1968) 
At such hearing. if satisfied that a majority of the landowners 
owning more than fifty per cent (50%) of the land in said 
proposed herd district who are resident in, and qualified 
electors of, the state of Idaho are in favor of the enforcement 
of the herd law therein, and that it would be beneficial to 
such district, the board of commissioners shall make an 
order creating such herd district, in accordance with the 
prayer of the petition, or with such modifications as it may 
choose to make. Such order shall specify a certain time at 
which it shall take effect, which time shall be at least thirty 
(30) days after the making of said order; and said order shall 
continue in force, according to the terms thereof, until the 
same shall be vacated or modified by the board of 
commissioners, upon the petition of a majority of the 
landowners owning more than fifty per cent (50%) of the land 
in said district who are resident in, and qualified electors of, 
the state of Idaho. 
Idaho Code §25-2404 (1968) (Emphasis supplied). 
As previously noted by the court, the lessons gleaned from these sections of the 
Code indicate that: 
• A majority of landowners may petition for a herd district; 
• If such petition is made, it will set forth a description of the requested district and 
state the animals to be included or exempt from the herd district; 
• Notice is to be given in three (3) locations and published in a newspaper in the 
county of the proposed district for two (2) weeks prior to the hearing; 
• The board of commissioners may create a herd district by order either "in 
accordance with the prayer of the petition, or with such modifications as it may 
choose to make" 
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• An order creating a herd district shall specify a date, after 30 days, when the 
district will take effect. 
Previously, Piercy argued that the order as entered by the Commissioners, and 
as set forth above, is invalid because it failed to reference the landowner petition; it 
failed to provide a metes and bounds description of the herd districts to be created; it 
failed to provide which breeds of animals are subject to the herd district; and finally, it 
failed to set forth any date when the herd district went into effect. Piercy contended 
these flaws overcome the presumption of validity of the herd district; hence, this court 
must strike it down. At that time, the court disagreed with Piercy's position. After the 
benefit of a trial on the issue, and seeing firsthand how the county failed at virtually 
every level to follow the Code, the court no longer disagrees with Piercy.9 
B. THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
The court concludes that counsel for Piercy has correctly analyzed the burden of 
proof, including who has it at the outset, how the burden of going forward might shift, 
and the level of proof required in DEFENDANT PIERCY'S REPLY BRIEF; hence, the 
court need not detail much analysis here. It is enough to say that the case relied upon 
by Piercy, Cole-Collister Fire Protection Dist. v. City of Boise, 93 Idaho 558, 468 P .2d 
290 (1970), reh'g denied, is consistent with the effect of presumptions as now contained 
in IRE 301 (a), though it contains stronger language from days gone by. 
(a) Effect. In all civil actions and proceedings, unless 
otherwise provided for by statute, by Idaho appellate 
9 At the time of Piercy's original motion for summary judgment, Canyon County had not entered as a party 
and the other parties did not have the benefit of any "inside" information of what the County may have 
done to satisfy the Code requirements. Ironically, in hindsight, the court could just as easily have entered 
judgment on behalf of Piercy based upon his original motion for summary judgment. 
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decisions or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the 
party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward 
with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not 
shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk 
of nonpersuasion. which remains throughout the trial upon 
the party on whom it was originally cast. The burden of 
going forward is satisfied by the introduction of evidence 
sufficient to permit reasonable minds to conclude that the 
presumed fact does not exist. If the party against whom a 
presumption operates fails to meet the burden of going 
forward, the presumed fact shall be deemed proved. If the 
party meets the burden of going forward, no instruction on 
the preS,umption shall be given, and the trier of fact shall 
determine the existence or nonexistence of the presumed 
fact without regard to the presumption. 
IRE 301 (a)(Emphasis supplied). 
Here, Piercy had the burden of proof throughout, namely, the burden of proving 
the invalidity of the 1982 Herd District, thus, proving a negative. Canyon County and its 
allies, Luis Guzman and Jennifer Sutton, had the advantage of a presumption (based 
upon the passage of time) that the 1982 Order was valid as entered. Nevertheless, 
after the evidence presented by all sides, and following the procedure outlined in IRE 
301(a), the court concludes no petition for the creation of the Herd District ever existed. 
Accordingly, Piercy overcame the presumed fact of the Herd District's validity. 
Similarly, in Cole-Collister Fire Protection Dist. v. City of Boise, supra, the 
district court declared on ordinance void in the face of the presumption of its validity, 
and our state Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision. In doing so, the Court 
emphasized that 
[T]he burden of proof devolved upon the [Fire Protection 
District], at the district court level, to show that the zoning 
ordinance as applied to the property in question was 
confiscatory, arbitrary, unreasonable and void. [Internal cite 
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omitted.] This burden the [Fire Protection District] has 
sustained as demonstrated by the ample evidence contained 
in the record to support the legal conclusion that the zoning 
ordinance was unlawful as applied to the [Fire Protection 
District's] property. 
Once the [Fire Protection District] overcame the 
presumption of validity by introducing evidence tending to 
show that the ordinance in question has been unreasonably 
applied to his property, the burden was the shifted to Boise 
City to come forward with the evidence to rebut the [Fire 
Protection District's] evidence and to show that the 
ordinance was valid. 
93 Idaho at 563, 468 P.2d at 295. 
Ill. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the court concludes that Canyon County's 1982 
ORDER ESTABLISHING HERD DISTRICT is invalid since Dale Piercy overcame the 
presumption of its validity. Specifically, the court concludes that no landowners within 
land not contained in a Canyon County Herd District, as required by Idaho statutes, ever 
presented the Canyon County Commissioners with a petition requesting that their 
property be made a part of a herd district or that it be consolidated within the pre-
existing herd districts of Canyon County. Accordingly, the court concludes no herd 
district existed at the location of the horrific accident involving Luis Guzman and 
Jennifer Sutton and Dale Piercy's bull. 
THEREFORE, THIS ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES THAT: 
1. The 1982 ORDER ESTABLISHING HERD DISTRICT is invalid and void. 
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2. Neither Plaintiff Luiz Guzman nor Defendant Jennifer Sutton may rely upon the 
existence of a herd district at the location of their involvement in a collision with 
Defendant Dale Piercy's bull in Canyon County in 2005. 
ON W. PETRIE, District Judge 
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when s/he placed the same into the latter's respective "pick up" boxes at the Canyon County Clerk's 
office, Canyon County Courthouse, Caldwell, Idaho; and upon 
• Timothy C. Walton, CHASAN & WALTON LLC, at PO Box 1069, Boise, ID 83701-1069, and upon 
Stephen E. Blackburn, BLACKBURN LAW PC, at 660 E. Franklin Road, Suite 255, Meridian, ID 
83642, attorneys for Plaintiff Luis Guzman; and upon 
• Joshua S. Evett, ELAM & BURKE, attorneys for Defendant Jennifer Sutton, at P.A., PO Box 
1539, Boise, ID 83701 
when s/he caused the same to be deposited into the US Mails, sufficient postage attached. 
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SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
101 S. Capitol Blvd 
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Telephone: (208) 336-0484 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
c.DYE,DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
LUIS J. GUZMAN, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, and JENNIFER 
SUTTON, individually, 
Defendants. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
CANYON COUNTY, LUIS GUZMAN, 
individually and JENNIFER SUTTON, 
individually, 
Def end ants. 
Case No. CV05-4848 
DEFENDANT PIERCY'S 
SECOND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW Defendant, Dale Piercy, by and through his attorney of record, Ryan B. 
Peck, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(a), and requests that this Court order that Defendant Piercy's Motion 
for Summary Judgment be granted and that Defendant Piercy be dismissed with prejudice from the 
above-captioned matter for the reason that Defendant Piercy owed no duty to Plaintiff that would 
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create liability in this action pursuant to LC.§§ 25-2118, 25-2402-2404 and Idaho case law. 
This motion is supported by the memorandum and affidavit filed herewith, previously 
submitted affidavits and depositions and the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment in Bifurcated Portion of Trial filed on January 21, 2009. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this 5th day of May 2009. 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
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C.DYE,DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
LUIS J. GUZMAN, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, and JENNIFER 
SUTTON, individually, 
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DALE PIERCY, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
CANYON COUNTY, LUIS GUZMAN, 
individually and JENNIFER SUTTON, 
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Case No. CVOS-4848 
l\1EMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT PIERCY'S 
SECOND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDG1\1ENT 
I.RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Dale Piercy is a rancher and farmer in the Parma, which is within Canyon County. Mr. 
Piercy has been a rancher and farmer in the Parma area for most of his life. (Deposition of Dale 
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Piercy, p. 5 In. 15-21.) fu March of 2005, Mr. Piercy was pasturing approximately nine bulls in a 
field that was north of the Boise River, south of Parma and to the immediate east of Wamstad 
Road. (Id. at p. 19 ln. 7 and p. 22, In. 18-19.) One of Mr. Piercy's bulls got out of the field where it 
was being pastured and was hit by a vehicle being driven by Jennifer Sutton. These facts were 
adopted by the Court in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in Bifurcated 
Portion of Trial filed on January 21, 2009. 
Defendant Piercy also incorporates all the affidavits and evidence submitted in support of 
his initial motion for summary judgment. 
II. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
Summary judgment under l.R.C.P. 56(c) can be granted by a trial court when there are no 
genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct.App.1986). fu ruling on 
a motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the 
nonmoving party. All reasonable inferences of fact must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. 
G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991); Sanders v. 
Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App.1994). Additionally, 
. The burden of proving the absence of material facts is upon the moving party. 
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue, the burden shifts to the 
nonmoving party to show that a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged element 
of the claim does exist. The nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials contained in the pleadings, but must come forward and produce evidence by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in the rules to set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial (citations omitted). 
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Levinger v. Mercy Medical Center, Nampa, 139 Idaho 192, 195, 75 P.3d 1202, 1205 (2003) 
(parenthesis added). The moving party is entitled to judgment when the nonmoving party fails to 
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on 
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Thompson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 
473, 475-76, 50 P.3d 488, 490-91 (2002). 
The construction of a legislative act presents a pure question of law for this Court to decide. 
Crawford v. Dept. of Corrections, 133 Idaho 633, 635, 991 P.2d 358, 360 (1999). Courts also 
exercise free review over the interpretation of statutes. Adamson v. Blanchard, 133 Idaho 602, 
605, 990 P.2d 1213, 1216, (1999)(construing Idaho Code§ 25-2118 and Idaho Code§ 25-2119 
together as they were adopted at the same time.) 
IV. LAW AND ANALYSIS 
Mr. Piercy bears no liability for the injuries incurred by Plaintiffs in the subject vehicle 
accident for the following reasons: (1) The bull that was involved in the subject accident was being 
pastured in an open range area pursuant to the Court's recent ruling and (2) Mr. Piercy is statutorily 
immune from liability for the accident under I.C. § 25-2118 and I.C. § 25-2402(1). 
A. The Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Filed on January 21, 2009, Hold 
that the Area Where Mr. Piercy Pastured the Subject Bull was Open Range. 
The Court stated: 
THEREFORE, TIDS ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES THAT: 
1. The 1982 ORDER ESTABLISHING HERD DISTRICT is invalid and void. 
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2. Neither Plaintiff Luiz Guzman nor Defendant Jennifer Sutton may rely upon the 
existence of a herd district at the location of their involvement in a collision with 
Defendant Dale Piercy' s bull in Canyon County in 2005. 
B. Mr. Piercy is Not Liable for the Subject Accident Because the Bull Involved in the 
Accident was Being Pastured in an Open Range Area. 
Two Idaho Code statutes apply in this case to provide Mr. Piercy with immunity from 
liability for the Plaintiffs' damages in the present case. 
Idaho Code§ 25-2118 provides: 
No person owning, or controlling the possession of, any domestic animal running on open 
range, shall have the duty to keep such animal off any highway on such range, and shall 
not be liable for damage to any vehicle or for injury to any person riding therein, caused 
by a collision between the vehicle and the animal. "Open range" means all uninclosed 
lands outside of cities, villages and herd districts, upon which cattle by custom, license, 
lease, or permit, are grazed or permitted to roam. 
Idaho Code§ 25-2402(1), in relevant part states: "and shall designate that the herd district 
shall not apply to nor cover livestock, excepting swine, which shall roam, drift or stray from open 
range into the district unless the district shall be inclosed by lawful fences and cattle guards as 
needed in roads penetrating the district so as to prevent livestock, excepting swine, from roaming, 
drifting or straying from open range into the district;." 
Mr. Piercy was pasturing his bull in an open range area. The accident occurred on 
Wamstad Rd. on or near a bridge that was straddling a boundary between open range and the 
boundary of a herd district. The area just south of the bridge over the Boise River where the 
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accident took place was allegedly within the boundaries of a herd district that was established on 
July 18, 1908 (1908 herd district). 
LC.§ 25-2402(1) allows immunity for Mr. Piercy's bull from the 1908 herd district, because 
Mr. Piercy's bull came from open range and the 1908 herd district was not "inclosed" by a lawful 
fence ·and there were no cattle guards on the road connecting the open range to the 1908 herd 
district. (Affidavit of Ryan B. Peck in Support of Defendant Piercy' s Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Affidavit of Dale W. Piercy.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court upheld and emphasized the provision in LC. § 25-2402(1), in 
Easley v. Lee, 111 Idaho 115, 118, 721 P.2d 215, 218 (1986). The Supreme Court stated: "We 
hold, therefore, that a herd district, and the liabilities resulting from the formation of a herd district, 
do not apply to livestock, excepting swine, that roam, drift or stray from open range into the herd 
district, unless the herd district is inclosed by lawful fences and cattle guards in roads penetrating 
the district." Id. 
Wamstad road does not have cattle guards to prevent livestock from crossing into the 1908 
herd district at the point at which it separates the open range area from the herd district. Therefore, 
I.C. § 25-2402(1) does not eliminate the immunity for Mr. Piercy under I.C. § 25-2118 even 
assuming Mr. Piercy's bull crossed over into the 1908 herd district. 
Mr. Piercy's motion for summary judgment should be granted in that he is statutorily 
immune from liability for the subject accident. 
lVIEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT PIERCY'S SECOND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGlVIENT - 5 
979 
..-) , .. "' 
DATED this 5th day of May 2009. 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of May 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document to be served by the method indicated below and addressed to: 
Timothy C. Walton Y U.S. Mail 
CHASAN & WALTON LLC 
1459 Tyrell Lane 
P.O. Box 1069 
Boise, ID 83701-1069 
Stephen E. Blackbum 
BLACKBURN LAW PC 
660 E. Franklin Road 
Suite 255 
Meridian, ID 83642 
Joshua S. Evett 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 East Front Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
Canyon County Prosecutor 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany 
















MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT PIERCY'S SECOND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6 
980 
Rodney R. Saetrum, ISBN: 2921 
Ryan B. Peck, ISBN: 7022 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
Post Office Box 7425 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 336-0484 
Attorneys for Defendant Dale Piercy 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
C.OVE,O!PUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
LUIS J. GUZMAN, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, and JENNIFER 
SUTTON, individually, 
Defendants. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
CANYON COUNTY, LUIS GUZMAN, 
individually and JENNIFER SUTTON, 
individually, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVOS-4848 
AFFIDAVIT OF RY AN B. PECK 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, Ryan B. Peck, who first being duly sworn upon his oath and deposes and 
says as follows: 
1. That I am a attorney for Saetrum Law Offices, who represents Defendant Dale 
.Piercy, and I make this affidavit of my own personal knowledge; 
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2. Affiant attests that attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the 
Affidavit of Dale Piercy originally submitted in support of Defendant Piercy's initial motion for 
summary judgment. 
Further this affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this 5th day of May 2009. 
STATEOFIDAHO ) 
: SS. 
County of Ada ) 
By 
On this 5th day of May 2009 before me, Notary Public, personally appeared RYAN B. 
PECK, known or identified to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within 
instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day 
and year in this certificate last above written. 
Notary Public, State of Idaho 
Residing at ~~4".-
My Commission Expires r /2 / P/cJ 
AFFIDAVIT OF RY AN B. PECK - 2 
982 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of May 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of 
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Timothy C. Walton 'A U.S. Mail 
CHASAN & WALTON LLC Hand Delivery 
1459 Tyrell Lane Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 1069 Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83701-1069 
Stephen E. Blackbum x U.S. Mail 
BLACKBURN LAW PC Hand Delivery 
660 E. Franklin Road Overnight Mail 
Suite 255 Facsimile 
Meridian, ID 83642 
Joshua S. Evett ')( U.S. Mail 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. Hand Delivery 
251 East Front Street, Suite 300 Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 1539 Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83701 
Canyon County Prosecutor ~ U.S. Mail 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney Hand Delivery 
Canyon County Courthouse Overnight Mail 
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Rodney_R. Saetrum, ISB: 2921 
Ryan B. Peck, ISB: 7022 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
101 S. Capitol Blvd 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 336-0484 
Attorneys for Defendant Dale Piercy 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
. O.BUTLER,DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COuRT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
Case No. CV05-4848 ERIKA L. RIVERA by and through LOREE 
RIVERA her mother and natural guardian AND 
LUIS J. GUZMAN by and through 
BALLARDO GUZMAN his father and natural 
guardian, 
AFFIDAVIT OF DALE PIERCY 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, and JENNIFER 
SUTTON, individually, 
Defendants. 
I, Dale Piercy, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
1. Affiant is a Co-Defendant in this case and has been a farmer and rancher in the 
Parma\ Wilder area for over 30 years and bases this Affidavit on his own personal 
knowledge and belief. 
2. Affiant attests that the bull invo_lved in the subject accident, which occurred on 
March 20, 2005, on Wamstad Road approximately where it goes over the Boise 
River, was being pastured in a field that borders the north bank of the Boise River 
and the east side of W amstad Road, which field is in the area shaded in green on 





Exhibit A to the Memorandum in Support of Defendant Piercy's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
3. The bull was being pastured in this field at the time of the accident and ·prior to 
the accident. 
4. The field described above is not within the limits of any city or village. 
5. There are no cattle guards or fences on W amstad Road at the point where it leaves 
the area on Exhibit A which is outlined in red and striped in blue and enters the 
area outlined in orange. 
Further your Affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this /~of May 2007. 
~ae.wB~ 
Dale Piercy · ~ 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
SS. 
County of Canyon ) 
On this/b~f May 2007, before me, a Notary Public, personally appeared DALE 
PIERCY, known or identified to m~ to be the. person whose name is subscribed to the within. 
instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the 
day and year in this certificate last above written. 
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Case No: CVOS-4848 
PLAINTIFF GUZMAN'S 
MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT 
PIERCY'S SECOND MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
On March 20, 2005, Erika Rivera and Luis Guzman were seriously injured when the 
vehicle in which they rode as passengers (which vehicle was driven by Defendant Jennifer 
Sutton (Sutton)) collided with a bull owned by Defendant Dale Piercy (Piercy) on Wamstad 
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Road in Canyon County, just south of Parma, Idaho. Erika Rivera has settled her claim 
and is no longer a party to this suit. 
The accident occurred in a herd district created by the Canyon County 
Commissioners in 1908. Piercy's bull was pastured in a herd district created by the 
Canyon County Commissioners in 1982. The border between the two herd districts is the 
Boise River. Piercy's bull escaped Piercy's pasture and was hit by Sutton's car a few 
hundred yards from Piercy's pasture, on the other side of the Boise River from Piercy's 
pasture. 
Despite the fact that Piercy has been a farmer and rancher in Canyon County for 
some 50 years, and despite the fact that Piercy lived under, conducted business under, 
and benefited from the protections of the 1982 herd district ordinance for some 23 years 
prior to this horrific accident, Piercy challenged the validity of the 1982 herd district 
ordinance. Specifically, Piercy claimed that the Canyon County Commissioners failed to 
follow statutory procedure in the creation of the ordinance. 
In October 2008 Judge Petrie held a bench trial on the issue of whether the 1982 
herd distrid was validly formed. In January 2009 Judge Petrie issued his decision, 
concluding that the 1982 herd district was not properly formed. Piercy now moves for 
summary judgment based upon Judge Petrie's January 2009 decision. 
Plaintiff Guzman objects to the entry of summary judgment in favor of Piercy. 
Plaintiff Guzman contends that summary judgment for Piercy is improper because: 
1. Piercy is equitably estopped, and/or is prevented by the doctrine of quasi 
estoppel, from contesting the validity of the 1982 herd district; 
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2. Piercy is estopped by laches from contesting the validity of the 1982 herd 
district; 
3. Piercy's claim that the 1982 herd district is invalid is barred by the statute of 
limitations; 
4. Per IC 25-2402, even if the bull was pastured in open range (as Piercy 
contends) since the accident occurred in a herd district created in 1908 (the 
validity of the 1908 herd district is not subject to dispute), Piercy is not 
immune from liability. 
5. Irrespective of the validity of the 1982 herd district, Piercy violated Canyon 
County Ordinance 03-05-17. Piercy was therefore negligent per se, and is 
subject to liability for Guzman's injuries. 
6. The findings of fact and conclusions of law of Judge Petries' January 21, 
2009 decision are not supported by the evidence. 
Plaintiff Guzman relies upon the following to support his objection to Piercy's 
motion for summary judgment: 
1. Defendant Sutton's Memorandum in opposition to Defendant Piercy's 
second motion for summary judgment, which memorandum, and the facts 
and legal arguments incorporated therein are adopted by Plaintiff Guzman 
for purposes of opposing Defendant Piercy's second motion for summary 
judgment. 
2. Plaintiffs' July 20, 2007 memorandum in opposition to Piercy's motion for 
summary judgment and the evidence cited therein; 
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3. Plaintiffs' August 22, 2007 Memorandum in support of motion to strike, or, 
in the alternative, Plaintiffs' second memorandum opposing Piercy's motion 
for summary judgment and the evidence cited therein; 
4. The June 5, 2007 affidavit of Allen in Opposition to Piercy's motion for 
summary judgment; 
5. The June 6, 2007 affidavits of Guzman and Rivera in opposition to Piercy's 
motion for summary judgment; 
6. The June 6, 2007 affidavit of Koch in opposition to Piercy's motion for 
summary judgment; 
7. The June 12, 2007 affidavit of Staker in opposition to Piercy's motion for 
Summary judgment; 
8. The June 20, 2007 affidavit of Walton (and exhibits attached thereto) in 
opposition to Piercy's motion for summary judgment; 
9. Plaintiff's November 6, 2007 Memorandum in support of Plaintiffs' motion to 
reconsider and the evidence cited therein; 
10. Plaintiff Guzman's post-trial memorandum in support of upholding the 
validity of Canyon County's 1982 herd district and the evidence cited 
therein; 
11. The filings of Defendant Sutton in opposition to Piercy's motions for 
summary judgment and the evidence cited therein; 
As pointed out by Defendant Sutton in her May 21, 2009 memorandum opposing 
Piercy's second motion for summary judgment, at the time the 1908 herd district where this 
accident occurred was created, the Idaho Code did not require that the 1908 herd district 
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be enclosed by fences and _cattle guards to prevent livestock from straying from open 
range into the herd district. That statutory requirement was not added to l.C. 25-2402 until 
1963, and the 1963 amendment was not made retroactive by the legislature. 
Because this bull/automobile wreck occurred within the 1908 herd district, Piercy is 
subject to herd district liability for Guzman's injuries even if his bull was pastured in open 
range, as Piercy contends. 
Additionally, Piercy's bull was running at large in violation of Canyon County Code 
03-05-17. Thus, irrespective of Piercy's liability under herd district law, Piercy is negligent 
per se, and liable to Guzman, because he was in violation of Canyon County Code 03-05-
17. 
Moreover, it is simply unfair to allow Piercy to argue after the fact (after he has 
injured Guzman) that the 1982 herd district is invalid. Piercy has lived under and done 
business under the 1982 herd district ordinance for over 27 years. He benefited from the 
1982 herd district. Because livestock within the 1982 herd district was contained in fenced 
pastures, Piercy's farm crops were protected from being eaten, over-run and trampled by 
other ranchers' livestock. When Piercy drove on the roads and highways within the 1982 
herd district (within which he owned property, including the pasture where his bull was 
pastured), Piercy enjoyed the protection provided by the 1982 herd district, since the herd 
district laws required that livestock be kept off of Canyon County's roads. Piercy's insurer 
acknowledged the existence and validity of the 1982 herd district when the insurer paid for 
damage to two vehicles as a result of Piercy's livestock escaping their pasture (inside of 
the 1982 herd district) in a 2001 incident. It is simply wrong and unfair, and Piercy is 
estopped from contending (after he has severely injured two children) that the 1982 
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ordinance is invalid. 
Finally, the evidence adduced at the October 2008 bench trial was inadequate to 
overcome the statutory presumption that the 1982 herd district is valid. 
Guzman therefore requests that Piercy's motion for summary judgment be 
denied. 
Because the Judge currently assigned to this case is unfamiliar with the proceedings 
to date in this case, and because oral argument will assist the Court in deciding Piercy's 
motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff Guzman requests oral argument on Piercy's 
summary judgment motion . --
-s ; 
DATED thisc2L day of May, 2009. 
Chasan & Walton, LLC 
Timothy C. Walton, Attorney for 
Plaintiff 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Defendant Jennifer Sutton, by and through her attorneys ofrecord, Elam & Burke, P.A., 
hereby submits this Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Piercy's Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant Piercy's Motion should be 
denied. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This action arises out of a motor vehicle collision with a black bull occurring in the late 
evening hours of Sunday, March 20, 2005. Defendant Jennifer Sutton ("Sutton"), with Plaintiffs 
Erika L. Rivera and Luis J. Guzman (collectively "Plaintiffs") as passengers, was traveling 
northbound on Warnstad Road, just south of Parma, when Sutton's vehicle collided with a black 
bull owned by Defendant Dale W. Piercy ("Piercy"). 
The accident occurred in an area designated as a herd district by the Canyon County 
Commissioners on July 18, 1908. (Affidavit of Joshua S. Evett in Support of Defendant Sutton's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Piercy's Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Evett Aff."),, 3.) The bull involved in the collision was pastured in a field east ofWarnstad 
Road, north of the Boise River bridge and south of Parma upon land designated as a herd district 
in the Order of the Canyon County Commissioners dated December 10, 1982. (Evett Aff.,, 4.) 
Livestock in Canyon County are prohibited from running at large pursuant to Canyon County 
Ordinance 03-05-17, enacted June 4, 2004, Ordinance No. 04-009. 
Rivera and Guzman filed a personal injury action against Piercy and Sutton. Rivera 
ultimately settled her claims. On or about May 1, 2007, Piercy filed a motion for summary 
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judgment seeking a judgment from the Court that the 1908 and 1982 herd district ordinances 
were void on the grounds that the ordinances did not comply with the requirements of Title 25, 
Chapter 24, Idaho Code. Piercy argued that if the 1908 and the 1982 herd district ordinances 
were invalid, the area where the bull was pastured, and the location where the accident occurred 
would be open range, and Piercy would be immune from liability for the accident pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 25-2118. 
On or about October 9, 2007, the District Court entered its Order Denying Defendant 
Percy's [sic] Motion for Summary Judgment, Joining Canyon County, and Holding all Other 
Motions in Abeyance Until the Herd District's Validity is Resolved ("Order Denying Defendant 
Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment"). Therein, the District Court denied Piercy's motion for 
summary judgment on the validity of the herd district ordinances on the grounds that there 
existed genuine issues of material fact. (Order Denying Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 23.) The Court further concluded that the validity of the herd districts was a legal 
issue that required resolution prior to litigating the damages issues. (Id. at 22.) To fully resolve 
the herd district issues, the Court further concluded that it was necessary to join Canyon County 
as a party. (Id. at 22-24.) The Court directed Sutton's counsel "to prepare and serve the 
necessary pleadings to join Canyon County ... as a third-party defendant."1 (Id. at 24.) 
1 Procedurally, joining Canyon County as a third-party defendant was not entirely proper. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a) provides that a defendant may bring in a third-party "who is 
or may be liable to such third-party plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the 
third-party plaintiff." Canyon County was not, nor could it have been liable to Piercy or Sutton 
for Guzman's tort claim. 
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Pursuant to the Order Denying Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment, on 
October 15, 2007, Sutton's counsel filed the Action for Declaratory Judgment, adding Canyon 
County as a defendant and requesting the Court to determine the validity of the herd district 
ordinances. The declaratory action was assigned the same case number as the personal injury 
action. On November 8, 2007, Canyon County filed its Answer of Third Party Defendant 
Canyon County, Idaho. The declaratory judgment action was scheduled for a two day bench trial 
commencing October 8, 2008. 
On August 1, 2008, the Court issued its Order of Clarification, clarifying the Order 
Denying Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment dated October 9, 2007. The Order 
of Clarification addressed whether Piercy would be would be able to argue the retroactive 
application of the July 1, 1983 amendment to Idaho Code§ 25-2402(2), on the 1908 and 1982 
herd districts. The Court concluded that Piercy could not "re-litigate the retroactive reach of the 
1983 amendment to Idaho Code§ 25-2402(2)." (Order of Clarification at 2.) The Court also 
indicated that, if relevant, it would "hear evidence on whether federal or state lands are included 
where the animal in question escaped or where the accident took place." (Id.) 
The parties to the declaratory judgment action were not properly aligned2; therefore, the 
parties stipulated to a realignment. On or about September 11, 2008, counsel for Piercy filed an 
Amended Action for Declaratory Relief seeking a determination that the 1908 and 1982 herd 
district ordinances were invalid and naming Canyon County, Sutton and Guzman as defendants. 
2Although Sutton's counsel filed the original declaratory judgment action by order of the 
trial court, it was actually Piercy that was seeking a determination from the court regarding the 
validity of the herd district. 
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Again, the declaratory judgment action was assigned the same case number. Shortly thereafter, 
Guzman, Sutton and Canyon County each filed an answer to the amended declaratory relief 
action. 
The court trial on the declaratory judgment action occurred as scheduled on October 8, 
2008. On January 21, 2009, the Court issued its Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment in Bifurcated Portion of Trial ("Declaratory Action Judgment"), holding the 1982 herd 
district ordinance invalid. Judge Petrie's Declaratory Action Judgment represents a final 
judgment of all claims asserted in the declaratory judgment action. Judge Petrie has since retired, 
and the case was reassigned to this Court. 
Piercy moves for summary judgment in the personal injury action based upon the Court's 
decision in the declaratory judgment action. The Court should deny Piercy's Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the grounds that (1) the accident occurred in the 1908 herd district, thus 
there is no immunity from liability; and (2) Piercy violated Canyon County ordinance 03-05-17, 
and is negligent per se. Further, Sutton's Motion to Reconsider Judge Petrie's decision in the 
declaratory judgment action, together with her supporting affidavit and memorandum, will be 
filed shortly hereafter. 
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56( c ). The burden is 
on the moving party to prove an absence of genuine issues of material fact. Rouse v. Household 
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Finance Corp., 144 Idaho 68, 170, 156 P.3d 569, 571 (2007), citing Evans v. Griswold, 129 
Idaho 902, 905, 935 P .2d 165, 168 (1997). For purposes of summary judgment, the evidence is 
construed liberally and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, and 
the moving party bears the burden of proving the absence of material fact issues. Sherer v. 
Pocatello School Dist.# 25, 143 Idaho 486, 489, 148 P.3d 1232, 1235 (2006), citing Hei v. 
Holzer, 139 Idaho 81, 84-85, 73 P.3d 94, 97-98 (2003). 
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the 
burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who must then come forward with sufficient evidence to 
create a genuine issue of material fact. Id. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment 
"may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's 
response ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Sherer, 
143 Idaho at 489-490, 148 P.3d at 1235-1236; I.R.C.P. 56(e). Such evidence may consist of 
affidavits or depositions, but "the Court will consider only that material ... which is based upon 
personal knowledge and which would be admissible at trial." Sherer, 143 Idaho at 490, 148 P.3d 
at 1236, citing Harris v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 297-98, 847 P.2d 
1156, 1158-59 (1992). The nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions 
that an issue of material fact exists to withstand summary judgment. Finholt v. Cresto, 143 
Idaho 894, 896-897, 155 P.3d 695, 697 -698 (2007), citing Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 
Idaho 233, 238, 108 P.3d 380, 385 (2005). A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to 
the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of summary 
judgment. Id. at 897, 155 P.3d at 698. 
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Statutory interpretation is a question oflaw. Jones v. Crawforth, _Idaho __.205 P .3d 
660, 664 (2009). When construing a statute, the words used must be given their plain, usual, and 
ordinary meaning, and the statute must be construed as a whole. Id. (citations omitted). 
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. PIERCY IS NOT IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY BECAUSE THE ACCIDENT 
OCCURRED IN A HERD DISTRICT ESTABLISHED IN 1908. 
Even assuming the bull escaped from an open range area, the accident occurred within the 
boundaries of the 1908 herd district, thus Piercy is not automatically immune from liability. 
Under the facts of this case, the Court's focus should be on where the accident occurred, not 
where the bull came from. Piercy improperly relies on Idaho Code § 25-2402(1) to support the 
proposition that Piercy is immune from liability for the accident that occurred in the 1908 herd 
district because Piercy's bull strayed from open range into the herd district, and the district was 
not enclosed by cattle guards to prevent livestock from straying across W amstad Road and into 
the district as required by Idaho Code § 25-2402(1 ). 
Idaho Code§ 25-2402(1), in general, sets forth the requirements for establishing a herd 
district and what must be included in the herd district petition. Idaho Code§ 25-2402(1) was 
originally enacted in 1907, and was subsequently amended in 1919, 1935, 1947, 1953, 1963, 
1983, 1985, 1990 and 1996. The statute in its current form, and as relied on by Piercy, sets forth 
the mandatory petition language, in pertinent part: 
Such petition shall...designate that the herd district shall not apply 
to nor cover livestock. excepting swine. which shall roam. drift or 
stray from open range into the district unless the district shall be 
inclosed by lawful fences and cattle guards as needed in roads 
penetrating the district so as to prevent livestock. excepting swine. 
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from roaming. drifting or straying from open range into the 
district... 
LC.§ 25-2402(1) (emphasis added). 
The underlined language, with the exception of"as needed,"3 was added by the 1963 
amendments. (Evett Aff., if 5.) New legislation is not given retroactive effect "unless expressly 
so declared." I.C. § 73-101. The Idaho Supreme Court held that "a statute is not applied 
retroactively unless there is 'clear legislative intent to that effect."' Gailey v. Jerome County, 
113 Idaho 430, 432, 745 P.2d 1051, 1053 (1987)(citations omitted). In the absence of an express 
declaration oflegislative intent that a statute apply retroactively, it will not be so applied. Id. 
The 1963 legislation amending LC. § 25-2402(1) did not provide for retroactive application. 
Since the statutory language has no retroactive effect, that specific herd district petition 
requirement is inapplicable to the 1908 herd district. 
Additionally, Idaho Code§ 25-2401(1) expressly states, in pertinent part: "[t]he 
provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any herd district or herd ordinance in full force and 
effect prior to January 1. 1990, but shall apply to any modification thereof." By its own terms, 
the herd district laws do not apply to the 1908 herd district, which was in full force in effect prior 
to January 1, 1990. 
At the time the 1908 herd district was established, the 1907 version of Idaho Code § 25-
2402 applied, which provided: 
A majority of the qualified electors of any district, which district 
may include one or more voting precincts or parts of one or more 
voting precincts, may petition the board of county commissioners 
3 The "as needed" language was introduced in the 1990 amendments. (Evett Aff., if 6.) 
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in writing to create such district a "herd district." Such petition 
shall describe the boundaries of the said proposed herd district, and 
shall designate what animals of the species of horses, mules, asses, 
cattle, swine, sheep and goats it is desired to prohibit from running 
at large in such district; and may designate the period of the year 
during which it is desired to prohibit such animals from running at 
large. 
1907 Idaho Sess. Laws 71; see Evett Aff., if 7. 
When the 1908 herd district was created, there was no requirement that the petition 
creating the herd district contain language designating that the herd district would not apply to 
cattle straying from open range into the district unless the herd district was enclosed by lawful 
fences and cattle guards to prevent livestock from straying into the district, thus Piercy cannot 
rely on such petition requirement to create immunity for the accident. Additionally, no statute 
enacted since the creation of the 1908 herd district has required the installation of cattle guards 
between post-1963 and pre-1963 herd districts. 
Further, the Idaho Supreme Court case relied upon by Piercy in support of his argument is 
distinguishable and is not applicable to the facts of this case. See, Easley v. Lee, 111 Idaho 115, 
721P.2d215 (1986). In Easley, the Supreme Court ofldaho addressed a question oflaw of first 
impression: when open range land and a herd district meet at a common border between two 
landowners, which owner, if either, is required to construct a legal fence. Id. at 117, 721 P.2d at 
217. Under the facts of that case, until 1975 both the Easleys' land and the Lees' land was open 
range. Id. at 116, 721 P.2d at 216. In 1975, the Easleys' initiated steps to form a herd district. 
Id. The 1963 version ofldaho Code § 25-2402(1) applied, requiring the petition to contain the 
statutory language designating that the herd district shall not apply to cattle roaming into the 
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district from open range unless the district is inclosed by lawful fences and cattle guards. Id. at 
118, 721 P .2d at 218. That mandatory language was deleted by the county commissioners at the 
Easleys' request. Id. at 116, 721 P.2d at 216. The court first concluded that the statutorily 
required language could not be removed by modification of the county commissioners. Id. at 
118, 721 P.2d at 218. Tne court then held that the 1963 legislative language evidenced the 
legislative intent to exclude liability for livestock roaming into a herd district from open range 
unless the district was properly enclosed. Id. Finally, the court held "that a herd district, and the 
liabilities resulting from the formation of a herd district, do not apply to livestock, excepting 
swine, that roam, drift or stray from open range into the herd district, unless the herd district is 
inclosed by lawful fences and cattle guards in roads penetrating the district." Id. Thus, the 
boundaries of the herd district must be fenced to "fence-out" open range cattle. 
The Easleys' established their herd district in 1975, and the 1963 amendments to Idaho 
Code§ 25-2402(1) clearly applied to the creation of that herd district. The Easley court did not 
address the effect of the 1963 amendments on a herd district created prior to the effective date of 
those amendments. Therefore, the Easley case does not affect the argument that the 1963 
amendments do not have retroactive application, and therefore, do not apply to the 1908 herd 
district. 
Based on the foregoing, the 1908 herd district was not required to place cattle guards on 
W amstad Road to prevent livestock from straying from open range into the district. Only post-
1963 herd districts that border open range areas are required to do so. Therefore, as a matter of 
law, Piercy is not immune from liability under Idaho Code § 25-2402(1 ). 
DEFENDANT SUTTON'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT PIERCY'S 
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 10 
1002 
Since the accident occurred in the 1908 herd district, and not open range, Idaho Code § 
25-2118 does not apply. See Adamson v. Blanchard, 133 Idaho 602, 607, 990 P.2d 1213, 1218 
(1999). Instead, the Court must analyze this case under Idaho Code§ 25-2119, which states: 
"[n]o person owning, or controlling the possession of, any domestic animal lawfully on any 
highway, shall be deemed guilty of negligence by reason thereof." (Emphasis added). LC. § 25-
2119. "Lawfully" has not been defined; however, it has been interpreted to mean when animals 
are on the roadway during the day while attended or driven or trailed down the road. Adamson, 
133 Idaho at 608, 990 P.2d at 1219. On the other hand, an inference exists that an animal owner 
is negligent "in cases of nighttime vehicle collisions with unattended domestic animals running 
at large" on the roadway. Griffith v. Schmidt, 110 Idaho 235, 239, 715 P.2d 905, 909 (1985). 
Such animals are not "lawfully" on the roadway. 
As a matter oflaw, Piercy is not immune from liability under Idaho Code§ 25-2119. See 
Adamson v. Blanchard, 133 Idaho 602, 990 P.2d 1213, (1999). The facts are undisputed. The 
bull that caused the accident was running on the roadway at night unattended. Piercy was not 
driving his bull down the highway at the time of the accident. Based on the foregoing, Idaho 
Code § 25-2119 fails to provide Piercy immunity from negligence liability. 
B. PIERCY'S BULL WAS RUNNING AT LARGE IN VIOLATION OF CANYON 
COUNTY CODE 03-05-17, AND THEREFORE, PIERCY IS NEGLIGENT PER 
SE. 
Canyon County Code § 03-05-17 prohibits animals from running at large and states in 
pertinent part: 
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03-05-17 RUNNING AT LARGE PROHIBITED: 
(2) Livestock: 
A. Prohibited: It shall be unlawful for any person to allow 
livestock which he owns, keeps or harbors to be at large 
upon the roads, streets or alleys of the county or upon any 
premises other than his own. 
(4) Animals At Large: It shall be unlawful for any animal(s) (except felines, 
domestic or feral), owned or possessed by an individual to be at large upon the 
roads, streets or alleys of the county or any public place of the county or upon any 
premises other than his own ... 
The ordinance regulates animals running at large in both herd districts and open range 
areas. The ordinance is a valid exercise of Canyon County's police power, and is enforceable. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "in the absence of a state legislative enactment 
clearly indicating that livestock must be free to roam the lands of Idaho uninhibited by the 
ownership or character of the lands, counties and municipalities may validly exercise their police 
powers to prohibit such free roaming livestock." Benewah County Cattlemen's Ass'n, Inc. v. 
Board of County Com'rs of Benewah County, 105 Idaho 209, 214, 668 P.2d 85, 90 (1983). In 
Benewah County, a cattlemen's association sought declaratory and injunctive relief against 
enforcement by the board of county commissioners of an ordinance prohibiting livestock from 
running at large in open range areas. Id. at 209, 668 P.2d at 85. The county passed an ordinance 
in 1977 to prohibit livestock from running at large. Id at 211, 668 P.2d at 87. The court 
concluded that the purpose and effect of the ordinance was different from the purpose and effect 
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of the herd district statutes.4 Id. at 214, 668 P .2d at 90. Ultimately, the Benewah court held that 
the ordinance was a valid exercise of the county's police power. Id. at 214, 668 P.2d at 90. 
Canyon County validly exercised its police power in enacting Canyon County ordinance 
03-05-17 prohibiting livestock from running at large. As a matter oflaw, Piercy violated the 
County ordinance by allowing his bull to run at large and is therefore, negligent per se. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Defendant Sutton respectfully requests the Court deny Piercy' s Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the grounds that as a matter oflaw Piercy was not immune from liability 
under Idaho Code§§ 25-2402(1) and 25-2118, and that Piercy is negligent per se pursuant to his 
violation of Canyon County ordinance 03-05-17. 
DATED this 1 l~'t- day of May, 2009. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By:_D.........._i_~-~------
Joshua S. Evett, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4The court did not analyze whether the ordinance conflicted with Idaho Code§ 25-2119, 
however, the ordinance imposes criminal liability while Idaho Code § 25-2119 addresses 
immunity for negligence. Therefore, the two statutes do not conflict. 
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Carlton R. Ericson 
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251 East Front Street, Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
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Attorneys for Defendant Jennifer Sutton 
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Case No. CV05-4848 
DEFENDANT JENNIFER SUTTON'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
COMES NOW Defendant Jennifer Sutton ("Sutton"), by and through her attorneys of 
record, Elam & Burke, P.A., and pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
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Procedure, hereby moves this Court to reconsider the Order on Motion to Reconsider dated April 
30, 2009, and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in Bifurcated Portion of 
Trial, dated January 21, 2009, on the grounds and for the reasons that the same are contrary to 
law and the facts of this case as set forth more fully in Sutton's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Reconsider, filed concurrently herewith. 
This motion is made and based upon the files and records in this action, together with the 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant Jennifer Sutton's Motion for Reconsideration and the 
Affidavit of Joshua S. Evett filed concurrently herewith. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED. 
DATED this~~ day of July 2009. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By: H \)\)( &Y~ 
Joshua S. Evett, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant 
DEFENDANT JENNIFER SUTTON'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION- 2 
1008 
-#' ,J • ~ • 
) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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indicated below: 
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P.O. Box 1069 
Boise, ID 83701-1069 
Stephen E. Blackbum 
Blackburn Law, P.C. 
660 East Franklin Road, Suite 220 
Meridian, ID 83642 
Ryan B. Peck 
Saetrum Law Offices 
P.O. Box 7425 
Boise, ID 83707 
John T. Bujak 
Carlton R. Ericson 
Canyon County Prosecutor 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
~U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
__ Overnight Mail 
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Joshua S. Evett ISB #5587 
Meghan E. Sullivan ISB #7038 
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Boise, Idaho 83701 
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jse@elamburke.com 
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Attorneys for Defendant Jennifer Sutton 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS. 
County of Ada ) 
Joshua S. Evett, having first been duly sworn, upon his oath deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am over the age of 18 years and make this affidavit of my own personal 
knowledge. I am one of the attorneys for Defendant Jennifer Sutton ("Defendant") in the above-
captioned case. 
2. I make this affidavit based on knowledge of the facts in this case, and in support 
of the Defendant Jennifer Sutton's Motion for Reconsideration, filed concurrently herewith. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Order of the Canyon 
County Commissioner's dated July 18, 1908, designating the area where the accident occurred as 
a herd district. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the December 10, 1982, 
Order Establishing Herd District issued by the Board of the Canyon County Commissioners. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit Care true and correct copies of excerpts from the 
Bench Trial, dated October 8, 2008 {"Trial Transcript"), before the Honorable Gordon W. Petrie: 
113:7-114:6, 167:5-168:1, and 116:10-12. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of the December 2, 1982, 
resolution of the Board of the Canyon County Commissioners establishing the 1982 herd district. 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of the notice published in 
the Idaho Press Tribune on December 20, 1982. 
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8. Attached hereto as Exhibit F are true and correct copies of excerpts from the 
deposition of E.G. Johnson ("Johnson Depo."), dated October 6, 2008: 15:14-15, see also 15:4-
16:5. 
9. Attached hereto as Exhibit Gare true and correct copies of excerpts from the 
deposition of Dale W. Piercy ("Piercy Depo."), dated May 10, 2006: 5:16-23, 41:4-7 and 44:17-
45:4. 
10. Attached hereto as Exhibit His a true and correct copy of the herd district map 
obtained from Canyon County. 
11. Attached hereto as Exhibit I are true and correct copies of excerpts from the 
deposition of Monica Reeves ("Reeves Depo."), dated July 7, 2008: 16:16-17:3. 
12. Attached hereto as Exhibit J are true and correct copies of excerpts from 
the deposition of Glen Koch ("Koch Depo."), dated August 25, 2008:19:23-20:10, 20:11-17, 
21:18-22:1, 23:6-10, 25: 12-20, 26:2-25, 27:14-22, 28:10-22, 33:5-14, 33:15-34:4, see also, 36:5-
16. 
13. Attached hereto as Exhibit Kare true and correct copies of excerpts from the 
deposition of Bill A. Staker ("Staker Depo."), September 22, 2008: 14:22-15:6, 15: 12-16, 17: 11-
16, 18:6-19:17, 20:6-21 :8 and 23:11-23. 
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DATED this ) 6 Jk-day of July 2009 
Joshua S. Evett 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this3il. day of July 2009. 
,,, ........ ,,, 
,..-.''" ~ PAPp ''''« 
i:-'" o~ ......... ~.s- "·~ 
.:-~,- .. ' 
f ~l o:t~RY ) \ 
::tie:~ : : • ~ J...•' I'. : . . ., ~ . 
: \ ~ 0: 
\ •._ puf," .,f ~,~ 
~ ... •• A'tl:' ,,,. .s- •••• ,... 'v__A 
"•,,., l' A TE o't ,.,,.,.-
'''''""'''''' 
~Lfiw:n£J 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Meridian 
Commission expires: 01-10-2012 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of July 2009, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Timothy C. Walton 
Chasan & Walton, LLC 
P.O. Box 1069 
Boise, ID 83701-1069 
Stephen E. Blackburn 
Blackbum Law, P.C. 
660 East Franklin Road, Suite 220 
Meridian, ID 83642 
RyanB. Peck 
Saetrum Law Offices 
P.O. Box 7425 
Boise, ID 83707 
John T. Bujak 
Carlton R. Ericson 
Canyon County Deputy Prosecutor 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
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•Xtfile is COHDO DE 31 05 f 
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• 
SialO ol' Idllha } 
SI>. 
County or Can~n . . . . 
t beictry certify 1hDI the roreso1ng ·~ ll> 
a true and com:t't cow of the original as the 
snme .cppcllfS in 1his offioe. o> ORDER ESTABLISHING HERD DISTRICT 
DATED /-I? - 0 0 
Willlam H. HUM. Clctlt of the District Collrt 
/')nd~l i ~t;: !ly~ 
The Board has aQain reviewed th~ coMplexity o¥'the Herd 
DisTrict Boondarias throughout th~ County and has deterMined, 
by reaolution, th~T the TiMe has coM& to siMpli'y and uni¥y 
tt-1~ status of Herd Di$tri..:-ts in Canyon County. :rn Maki119 thi<S 




A survey Map attached hereto, prepared by the Planning and 
Zoning AdMinistr~tor designates th~ Three s~~ll areas within the 
County which raMain open range. 
Th~t Map $hows that over 95X Q~ the l~nd within the County is 
now in Herd District status. 
Through the years confusion has existed because o9 overlapping 
boundar~ lines and inde¥inite District boundary descriptions. 
canyon County has reached the st4ge o? urb~n developMent which 
destroys ~he original purpose •nd use¥ulnass ol the concept of 
open range. 
The Mobility of our citi~ens has increased to the point at which 
it becoMes necessary that Herd District st~tus exist throughout 
the County, Therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the Board of Canyon County CoMMissioners 
on this -/..t2. day of Decel"lber, 1982, that <i Herd Dis'tr:i.ct be estab-
li~hed in the chrae reMaining open range are~s in Canyon County ~s 
shown on the attached suryey MaP (~arked in bl~ck> 1 to the end 
that the entire l~nd ~rea of Canyon County be placed in Herd District 
S1'a"i:'U$, 
~~-~--= , Ccirlos IHedso~ 
:::~~~~~- ·~--· --Del fioi;) za ~.:'--~2°:) 
11eMbel" 
£.--::: / ) ,,;;/ £ 
Deputy 
~~---,.U~-~-----· 
Glc~nri o. Koch EXHIBITB 
. M ' M<~Mb«-H'" 























IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 




vs. ) Case No. CVOS-4848 
) 
DALE PIERCY, individually, ) 












CANYON COUNTY, LUIS GUZMAN, ) 
individually and JENNIFER ) 





October 8, 2008 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE GORDON W. PETRIE 
REPORTED BY: 
YVONNE L. HYDE GIER, C.S.R. #73, R.P.R. 
EXHIBITC 
1020 
MR. SAETRUM: I apologi 
"10....,..'u1·1: M'r-: Piercy, dci you recognize 
ral ai-ea represented on the Exhibit 2? 
a. The field from which the bull escaped, where is 
that located at? 
A. It is on Longstead Road, it would be north of 
Boise River, and east next to the bridge. 
a. Can you find that area on that map? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you show that area to the judge, please? 
THE COURT: This is what I am going to have you 
do. I am going to have you put this little sticky above 
it. And then on the sticky, I am going to have you 
write an arrow that stops at about the location, just 
for my reference. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
THE COURT: No. Put the actual sticky portion, 
use it up-side down, because I want the arrow coming 
from down above. 
THE WITNESS: (Witness complied.) 
THE COURT: Now, hold that up so everyone else 
can see, please. 
113 
MR. SAARI: Can I see, sir? 
THE WITNESS: (Witness complied.) 
MR. SAETRUM: Mr. Piercy, thank you. That's all 
the question$ I have for you. 
THE WITNESS : Thank you. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
QUESTIONS BY MR. SAARI: 
a. Sir, with regard to joint Exhibit 2, the map 
you just marked, it is true, is it not, that there 
cattle on both sides of the Boise River off of. ongstead 
Road? 
A. You have to be more sj:>eci c --
MR. SAETRUM: Wait, w 1t. Could counsel provide 
pasture you con 
2 how long? 
·bn some property you have owned for 
3 A. Give or take a year i.n '94. 
4 Q. At the time when the incident occurred involvin 
5 the bull and involving the car - and involving the 
6 
7 I believe it was 2005, at that particular time, 
e question is, you spoke of your bull being pa ured on 
9 the north side of the Boise River off of L gstead Road, 
10 my question is, were there also cattle at were on the 
11 south side of the Boise River on Lo stead Road right by 





A. On the south side, e t, west? 
Q. It would be west, si . 
MR. SAETRUM: Y. ur Honor, I am going to object 
17 anybody or cattle o ned by Mr. Piercy? 





23 Riv r, at the time this incident occurred in 2005, was 
at bull pastured off of Longstead Road, south of the 
Boise River, west of Longstead Road? 
115 
THE COURT: You are talking about the bull in 
2 question? 
3 MR. SAARI: The bull in question. 
4 THE WITNESS: No. 
s MR. SAARI: I have no further questions. 
6 THE COURT: Mr. Walton . 
7 
8 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
9 QUESTIONS BY MR. WALTON: 
10 Q. You have been a rancher, Mr. 
11 County for over 30 years; right? 
12 A. Correct. 
13 
14 ranching in this litigation, 
15 A. I do not know. 
a time frame? This is very ague. Are we talking 1982, 16 
or are we talking now? 
THE COURT: right. Please rephrase. 
MR. SAARI· Yes. 
Q. RI: With regard to -- in 1982, on 
December 2 , 1982, at that particular time, you did 
e property at which you live at now; is that 
That's correct. 
And the bull you are talking about is in a 
114 
17 now. 
18 May I approach? 






Q. . WALTON: I'm showing you, these are 
responses, Mr. Piercy, filed by your counsel 
ersonal injury case. I am going to show you 
discovery response. 
It says, Dale Piercy is an expert in the areas of 
farming and ranching in Canyon County, Idaho. 
116 
LUIS J. GUZMAN vs. DALE PIERCY 
j.~~~--'~~'--~~...-~~~~~~~--1 
reflect that the two discussed tha "'e was no open \ 1 
range where the accident occurred. 
Mr. Piercy testified today that the accident 
occurred in the white area. 
Mr. Piercy has alleged in this suit that he 
knew that that was herd district. 
That is not true if he and Mr. Axis ha 
discussion in 2001 that is documented in 
company's notes. 
Moreover, the record will refl 
Mr. Axis's deposition that Mr. Pie y was paid money by 
his insurance company for his 
insurance company paid for 
If it was open ran , Mr. Piercy's cattle would 




then it was closed range. It was en range, 
any would have paid because of 
5 THE COURT: See, the dynamic changed, the rules 
6 changed, and I think that changes the defense even if I 
7 could get to the point where taking two-grand is 
8 unconscionable, because this is not open range. 
9 First of all, it requires this court to make the 
10 leap - and maybe the evidence shows, I don't know - that 
11 Mr. Piercy knows the difference and would believe but 
12 for the type of coverage he had that if this were -- if 
13 this were open range, I don't get paid. 
14 So that's a long way of saying, I can't imagine 
15 putting every negative inference I can on a settlement 
16 that Mr. Piercy accepted in 2001, that that rises to the 
17 level of estoppel or laches. I just don't find the kind 
e a stance that it was herd district. 18 of thing that was going on in the other cases that the 
want to say a thousand dollars or more, 19 court discussed; particularly, since we had that hybrid 
ousand and 2000 from his insurance company 20 closed range versus open range versus herd district 
HE COURT: Whether he accepts it from his herd 
ict -- or his insurance company or someone else's 
surance company, isn't the result the same? 
MR. WALTON: No, because he acknowledged the 
165 
existence of the herd district by taking the money from 
his insurance company. He has accepted the existence 
the herd district. He had a conversation in which it 
was acknowledged that there was no open range. 
MR. SAETRUM: 
issue? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. SAETRUM: When a person bu 
coverage, it is a Section 1 coverage. I rs just like 
buying coverage on your bicycle if i 
insurance company - if someone 
will pay you for the loss of you 
stroys your bicycle -
icycle. They will 
killed through an acciden It is a Section 1 coverage. 
anything as to where the 
It is a matter of whether or 
n accident. So that is irrelevant 
t Mr. Axis would say, counsel, and I 
21 business going on during that period of time. 
22 So, Mr. Evett, I see this as essentially a 
23 simHar issue, whether or not there was a herd district, 
24 a valid herd district at the time of the accident. 
25 So if it's a motion to try'the other part -
167 
denied. Anything else? 
3 rebuttal witness. 
4 THE COURT: The witness is short? 
5 MR. SAETRUM: 
G witness, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: You do? 
8 MR. SAETRUM: Yes. 
9 THE COURT: All right. 
10 MR. WALTON: If I may? 
11 
12 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. WALTON: In talking 
13 the room, he feels strongly th 
14 
15 might include the whole ounty. 





our language, that you determined it was not 21 
nge. There is nothing in his report saying it is 22 , candidly, if what we are searching for is the 
23 tru , it ought to be heard, and so I would request 
se came out - I was wrong - it came out in January of rmission to re-open and put him on for brief testimony 
last year. 
1022 
MR. SAETRUM: I apologi 
THE COURT: And it doesn't take much. The 
witness is being handed joint 2. 
Q. BY MR. SAETRUM: Mr. Piercy, do you recogniz 
that general area represented on the Exhibit 2? 
A. Yes. 
a. The field from which the bull escaped, 
that located at? 
A. It is on Longstead Road, it wo d be north of 
Boise River, and east next to the b dge. 
Q. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you show that a a to the judge, please? 
THE COURT: This is hat I am going to have you 
THE WITNESS: (Witness complied.) 
THE COURT: Now, hold that up so everyone else 
113 
MR. SAARI: Can I see, Sir? 
THE WITNESS: (Witness complied.) 
MR. SAETRUM: Mr. Piercy, thank you. 
the questions I have for you. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Saari? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
QUESTIONS BY MR. SAARI : 
cattle on both sides of the Boise 
Road? 
pasture you con ) on some property you have owned for 
2 how long? 
3 A. Give or take a year in '94. 
4 Q. At the time when the incident occurred involvi 
5 the bull and involving the car - and involving the 
6 reason why we are here today - at that particular; 
7 I believe it was 2005, at that particular time, 
a question is, you spoke of your bull being p 
9 the north side of the Boise River off of L gstea:J Road, 
10 my question is, were there also cattle 
11 south side of the Boise River on Lo stead Road right by 




A. On the south side, e st, west? 
Q. It would be west, si . 
MR. SAETRUM: Y. ur Honor, I am going to object 
16 that it is vague. Are e talking about cattle owned by 
17 anybody or cattle o ned by Mr. Piercy? 





23 Riv r, at the time this incident occurred In 2005, was 
at bull pastured off of Longstead Road, south of the 
Boise River, west of Longstead Road? 
115 
THE COURT: You are talking about the bull in 
2 question? 
3 MR. SAARI: The bull in question. 




10 Q. You have been a rancher, Mr. Piercy, in Canyon 
11 County for over 30 years; right? 
12 A. Correct. 
13 Q. You have been listed as an expert witness on 
14 ranching in this litigation, haven't you? 
ait, wait. Could counsel provide 15 A. I do not know. 
a time frame? This · very vague. Are we talking 1982, 
or are we talking ow? 
THE COU T: All right. Please rephrase. 
MR.S 
. SAARI: With regard to -- in 1982, on 
the property at which you. live at now; is that 
That's correct. 
Q . And the bull you are talking about is in a 
114 





21 r. Piercy, filed by your counsel 
22 in the personal · Jury case. I am going to show you 
23 that disco 





SEVENTEENTH DAY OF NOVEMBER TERM, A.D., 1982 
CALDWELL, IDAHO DECEMBER 2, 1982 
CERTIFICATE OF RESIDENCY APPROVED 
The Board of Commissioners approved a Certificate of 
Residency for Marcedalin Torres to receive tuition aid to 
attend College of Southern Idaho. 
RESOLUTION PASSED REGARDING HERD DISTRICTS IN CANYON COUNTY 
The following Resolution was considered and adopted by the 
Canyon County Board of Commissioners on the 2nd day of 
December, 1982: Q.22.n. motion of Commissioner Hobza and the 
second by Commissioner Bledsoe the Board resolves as 
follows: That because of the confusion that exists due to 
the over-lapping lines of herd districts and open range and 
because over ninety-five (95%) percent of the area of Canyon 
County is already designated a herd district the Board will 
issue an order designating all of Canyon County to be herd 
district as of December 14, 1982. Motion Carried 
Unanimously. 
~ BEER AND WINE LICENSE APPROYED 
The Board of Commissioners granted a retail license to 
Intermountain Food Stores, Inc. dba M&W Market #11, 120 
Holly, Nampa, Idaho to sell beer and wine. 
BEER LICENSE APPROVED 
The Board of Commissioners granted a retail license to John 
L. O'Very dba El Charro Mini Mart, 1701 1st Street North, 








IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
LUIS J. GUZMAN, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Case No. CV05-4848 
DALE PIERCY, individually, and 
JENNIFER SUTTON, individually, 
Defendants. 
CANYON COUNTY 
Third Party Defendant. 
DEPOSITION OF E.G. JOHNSON 
OCTOBER 6, 2008 
REPORTED BY: 
MARLENE "MOLLY" WARD, CSR No. 704, RPR 
Notary Public 
EXHIBITF 
(208) 345-9611 M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. ( 2 0 8 ) 3 4 5 - 8 8 0 0 ( fax) 
1029 
1 · changed there? 
2 A. Relative to? 
3 Q. Whether or not 
4 A. Yeah. Yeah. I've been 
5 don't remember exactly when, aware 
6 that the -- with the open was 
7 removed and it was a 
8 Q. Do any specific time frame 
9 when you 
11 there. I know in my deposition here it 
and '83. I'm not positive that that 
14 you know. But I've been aware of it for at least 
15 the last 12 to 15 years that it's been -- it was 
1 7 status, so 
18 Q. And in 
19 MR. WALTON: You said "in 
20 deposition;" you meant "in 
: 't. 
21 THE WITNESS :. 
22 MR. 
24 PECK: Let's describe it 
MR. WALTON: Got you. 
(208) 345-9611 (208) 345-8800 (fax) 
1 · changed there? 
2 
4 A. Yeah. Yeah. I've been aware and I 
5 don't remember exactly when, but I've been aware 
6 that the -- with the open range status was 
7 removed and it was a herd district. 
8 Q. Do you recall any specific time frame 
9 when you became aware of that? 
10 A. Well, you know, it was some time after 
11 we moved there. I know in my deposition here it 
12 says '82 and '83. I'm not positive that that 
13 time window fits with -- within when I knew that, 
14 you know. But I've been aware of it for at least 
15 the last 12 to 15 years that it's been -- it was 
16 a herd district; we were no longer in open range 
17 status, so ... 
18 Q. And in 
19 MR. WALTON: You said "in my 
20 deposition;" you meant "in my affidavit"? 
21 THE WITNESS: Or yeah. 
22 MR. PECK: Yeah. 
23 THE WITNESS: The affidavit, I mean. 
24 MR. PECK: Let's describe it 
25 MR. WALTON: Got you. 
(208} 345-9611 M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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Page 16 
1 MR. PECK: -- describe it specifically. 
2 THE WITNESS: I hadn't looked at that 
3 until this morning and when I re-read that, I'm 
4 not -- you know, I'm not sure that window fits, 
5 is what I'm saying, is when I became aware of it. 
7 Exhibit No. 1, right, your affidavit? 
8 A. Yeah, that's correct. 
9 Q. Okay. Do you recall how it was you 
10 came to be aware of this change? 
11 A. No, I don't. You know, 
12 been in a conversation, you know. 
13 I've tried to search my memory a lot 
14 know. We have a lot of - - you like a lot 
17 this, and all the regula ory functions that we 
18 deal with. And so know, it could even 
19 be -- It could have been, you 
20 know, the fact that we -- we 
21 graze on corn stocks in the winter 
22 and, have been a conversation with my son, 
23 because a lot of those areas are 
24 fenced, you know; we put up temporary fencing 
for those cattle. And so the actual time frame I 
(208) 345-9611 M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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· IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
ERIKA L. RIVERA, by and through 
LOREE RIVERA her mother and natural 








vs. ) No. CVOS-4848 
} 
DALE W. PIERCY, individually, and 







DEPOSITION OF DALE W. PIERCY 
MAY 10, 2006 
REPORTED BY: 
DEANN MORRIS, CSR No. 747, RPR 
Notary Public 
(208) 345-9611 M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
1034 
EXHIBITG 
(208) 345-8800 (fax) 
1 DALE W. PIERCY, 
2 first duly sworn to tell the truth relating to 
3 cause, testified as follows: 
4 EXAMINATION 
5 QUESTIONS BY MR. WALTON: 
6 Q. Would you state for the record, 
7 please. 
8 A. Dave Piercy. 
9 Q. And what's our age, Mr. Piercy? 
10 A. 57. 
11 
12 Parma, Idaho. 
13 Give me a little bit of -- what do you do? Let 
ask you that first. 
16 Q. And how long have you been a farmer and a 
17 rancher? 
18 A. Since I was probably seven years old, so 50 
19 years. 
20 Q. Where have you farmed and ranched? 
21 A. Parma area. 
22 Q. All your life? 
23 A. Yes. 
25 A. Yes. 
(208) 345-9611 M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. (208) 345-8800 (fax) 
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4 Q. It's accurate to say 1 is it not 1 that you've 
5 been a cattleman in Canyon County for -- what did you 
6 tell me -- 50 years; right? 
7 A. Yes. 
9 livestock are pastured in canyon County are lands which 
10 are enclosed by fences; correct? 
11 MS. MEIKLE: Objection to the 
12 and calls for a legal conclusion. 
13 Counsel 1 if you're asking him Canyon 
14 County 1 you're asking for a legal concl And I'm 
15 going to object --
16 MR. WALTON: Go ahead. it. 
17 MS . MEIKLE: and not to respond. 
22 You're free to object. 
23 MEIKLE: It calls for a legal conclusion. 
24 MR. WALTON: It actually doesn't. It's a factual 
question. 
(208) 345-9611 M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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1 · this question. 
2 All the cattle in Canyon County are fenced in, 
3 aren't they? 
4 MS. MEIKLE: Objection to the form e question. 
5 THE WITNESS: Should I answer? 
6 MS. MEIKLE: Do you know the 
7 question? 




12 Q. when you say "not fenced in," you mean 
13 ere's sometimes rivers that keep the cattle in; 
14 
A. Yes. 
17 You're not aware of any cattle in Canyon County 
18 that roam free, are you? 
19 MS. MEIKLE: Objection to the form of the question. 
20 THE WITNESS: I don't understand what you mean by 
21 "roam free." Where? 
22 Q. (BY MR. WALTON): Outside of boundaries such as 
23 fences, rivers, or natural barriers that contain the 
24 livestock. 
25 MS. MEIKLE: Objection to the form of the question. 
(208) 345-9611 M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. (208) 345-8800 (fax) 
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1 You can answer if you understand. 
2 THE WITNESS: No. 
3 Q. (BY MR. WALTON): What do you mean 11 no 11 ? 
4 A. Everything is contained. 
6 MR. EVETT: Would this be a good time to take a 
7 break? 
8 MS. MEIKLE: I'd like to take one. 
9 MR. WALTON: Fine by me. 
10 (Recess taken.) 
11 MR. WALTON: Let's go on the record. 
12 Would you mark that as an exhibit me. 
13 (Exhibit 8 marked.) 
14 Q. (BY MR. WALTON): Mr. 
15 Exhibit 8. On Exhibit 8 ther a road going down the 
16 middle of the photograph at's colored in orange that 
17 is Wamstad Road; corre 
18 A. Correct. 
19 Q. And a road colored in yellow that 
20 is Lee Lane; 
21 A. 
And you have been kind enough to color in for 
lands both to the east and to the west of 
Road and north of the Boise River; correct? 
Correct. 
(208) 345-9611 M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
LUIS J. GUZMAN, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, and 
JENNIFER SUTTON, individually, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV05-4848 
) 
CANYON COUNTY 
Third Party Defendant. ) 
REPORTED BY: 
) 
DEPOSITION OF MONICA N. REEVES 
JULY 7, 2008 
MICHAEL S. LUCERO, CSR No. 255, RPR 
Notary Public 
(208) 345-9611 M & M COURT RE1cif4~G SERVICE, INC. 
EXHIBIT I 
(208) 345-8800 (fax) 
1 A. Yes. I started with Canyon county in 
2 1988 in another department, and then I came to 
3 the commissioners' office in 1989. 
4 
5 
Q. And since the time 
with the commissioners' office, 
6 any change in how you 
7 commissioner files? 







today, did you review any 
11 files? 
12 The only file I have for the herd 
13 is this document that I brought here, 
order establishing a herd district. 
16 A. And this was a strange -- a strange 
17 file, if you will, because when I came to the 
18 off ice the lady who trained me had a copy of this 
19 order. It was attached to the wall because, as I 
20 was told, once a year you'd get a call from 
21 someone saying, "I want to know what section of 
22 Canyon County is a herd district." 
23 And I was told 11 All of Canyon County is 
24 a herd district, and if they want to see the 
25 documentation, give them this" (indicating). And 
(208) 345-9611 M & M COURT RE1'Cr43NG SERVICE, INC. (208) 345-8800 (fax) 
1 ·that's this is all I've ever been able to 
2 locate in our office, is this document, so it's 
3 been hanging on our wall for many, many years. 
5 record, let's go ahead and have that packet of 
6 documents there designated as Exhibit A to your 
7 deposition. 
8 (Exhibit A is marked.) 
9 Q. (BY MR. PECK) Now, with regards to 
10 Exhibit A, that first page, this is the one hat 
11 you had just mentioned was evidently han ng 





Q. And it's just on a 
A. When I started in 
board or --
office, the 
16 switchboard was located So there was a 
17 desk that had the -- e switchboard for the 
18 entire courthouse, there were a number of 
19 things, telepho e numbers for various department 





was about it. It was 
pinne to wall. 
Q. And to make sure I understand it, it 
just this first page; is that correct? 
A. I believe the -- oh. I want to say 
Page 17 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
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DALE PIERCY, individually, and Case No. CVOS-4848 
JENNIFER SUTTON, individually, 
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CANYON COUNTY 
Third Party Defendant. 
DEPOSITION OF GLENN KOCH 
AUGUST 25, 2008 
REPORTED BY: 
MONICA M. ARCHULETA, CSR NO. 471 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
EXHIBIT J 
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1 some of the Idaho Code? 
2 A. A portion of the Idaho Code. 
3 Q. And on the front page in the 
4 there it says "Republished." 
5 What is the year on there? 
6 A. 1949. 
7 Q. So let's turn 
8 There on second page we And 
9 underneath that it says, 11 Districts." 
10 Do you see 
11 A. The 
12 Q. The 
13 
14 Q. you see in the middle where it says, 
15 - Herd Districts"? 
16 Yes. 
17 Q. Have you had a chance to review that 
18 
19 A. Just briefly. 
20 Q. And does that appear to be the statutes 
governing creation of herd districts? 
23 Q. Now, as part of this litigation -- I 
24 guess the reason why we are talking with you 
25 today is because the Canyon County Conunissioners 
(208) 345-9611 M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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in 1982 passed an ordinance that purportedly 
establishes a herd district. 
Is that your understanding? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you currently have a memory of that 
event? 
A. I'm sorry, I really don't. 
Q. Do you recall that that is something 
that you did? 
A. I remember there was a discussion. 
Page 20 
this do you recall looking over the Idaho Code in 
preparing to do that herd district? 
A. I do not. 
MR. WALTON: Does that mean 
Or does that mean you don't 
THE WITNESS: I 





Idaho Code 25-2401 
under the "Herd Districts" caption? 
A. "The board of county commissioners of 
each county in the state shall have power to 
create herd districts within such county as 
M & M COURT RE1'lf48NG SERVICE, INC. (208) 345-8800 (fax) 
1 in 1982 passed an ordinance that 
2 establishes a herd district. 
3 Is that 
4 A. Yes. 
5 
6 event? 
7 I'm sorry, I really don't. 
8 Q. Do you recall that that is something 
that you did? 
11 Q. Now, when there was a discussion about 
12 this do you recall looking over the Idaho Code in 
13 preparing to do that herd district? 
14 A. I do not. 
15 MR. WALTON: Does that mean you didn't? 
16 Or does that mean you don't recall? 
17 THE WITNESS: I don't recall. 
19 just don't remember? 
20 A. I don't remember. 
21 Q. Why don't you 
22 there erd Districts" caption? 
23 A. of county commissioners of 
24 in the state shall have power to 
25 create herd districts within such county as 
(208) 345-9611 M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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hereinafter provided; and when such district is 
so created the provisions of this chapter 
apply and be enforceable therein." 
Q. As you look at 
remember -- does anything about 
you 
familiar? I mean, does that at all after 
reading through the statu help you remember 




Q. the next section, 25-2402, it 
petition for district. And it says, 
of the landowners in any area or 
described by metes and bounds not 
including open range and who are also resident 
in, and qualified electors of, the State of Idaho 
may petition the board of county commissioners in 
Now, in 1982, in conjunction with what 
I'm going to call the '82 ordinance, do you 
recall there being a petition that was submitted 
to create a herd district? 
A. I'm sorry, I do not recall that. 
MR. WALTON: Same question. Does that 
mean that you don't know if there was or wasn't a 
petition? Is that what you are saying? 

























THE WITNESS: That's what I'm saying. 
(Exhibit 2 marked.) 
Q. (BY MR. PECK) I have handed you what I 
have marked as Exhibit No. 2. Now, in 
Exhibit 2, down there towards the 
is a caption "Canyon County Board 
Commissioners Public Hearing Minutes." 
just represent that this is from Boo 
came out of the recorder's office 
I'll 
This 
minutes that are kept there. 
just read that for me. 
yourself. That section 
if you could 





one I want. 
second. That is not the 
I apologize. This is the 
one I 
(Exhibit 3 marked.) 
(BY MR. PECK) We have marked that as 
This is the same thing. These are 
And I guess the date up there is 
December 2, 1982. Do you see that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then we have in the middle that 
M & M COURT RE1(f51NG SERVICE, INC. (208) 345-8800 (fax) 
23 
1 says, "Resolution passed regardin._,__~ ....... 
2 in Canyon County." read that 
3 And let me know when you 
4 
6 Q. Now, in reading through those minutes 
7 do you recall at all having a meeting on 
8 December 2, 1982 regarding this resolution that 
9 Commissioner Hobza made? 
10 A. No. 
12 regarding having confusion existing due to the 
13 overlapping lines of the herd districts in 
14 County? 
15 A. Way back in the back of my 
16 recall that there was an issue 
17 district. And that a was not -- a 
18 portion of as not in the herd 
19 district. about the extent of what I 
20 remember. 
21 Q. w, I take it that you remember 
22 is that correct? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Just solely based on what it says here 
in the minutes it sounds as if this was his 
(208) 345-9611 M & M COURT REPO~TING SERVICE, INC. 
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1 by posting notices thereof in three 
2 places in the proposed herd district, 
3 publication for two weeks previous 
4 hearing in a newspaper the county 
5 nearest the proposed 
6 read that language would it 
7 be on your prior testimony, that 
8 to notice of this hearing for a herd 
9 would be the job of the 
secretaries to put that notice in the paper? 
12 Q. And do you recall with regards to the 
13 herd district discussions that you have had that 
14 there was a -- whether or not there was a notice 
15 published for the hearing on the herd district 
16 ordinance? 
17 A. No, I do not recall anything. 
18 MR. WALTON: Again, you don't recall if 
19 one was or was not? 
20 THE WITNESS: Right. 
22 Q. (BY MR. PECK) Now, 
23 No. 3 in the in 
24 don't see any language 
whether or not a petition was 
(208) 345-9611 (208) 345-8800 (fax) M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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2 Would it be your typical practice in 
3 this type of meeting to have included in the 
4 minutes that a published notice had been sent 
5 out? 
6 MR. SAARI: Objection. Lack of 
7 foundation. 
8 MR. WALTON: Join. I believe he has 
9 testified the secretaries did that for him. 
10 Q. {BY MR. PECK) You can go ahead and 
11 answer the question. 
12 A. State the question again. 
13 Q. Let me have the court reporter read it 
14 back. 
15 {Record read. ) 
16 THE WITNESS: I guess I can't answer 
17 that. I just don't recall one way or the other. 
18 Whether those were attached or whether they 
19 weren't. 
20 Q. {BY MR. PECK) So let me make sure I 
21 understand you. You are not sure whether or not 
22 it was your typical practice to include that in 
23 the minutes or not? Or have that included in the 
24 minutes? 
25 A. That's correct. 
(208) 345-9611 M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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1 {Exhibit 4 marked.) 
2 Q. {BY MR. PECK) Mr. Koch, 
3 recognize Exhibit No. 4? 
4 A. It's an 
5 District. 
6 Q. If you review that and let 
7 me know when reviewing that order. 
8 A. read it. 
9 the date of this order? 
10 December 9, 1982. 
11 Q. And looking down in the body of the 
order just above the signatures. That last line. 
14 What is the date contained there in the 
15 body? 
16 A. December 10, 1982. 
17 Q. And then in the signature portion, that 
18 bottom signature above Glenn o. Koch, is that 
19 your signature? 
20 A. Yes, it is. 
21 Q. Do you recall signing this order? 
22 A. No, I do not. 
24 do 
25 5 marked.) 
(208) 345-9611 M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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1 Q. {BY MR. PECK) 
2 chance to review No. 5? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Now, in 4, the Order 
5 District, under No. 1, it says, 
6 "A map attached hereto, prepared by the 
7 and Zoning Administrator, designates the 
three small areas within the county which remain 
10 Do you recall whether or not you saw 
11 that survey map? 
12 A. I don't remember seeing it. 
13 MR. WALTON: Are you saying you don't 
14 remember if you did or you didn't see it? Or are 
15 you saying you don't think you did see it? 
16 THE WITNESS: I don't remember seeing 
17 it. That is what I'm saying. 
18 Q. {BY MR. PECK) Now, looking at Exhibit 
19 No. 5. Do you recall having ever seen that map 
20 before? 
21 A. No, I don't recall ever having seen it. 
22 I probably did, but I don't recall. 
24 
25 Commissioners 
(208) 345-9611 M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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1 THE WITNESS: is 
2 hereby Canyon County 
Comm~ssioners that on the 10th day of December, 
5 Q. (BY MR. PECK) And so as being part of 
6 the panel that signed this document is it your 
7 understanding that that was intended to be the 
8 date it was to corrunence? 
9 MR. SAARI: Objection. He earlier 
10 testified he doesn't have the recollection of the 
11 events. You are asking him to speculate, 
12 guesstimate on matters many, many years ago that 
13 he has no independent memory. 
14 THE WITNESS: I don't recall. 
16 having any conversations with your fellow 
17 corrunissioners, Corrunissioner Hobza and 
.. - 18. Corrunissioner·Bledsoe; regarding 
19 animals they to apply 
20 to? 
21 MR. We supplied 
22 to you indicating both of 
23 are dead and deceased. Having him 
24 as to people who are no longer here to be 
deposed is not proper. 
(208) 345-9611 M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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THE WITNESS: Well, it says that it 
hereby ordered by the Board of Canyon 
Conunissioners that on the 10th day of 
1982, that a herd district be 
Q. (BY MR. PECK) being part of 
the panel 
understanding that 
document is it your 
intended to be the 
date it was 
Objection. He earlier 
he doesn't have the recollection of the 
You are asking him to speculate, 
guesstimate on matters many, many years ago that 
he has no independent memory. 
Q. {BY MR. PECK) Do you recall ever 
having any conversations with your fellow 
commissioners, Commissioner Hobza and 
Commissioner Bledsoe, regarding what type of 
animals they wanted the herd district to apply 
to? 
MR. SAARI: Objection. We supplied 
discovery, Counselor, to you indicating both of 
those people are dead and deceased. Having him 
testify as to people who are no longer here to be 
deposed is not proper. 
M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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1 Q. {BY MR. PECK) You can go ahead and 
2 answer the question. 
3 A. No, I don't recall any conversations 
4 specifying animals. 
6 with the concept of a herd district. At the time 
7 this order was put out there did you have a 
8 concept of what the term "open range" entailed-;i 
9 A. That is pretty self-explanatory. Open 
10 range is open range. 
11 Q. Now, do you recall it bein the intent 
12 of this order to place a herd ict over the 
13 open range areas in Canyon 
14 MR. SAARI: The document 
15 speaks for itself. 
16 THE 
17 That is all the questions I 
18 have. Oh, One more. I guess this is just 
19 to see can spark your memory at all. I'm 
20 not to make it an exhibit. But I'm going 
21 you look at it. 
22 Q. {BY MR. PECK) Now, in reviewing that 
23 map 
24 MR. SAARI: If you are going to ask him 
to try to spark his memory you need to mark 
(208) 345-9611 M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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that we are going 
and the record. 
that sound good? 
Q. (BY MR. PECK) Now, looking over 
Exhibit No. 6 there, Mr. Koch. Do you recall 
seeing that particular map before? What is 
represented there? 
A. ·No, I don't. I thought there was just 
one area in Canyon County that was not included 
in the herd district. In my mind, before coming 
here today, I felt there was only one area in 
Canyon County that was not included in the herd 
district. And coming here today I find that 
there were three. And I assume that these white 





Mr. Koch, based upon your testimony 
\~ ' 
today}·- w1 th the events having occurred so 
" 
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Bill Staker Depa 
7 any instructions on how to proceed? 
8 A. No. No. They would have probably gone 
9 to the prosecuting 
10 civil attorney. 
11 MR. POPE: 
12 Exhibit 1. 







Q. Mr. Staker, 
marked as Exhibit 
you what's been 
deposition. This is 
1968 edition. This is 
entitled 
I'm 
apter 24, concerning Herd Districts. 
have you look at a couple of sections, 
talk about these for a moment. If you 
bottom of the page I've opened to, 
22 section 25-2402, "Petition for district," do you 
23 have any personal knowledge of a petition for a herd 
24 district being submitted in 1980, '81, or '82? 
25 A. NO. 
1 Q. would the clerk's office have received 





I don't know. 
would that have been a normal matter 
5 filed with the clerk's office for any reason? 
6 A. I don't know that either. 
8 there on what is Page 437, sec · ice 








after a petition for a herd 
~::::;_~i-s.:t:'"P-"l-~-'1-':;-4::.:i-+~€1--s-et a date aRd publis~ed a Retiee 
12 of hearing. Do you have any personal recollection 
13 of a notice of hearing being published by the county 









No, I don't. 
MR. POPfii okay. Tl:lank YGLI 
Let's mark that Exhibit 2, please. 
(Exhibit 2 was marked.) 
I'm handing you what's been marked as 
21 Exhibit 2, which are minutes from December 2, 1982. 
22 In the center of the page there it states, 
23 "Resolution Passed Regarding Herd District in Canyon 
24 county." Do you recall being present at a hearing 
25 of the county commissioners in December of 1982 






A. No, I don't, but look like one 
of our an entry out of our minute books. 
one of those Q. would this 
hearings, 
your support 
stated earlier where one of 
deputy clerks, would have 
7 attended? 
Yes. 
Do you mind if I take time to read this? 
No. Please do. 
(Mr. Staker reviews document.) 






Bill Staker Depa 
13 particular paragraph says, "The following Resolution 
14 was considered and adopted by the canyon county 
15 Board of commissioners on the 2nd day of December, 
16 1982." Do you remember what the resolutions were as 
17 far as how the county commissioners acted on those? 
18 I know that's a really bad question. Let me try 
19 that again. what was a resolution as far as the 
20 county commissioners were concerned? 
21 MR. SAARI: objection to the for. of the 
22 question. It's very confusing. 
23 THE WITNESS: I agree with that. I 
24 don't quite understand what 
25 Q. (BY MR. POPE) say 
1 here that this was resolution which was 
2 considered. u have any knowledge or 
11 
resolutions were as far as 
getting that. Let me try it 
Petitions would be filed by members of 
for the commissioners' consideration. 
Exhibit 2 talks about a resolution. Do you 
if there was any difference between the two? 
Q. And I believe you've already testified 
12 that you were not personally aware of any petition 
13 for herd districts by anyone in the early '80s. 
14 A. I can't state whether there was one or 






16 of it. 
Bill Staker oepo 
17 Q. Do yoi,i know whether or not a resoli,ition 
18 of the board of county commissioners would require a 
19 notice of hearing for the public's information? 
20 MR. SAARI: Objection to the form of the 
21 question. The witness is being asked to express a 
22 legal opinion that's beyond his ability to do so. 
23 Q. (BY MR. POPE) YOU can go ahead and 
24 answer it. 
25 A. The board of county commissioners would 
1 go to the prosecuting attorney and make tho 
2 of decisions, not me. 
3 MR. POPE: Mark this as E 
4 4. 
5 
6 Q. (BY MR. POPE) 
7 December 10, 1982 "order 
8 District," and Exhibit a two-page map of canyon 
9 county with herd dis we'll go to 








Q. bottom of the page under the 
-hand corner there it says "Attest: 
and then "Jeanie Irvine." Is that 
16 A. No. That's not my stamp either. This 
fairly common way that my deputies would attest 





16 of it. 
Bill Staker Depa 
17 Q. Do you know whether or not a resolution 
18 of the board of county commissioners would require a 
19 notice of hearing for the public's information? 
20 MR. SAARI: objection to the 
21 question. The witness is being asked to 
22 legal opinion that's beyond his to do so. 
23 Q. (BY MR. POPE) 


















A. commissioners would 
attorney and make those kind 
MR. POPE: Mark this as Exhibits 3 and 
Q. (BY MR. POPE) Exhibit 3 is a 
December 10, 1982 "order Establishing Herd 
District," and Exhibit 4 is a two-page map of canyon 
County with herd districts defined. we'll go to 
Exhibit 3 firs if you don't mind. 
A. okay. 
Q. At the bottom of the page under the 
bottom left-hand corner there it says "Attest: 
Bill A. Staker" and then "Jeanie Irvine." Is that 
your signature? 
A. No. That's not my stamp either. This 
is a fairly common way that my deputies would attest 






Bill Staker Depa 
19 either a dash or a slash or a dot, their name, which 
20 means they attest in my power by my deputy. she's 
21 actually saying she's a deputy there. She's a 
22 deputy clerk. 
23 Q. so you're saying that Jeanie Irvine 
24 would have signed your name, Bill A. Staker, to the 











That is correct. 
Do you recall ever seeing this order 
No, I don't. 
Do you recall having any input as to the 







Let me read it first. 
(Mr. Staker reviews document.) 
what was your question again? 
Do you recall having any input to the 






I had no input to this. 
Do you have any recollection as to being 
15 advised by the commissioners in December of 1982 





I don't recall. 
I'm Mt aski fl§ yeu te §Uess. I' RI as Id fl!!J 
19 if you recall. would Jeanie Irvine have been 
20 present when this 
commissioners? 














Bill Staker Depo 
A. I have no knowledge of the meeting. 





or not. Now, do 
No, I do not. 
it be the standard practice, 
a person like Jeanie Irvine to be 
these orders were signed? 
If you'd look now at Exhibit No. 4. 
7 Have you ever seen that map before? 
8 A. It's a map of canyon county. The 
I 
9 possibility that I've seen it is probably pretty 
10 good, but I can't attest that I have actually seen 
11 this map before. I've seen thousands of maps of 
12 canyon county. It is very similar to what we would 
13 do for elections, and I put out literally hundreds 
14 of maps for the election department. They were all 
15 of canyon county, and they're all color coded and 
16 stuff like that. I cannot say I have not seen this, 
17 but I can't attest that I have either. 
18 Q. okay. Thank you. 
19 If you'd look back at Exhibit 3, in 
20 paragraph 1 it says, "A survey map attached hereto, 
21 prepar~d by the Planning and zoning Administrator, 
22 designates the three small areas within the county 
23 which remain open range." what would be the normal 







Bill Staker Depa 
1 A. I don't know. You're asking questions 
2 that I can't even recall happened let alone having 
3 to attest to them. 
,4 Q. I appreciate that, Mr. Staker. Do you 
5 have any recollection as to whether Exhibit 4 would 
6 be the map that is referred to in paragraph 1 of 
7 Exhibit 3? 
8 A. No, I don't. 
9 Q. ~Jl'lat ~~eul el tlie ca11yo1i county cl e1 k's 
10 office do with an order such as Exhibit 3 once the 
11 commissioners had signed it? 
12 A. say that again. I'm sorry. 
13 Q. The commissioners signed this in 
14 December of 1982. What would the clerk's office 
15 with this order once it was signed? 
16 A. The 
17 generally published as I recall, 
18 be filed, because this 
19 record. 




22 newspaper. I assume it's still 
23 
24 
It is here. You'll see a proceedings 
the commissioners considered, that they passed 






Bill Staker De po 
3 As far as personal associations after 
4 hours, zero. 
5 MR. POPE: 
6 Mr. all the questions I 
7 have. I much for your time. 
8 does anybody have any questions 
Staker? 
11 This is Tim Walton, Mr. Staker, and I 
12 think you answered this question, but I just wanted 
13 the record to be clear. The question was posed to 
14 you whether or not a notice of hearing was published 
15 in the newspaper with respect to the herd district 
16 that was created by the county commissioners in 
17 1982. Do you recall that question? 
18 
19 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
MR. WALTON: And as I understood your 
20 answer, you don't know if a notice of hearing was or 
21 was not published in the paper about that hearing. 




THE WITNESS: Yes, it is. 
MR. \"tALTON: That' s al 1 I have, 
MR. POPE: Mr. Saari? Ms. Sullivan? 
l MS. SULLIVAN: 
2 questions. 
3 Mr. Saari? 
4 MR. SAARI: I have no questions. 
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On April 30, 2008, the Honorable Gordon W. Petrie entered his Order on Motion to 
Reconsider. On January 21, 2009, Judge Petrie entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment in Bifurcated Portion of Trial ("Judgment") following a bench trial held on 
October 8, 2008, on the validity of the 1982 Canyon County herd district ordinance. Defendant 
Jennifer Sutton ("Sutton") now files this Memorandum in Support of her Motion for 
Reconsideration. Sutton requests that this Court reconsider the Order on Motion to Reconsider 
entered by Judge Petrie precluding Sutton from asserting the affirmative defenses of estoppel and 
laches against Defendant Dale Piercy's challenge to the 1982 Canyon County herd district 
ordinance. Sutton also requests that this Court reconsider the Judgment entered by Judge Petrie 
for purposes of considering Sutton's affirmative defenses of estoppel by laches, estoppel by 
waiver, equitable estoppel and statute oflimitations pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 5-224. Sutton 
also requests this Court to clarify and to correct a factual error in the Judgment. 
II. FACTUAL HISTORY AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This action arises out of a motor vehicle collision with a black bull occurring in the late 
evening hours of Sunday, March 20, 2005. Sutton, with Plaintiffs Erika L. Rivera and Luis J. 
Guzman (collectively "Plaintiffs") as passengers, was traveling northbound on W arnstad Road, 
just south of Parma, when Sutton's vehicle collided with a black bull owned by Defendant Dale 
W. Piercy ("Piercy"). 
The accident occurred in an area designated as a herd district by the Canyon County 
Commissioners on July 18, 1908. (Affidavit of Joshua S. Evett in Support of Defendant Jennifer 
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Sutton's Motion for Reconsideration ("Evett Aff."), ir 3 .) The bull involved in the collision was 
pastured in a field east ofWamstad Road, north of the Boise River bridge and south of Parma 
upon land designated as a herd district by the Order of the Canyon County Commissioners dated 
December 10, 1982. (Evett Aff., ifif 4, 5.) 
Rivera and Guzman filed a personal injury action against Piercy and Sutton. Rivera 
ultimately settled her claims. On or about May 1, 2007, Piercy filed a motion for summary 
judgment seeking a judgment from the Court that the 1908 and 1982 herd district ordinances 
were void on the grounds that the ordinances did not comply with the requirements of Title 25, 
Chapter 24, Idaho Code. Piercy argued that ifthe 1908 and the 1982 herd district ordinances 
were invalid, the area where the bull was pastured, and the location where the accident occurred 
would be open range, and Piercy would be immune from liability for the accident pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 25-2118. Sutton opposed the motion, in part, arguing that Piercy's challenge to the 
1982 herd district ordinance twenty-five years after its passage was barred by the doctrine of 
estoppel by !aches. Guzman also opposed the motion, in part, arguing that Piercy was estopped 
from challenging the validity of the herd district ordinances. 
On or about October 9, 2007, the District Court entered its Order Denying Defendant 
Percy's [sic] Motion for Summary Judgment, Joining Canyon County, and Holding all Other 
Motions in Abeyance Until the Herd District's Validity is Resolved ("Order Denying Defendant 
Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment"). Therein, the District Court denied Piercy's motion 
for summary judgment on the validity of the herd districts on the grounds that there existed 
genuine issues of material fact. (Order Denying Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary 
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Judgment at 23.) The Court further concluded that the validity of the herd districts was a legal 
issue that required resolution prior to litigating the damages issues. (Id. at 22.) To fully resolve 
the herd district issues, the Court further concluded that it was necessary to join Canyon County 
as a party. (Id. at 22-24.) The Court directed Sutton's counsel "to prepare and serve the 
necessary pleadings to join Canyon County ... as a third-party defendant."1 (Id. at 24.) The Court 
did not address whether Piercy was estopped from challenging the validity of the herd district 
ordinances. 
Guzman, joined by Sutton, moved the Court to reconsider its Order Denying Defendant 
Piercy' s Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that the Court failed to consider the 
estoppel arguments. On April 30, 2008, the Court entered its Order on Motion to Reconsider, 
denying Guzman and Sutton from asserting "the doctrine of quasi estoppel and the doctrine of 
!aches against Defendant Piercy' s attempt to invalidate Canyon County's Herd District 
ordinances." (Order on Motion to Reconsider at 20.) 
Pursuant to the Order Denying Defendant Piercy' s Motion for Summary Judgment, on 
October 15, 2007, Sutton's counsel filed the Action for Declaratory Judgment, adding Canyon 
County as a defendant and requesting the Court to determine the validity of the herd districts. 
The declaratory action was assigned the same case number as the personal injury action. On 
November 8, 2007, Canyon County filed its Answer of Third Party Defendant Canyon County, 
1 Procedurally, joining Canyon County as a third-party defendant was not entirely proper. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 14( a) provides that a defendant may bring in a third-party "who is 
or may be liable to such third-party plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the 
third-party plaintiff." Canyon County was not, nor could it have been liable to Piercy or Sutton 
for Guzman's tort claim. 
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Idaho. The declaratory judgment action was scheduled for a two day bench trial commencing 
October 8, 2008. 
The parties to the declaratory judgment action were not properly aligned2; therefore, the 
parties stipulated to a realignment. On or about September 11, 2008, counsel for Piercy filed an 
Amended Action for Declaratory Relief seeking a determination that the 1908 and 1982 herd 
districts were invalid and naming Canyon County, Sutton and Guzman as defendants. Again, the 
declaratory judgment action was assigned the same case number. On or about September 23, 
2008, Sutton filed her Answer to Amended Action for Declaratory Relief, asserting the 
affirmative defenses of estoppel by laches, estoppel by waiver, equitable estoppel, and statute of 
limitations pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 5-224. 
Sutton filed her Pretrial Memorandum on or about September 2, 2008, which again 
asserted the affirmative defenses of estoppel, waiver by estoppel, and estoppel by laches. 
The bench trial on the declaratory judgment action occurred as scheduled on October 8, 
2008. Sutton attempted to again raise the equitable defenses of laches and estoppel at trial, and 
to present evidence on the same. The Court did not allow the defenses, and denied the admission 
of evidence. (Evett Aff., ~ 5.) Sutton's Post-Trial Memorandum was filed on December 3, 2008. 
Because of the Court's ruling on the equitable defenses, the equitable issues of estoppel and 
laches were not briefed in the Post-trial Memorandum. However, Sutton did fully brief the issue 
2 Although Sutton's counsel filed the original declaratory judgment action by order of the 
trial court, it was actually Piercy that was seeking a determination from the court regarding the 
validity of the herd district. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT JENNIFER 
SUTTON'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION- 5 
1076 
of whether Piercy's challenge to the 1982 herd district ordinance was barred by the statute of 
limitations. (Post-Trial Memorandum at 5-15.) 
On January 21, 2009, the Court issued its Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment in Bifurcated Portion of Trial ("Judgment"), holding the 1982 herd district ordinance 
invalid. In sum, the Court concluded that the 1982 herd district was created without the benefit 
of a petition as required by Title 25, Chapter 24, Idaho Code. (Judgment at 4, 7.) Because the 
Canyon County Commissioners failed to follow the procedures set forth in Title 25, Chapter 24, 
Idaho Code, the 1982 Order Establishing Herd District was void. (Id. at 7.) Further, the 
Conclusion states "[a]ccordingly, the court concludes no herd district existed at the location of 
the horrific accident involving Luis Guzman and Jennifer Sutton and Dale Piercy's bull." (Id. at 
12.)(emphasis added.) Specifically, the Court decreed: "I. The 1982 Order Establishing Herd 
District is invalid and void. 2. Neither Plaintiff Luiz [sic] Guzman nor Defendant Jennifer 
Sutton may rely upon the existence of a herd district at the location of their involvement in a 
collision with Defendant Dale Piercy's bull in Canyon County in 2005." (Id. at 12-13.)(emphasis 
added.) The Judgment did not expressly dismiss Piercy from the personal injury lawsuit. 
The Court's Judgment failed to address the equitable defenses oflaches or estoppel, nor 
did it address the statute oflimitations defense. Judge Petrie has since resigned, and the case was 
reassigned to this Honorable Judge. 
Sutton requests reconsideration of the April 30, 2008, Order on Motion to Reconsider, 
and the January 21, 2009, Judgment to allow for consideration of Sutton's affirmative defenses 
of estoppel and statute oflimitations. In the event the Court grants the Motion for 
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Reconsideration, Sutton also requests that this Court uphold the 1982 herd district ordinance. 
Sutton further requests the Court clarifyand correct a factual error in the Judgment, which could 
be read as voiding the 1908 herd district ordinance. 
III. UNDISPUTED FACTS 
On or about December 2, 1982, the Board of the Canyon County Commissioners 
approved a resolution establishing a herd district as set forth in the minutes: 
RESOLUTION PASSED REGARDING HERD DISTRICTS IN 
CANYON COUNTY 
The following Resolution was considered and adopted by the Canyon 
County Board of Commissioners on the 2nd day of December, 1982: 
Upon motion of Commissioner Hobza and the second by 
Commissioner Bledsoe the Board resolves as follows: That because 
of the confusion that exists due to the over-lapping lines of herd 
districts and open range and because over ninety-five (95%) percent 
of the area of Canyon County is already designated a herd district the 
Board will issue an order designating all of Canyon County to be herd 
district as of December 14, 1982. Motion Carried Unanimously. 
(Evett Aff., if 6.) 
On December 10, 1982, the Board of Canyon County Commissioners issued the 
following Order: 
ORDER ESTABLISHING HERD DISTRICT 
The Board has again reviewed the complexity of the Herd District 
Boundaries throughout the County and has determined, by resolution, 
that the time has come to simplify and unify the status of Herd 
Districts in Canyon County. In making this determination the Board 
has found the following: 
I. A survey map attached hereto, prepared by the Planning and 
Zoning Administrator designates the three small areas within 
the County which remain open range. 
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2. That map shows that over 95% of the land within the County 
is now in Herd District status. 
3. Through the years confusion has existed because of 
overlapping boundary lines and indefinite District boundary 
descriptions. 
4. Canyon County has reached the stage of urban development 
which destroys the original purpose and usefulness of the 
concept of open range. 
5. The mobility of our citizens has increased to the point at 
which it becomes necessary that Herd District status exist 
throughout the County. Therefore, 
(Evett Aff., if 4.) 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the Board of Canyon County 
Commissioners on this 10 day of December, 1982, that a 
Herd District be established in the three remaining open range 
areas in Canyon County as shown on the attached survey map 
(marked in black), to the end that the entire land area of 
Canyon County be placed in Herd District status. 
On December 20, 1982, the Idaho Press Tribune published the following notice: 
RESOLUTION PASSED REGARDING HERD DISTRICTS IN 
CANYON COUNTY 
The following Resolution was considered and adopted by the 
Canyon County Board of Commissioners on the 2nd day of 
December, 1982: Upon motion of Commissioner Hobza and the 
second by Commissioner Bledsoe the Board resolves as follows: 
That because of the confusion that exists due to the over-lapping 
lines of herd districts and open range and because over ninety-five 
(95%) percent of the area of Canyon County is already designated a 
herd district the Board will issue an order designating all of 
Canyon County to be herd district as of December 14, 1982. 
Motion Carried Unanimously. 
(Evett Aff., if 7.) 
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At the time the 1982 herd district ordinance was enacted, the 1963 version of the Idaho 
Herd District Law was in effect. See Idaho Code§§ 25-2401, et. seq. The Herd District Law was 
subsequently amended in 1983, 1985, 1990 and 1996. 
IV. GOVERNING STANDARDS 
Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states, in pertinent part: 
(B) Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration of 
any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at any time 
before the entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen ( 14) 
days after the entry of the final judgment... 
The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration rests within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Campbell v. Reagan, 144 Idaho 254, 258, 159 P.3d 891, 895 
(2007)( citations omitted). A motion for reconsideration allows a party an opportunity to draw 
the trial court's attention to errors of law or fact in the initial decision. Johnson v. Lambros, 
143 Idaho 468, 473, 147 P.3d 100, 105 (Ct. App. 2006). While Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) permits a party 
to present new evidence when a motion for reconsideration is brought under this rule, it does not 
require that the motion be accompanied by new evidence. Id. at 472, 147 P.3d at 104. 
V. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. DEFENDANT PIERCY'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE§§ 5-224. 
The Judgment entered January 21, 2009, did not address the statute oflimitations defense. 
Should the Court grant the Motion for Reconsideration, Idaho Code§§ 5-224 would bar Piercy 
from challenging the validity of the 1982 herd district ordinance. Thus, the 1982 herd district 
ordinance should be upheld. 
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The limitations of action statutes apply to all actions and special proceedings. The 
declaratory judgment action constitutes a type of"action" limited by Idaho Code§§ 5-224. 
Even assuming that there were procedural irregularities in the passage of the 1982 
herd district ordinance, Piercy's claim is barred by Idaho Code§ 5-224. 
Idaho Code§ 5-201 sets forth the general statute oflimitations provision: 
Civil actions can only be commenced within the periods prescribed 
in this chapter after the cause of action shall have accrued, except 
when, in special cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute. 
LC. § 5-201. There is no specific statute oflimitations that applies to either a declaratory 
judgment action, or to the underlying claim, therefore, the catchall provision applies. 
Idaho Code § 5-224 is the catchall statute oflimitations provision, which provides: 
LC. § 5-224. 
An action for relief not hereinbefore provided for must be 
commenced within four ( 4) years after the cause of action shall have 
accrued. 
There is only one form of action in Idaho's civil courts: the "civil action." See LR.C.P. 
2. An "action" is further defined in Title 5, Chapter 2 to mean: 
LC. § 5-240. 
The word "action" as used in this chapter is to be construed, 
whenever it is necessary so to do, as including a special proceeding 
of a civil nature. 
An action seeking declaratory judgment is authorized pursuant to Rule 57 of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Title 10, Chapter 12, Idaho Code, and constitutes "[a]n action for 
relief ... " under Idaho Code§ 5-224. Rule 57 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states that 
the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to declaratory judgment actions. A declaratory relief claim is 
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an "action;" the Supreme Court ofldaho has recognized this in writing "[t]his is a civil action, 
albeit for a declaratory judgment." Smith v. State Board of Medicine of Idaho, 74 Idaho 191, 
194, 259 P.2d 1033, 1034 (1953). Furthermore, the Supreme Court ofldaho awarded attorney's 
fees in favor of a plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3), which 
statute allows for the recovery of attorney fees in "any civil action."3 Freiburger v. J-U-B 
Engineers, Inc., 141 Idaho 415, 423-424, 111P.3d100, 108-109 (2005). 
Based on the above, the declaratory judgment action is a "civil action" under Idaho Code 
§ 5-201 and "an action for relief..." subject to the limitations set forth under Idaho Code§ 5-224. 
Where there is no fraud shown, neither the ignorance of a person of his rights to bring an 
action, nor the mere silence of a person liable to the action, prevents the running of the statute of 
limitations. Coe v. Sloan, 16 Idaho 49, 100 P. 354, 355 (1909). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has set forth the policy underlying statutes of limitation: 
"The policy behind statutes oflimitations is protection of 
defendants against stale claims, and protection of the courts against 
needless expenditures of resources." Johnson v. Pischke, 108 Idaho 
397, 402, 700 P.2d 19, 25 (1985). Statutes oflimitation are 
designed to promote stability and avoid uncertainty with regards to 
future litigation. 
Wadsworth v. Department ofTransp., 128 Idaho 439, 442, 915 P.2d 1, 4 (1996). Additional 
policy reasons for the imposition of statutory time limits for filing actions are set forth in Renner 
v. Edwards: 
3Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) states, in pertinent part: 
In any civil action to recover on ... any commercial transaction unless otherwise 
provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee 
to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs ... ( emphasis added.) 
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It is eminently clear that statutes oflimitations were intended to 
prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale claims concerning 
which persons interested have been thrown off their guard for want 
of seasonable prosecution. They are, to be sure, a bane to those 
who are neglectful or dilatory in the prosecution of their legal 
rights. 1 Wood, Limitation of Actions,§ 4, p. 8. As a statute of 
repose, they afford parties needed protection against the necessity 
of defending claims which, because of their antiquity, would place 
the defendant at a grave disadvantage. In such cases how resolutely 
unfair it would be to award one who has willfully or carelessly 
slept on his legal rights an opportunity to enforce an unfresh claim 
against a party who is left to shield himself from liability with 
nothing more than tattered or faded memories, misplaced or 
discarded records, and missing or deceased witnesses. Indeed, in 
such circumstances, the quest for truth might elude even the wisest 
court. The statutes are predicated on the reasonable and fair 
presumption that valid claims which are of value are not usually 
left to gather dust or remain dormant for long periods of time. 
Riddlesbargerv. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386, 19 L.Ed. 
257; 1 Wood, Limitation of Actions, supra,§ 4; Spath v. Morrow, 
supra (174 Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581). To those who are unduly 
tardy in enforcing their known rights, the statute of limitations 
operates to extinguish the remedies; in effect, their right ceases to 
create a legal obligation and in lieu thereof a moral obligation may 
arise in the aid of which courts will not lend their assistance. Cf. 34 
Am.Jur., 'Limitation of Actions,' § 11, p. 20. 
Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 838-839, 475 P.2d 530, 532 - 533 (1969), citing Wood v. 
Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 25 L.Ed. 807 (1879). 
No matter how you look at the application ofldaho Code § 5-224, whether it applies to 
the declaratory judgment action itself, or to the underlying claim, there is no statute of limitations 
that would extend Piercy's right to bring the declaratory judgment action, or the underlying 
claim, nearly 25 years after the ordinance became effective. 
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Under Idaho Code§ 5-224, an action "must be commenced within four (4) years after the 
cause of action shall have accrued." In this case, the cause of action accrued the date the herd 
district ordinance went into effect. 
The Idaho Supreme Court holds that the statute of limitations in a case where the validity 
of an ordinance is challenged begins to accrue the date of the ordinance's passage. Canady v. 
Coeur d'Alene Lumber Co., 21 Idaho 77, 120 P. 830, 831 (1911). In Canady the Supreme Court 
held that the statute of limitations barred an action to declare an ordinance null and void filed 
nine years after the ordinance's enactment. Id. In Canady, the city of Coeur d'Alene enacted 
two ordinances in 1900, and another ordinance in 19054, generally for the purpose of vacating 
certain streets and alleys in the city, with the understanding that the Coeur d'Alene Lumber 
Company would establish and maintain a sawmill, planing mill and lumber yard on the vacated 
streets. Id. Thereafter, the Coeur d'Alene Lumber Company expended funds to build the lumber 
manufacturing establishment. Id. at 830. Plaintiff had notice of the enactment of the ordinances 
and the expenditure of money in the construction of the plant and did not object at that time. Id. 
Plaintiff's husband owned certain lands bordering on or near the streets vacated by the 
ordinances. Id. at 832. At some point, plaintiff succeeded to the interest of her husband and 
brought action on June 15, 1909, to have the ordinances vacating the streets and alleys declared 
null and void, to compel the defendants to remove obstructions from the streets vacated by the 
ordinances, to enjoin the defendants from obstructing the streets in the future, and for damages. 
Id. at 831. Defendants answered the complaint and denied that plaintiff was damaged by the 
40rdinance No. 71 was approved March 10, 1900; No. 75 was approved November 6, 
1900; and No. 115 was approved March 29, 1905. 
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street vacation, denied that plaintiffs land was within the city limits, and asserted the statute of 
limitations and estoppel. Id. at 832. 
At the close of plaintiffs evidence, defendants moved for a nonsuit, which was granted 
by the court. Id. at 832. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court and held, 
in part, that plaintiffs action was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 830. In support of its 
decision, the Court concluded: 
We think, under the facts of this case, that this action is barred by the 
statute oflimitations: and that this action should have been brought 
at least within five years from the date such cause of action arose. We 
think it sufficiently appears that appellant sat by when Ordinances 
Nos. 71 and 75 were passed in 1900. and more than nine years before 
this action was commenced. and made no complaint of any damages 
having been sustained to her property by reason of said ordinances 
and the vacation of the streets. And, again, in 1905, when Ordinance 
No. 115 was passed, she made no protest or objection of any kind. 
She knew that the Coeur d'Alene Lumber Company was expending 
a great deal of money in establishing its lumber plant upon said 
blocks and a portion of one of the streets, and made no protest of any 
kind whatever to the city, and made no claim for damages to her 
property as resulting from the passage of said ordinances. The first 
time she complained of damage to her property. so far as the record 
shows. was when she commenced this action. June 15. 1909. 
Howard Co. v. Chicago &A. R. Co., 130 Mo. 652. 32 S. W. 651; City 
o/Logansportv. Uhl, 99 Ind. 531, 49 Am. Rep. 109. 
Id. at 835 (emphasis added). 
Under Canady, Piercy' s challenge to the 1982 herd district ordinance is barred by the 
statute of limitations. The Order Establishing Herd District was enacted December 10, 1982, 
nearly 23 years before this action was commenced. Piercy did not raise this issue until after 
Guzman filed a Complaint against Piercy for damages arising from the collision between 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT JENNIFER 
SUTTON'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION- 14 
1085 
Sutton's vehicle and Piercy's black bull. Prior to the subject accident, Piercy never complained 
of any damages sustained by reason of the herd district ordinance. 
Piercy knew or had reason to know that the field where his bull was pastured was 
included in a herd district by virtue of the notice posted in the Idaho Press Tribune on December 
20, 1982, indicating that the resolution regarding herd district had been passed by the Canyon 
County Commissioners. 
Moreover, E.G. Johnson, a rancher in the area where the accident occurred and an owner 
ofland that is within the description of the 1982 herd district ordinance, knew that the area in 
question was in a herd district. On or about July 18, 2007, Mr. Johnson executed an affidavit for 
another case that was subsequently made part of the record in this lawsuit. (See Second Affidavit 
of Ryan B. Peck, dated on or about July 30, 2007, ii 2, Ex. A.) Therein, Mr. Johnson stated 
"[ s ]ometime in either late 1982 or early 1983, I discovered that the above property had been 
placed into the herd district created by the Canyon County Commissioners in December 1982." 
(Id., ii 2, Ex. A at i15.) Mr. Johnson testified at his deposition in this case, that he does not 
believe that he became aware of the herd district status in 1982 or early 1983; rather Mr. Johnson 
testified that he had been aware that the property was a herd district "for at least the last 12-15 
years." (Evett Aff., if 8 .) Piercy by his own admission has been a cattle rancher in the area where 
the accident occurred for 50 years. (Evett Aff., if 9.)5 It would seem unlikely that Mr. Johnson 
would know that his land was in a herd district, but that Piercy would not know that same 
information. 
5 At the Bench Trial, Piercy testified that he had been a rancher in Canyon County for over 
30 years. (Evett Af£, ii 5.) 
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Furthennore, based on Piercy's presumed familiarity with the roadway where the accident 
occurred, he was aware that there were no open range or cattle warning signs along that section 
of roadway. He was aware that there were no cattle guards or other devices separating open 
range land from herd district land. To Piercy's knowledge all livestock in Canyon County are not 
allowed to roam free and are contained by fences and/or natural geographic barriers, such as 
rivers. (Evett Aff., ii 9.) 
The status and location of herd districts within Canyon County were ofrecord. (Evett 
Aff., ii 10.) The herd district map could be found in the Canyon County recorder's office and the 
Canyon County Commissioner's office. Court employees were instructed that if asked, all of the 
land in Canyon County was included in a herd district. (Evett Aff, if 11.) At the least, Piercy had 
constructive knowledge that the field where his bull was pastured was included in a herd district. 
The Idaho Supreme Court holds that failure to acquire knowledge within reach does not 
toll the statute of limitation: 
While it is stipulated that the appellants did not know of their interest 
in those lots until about a year before this suit was brought, that 
makes no difference, for they had the means of acquiring that 
knowledge, as the deed conveying the title to said lots to their father 
was of record during all that time in the office of the county recorder 
of Ada county, where said lots were situated. The means of acquiring 
this knowledge was open to them, and, under the facts of this case, 
that places them in the same position as though they had such 
knowledge. When one by his own carelessness or negligence fails to 
acquire knowledge that is within his reach, and such infonnation is 
upon the proper records which impart constructive notice, the person 
cannot protect himself behind the plea that he did not know facts of 
which the law imputes knowledge to him and thus suspend the 
running of the statute. It was held in State v. Walters, 31 Ind. App. 77, 
66 N. E. 182, 99 Am. St. Rep. 244, that neither the ignorance of a 
person of his right to bring an action, nor the mere silence of a person 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT JENNIFER 
SUTTON'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION- 16 
1087 
liable to the action, prevents the running of the statute oflimitation. 
Ala., etc., Ry. Co. v. Jones, 73 Miss. 110, 19 South. 105, 55 Am. St. 
Rep. 488. See, also, Ames v. Howes, 13 Idaho, 756, 93 Pac. 35. 
Coe v. Sloan, 16 Idaho 49, 100 P. 354, 357 -358 (1909). 
Piercy has benefitted from herd district status, as his lands have not been subject to 
depredations from the at large cattle of his neighbors. Because he is required to fence his cattle 
in, fewer of his livestock (and the livestock of others) have been on the roadway and subject to 
injury or death because of collisions with automobiles. In the same way that third party 
automobile drivers have been protected since 1982 by a county-wide herd district, Piercy has 
benefitted from that protection in his travels on roadways throughout Canyon County. 
The public benefits and influence on public and private behavior of Canyon County's 25 
year herd district status are significant. Cattle are not allowed on Canyon County roads, and the 
county's police officers have confirmed that repeatedly in deposition. For 25 years it has been a 
misdemeanor for a rancher in Canyon County to permit his cattle to run at large in Canyon 
County. See Idaho Code§ 25-2407. For 25 years a rancher in Canyon County has been strictly 
liable for damages caused by his livestock to the property of others. See Idaho Code § 25-2408. 
For 25 years county commissioners have had the authority to order agricultural landowners in the 
vicinity of public domain where livestock are grazed to fence their land to prevent livestock in a 
herd district from entering onto their land. See Idaho Code § 25-2405. 
Piercy should have acted promptly if he considered that his rights were invaded by the 
passage of the herd district ordinance. He should not have sat passively by and permitted the 
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Canyon County officials and the citizens of Canyon County to order itself under the belief that all 
of Canyon County was in a herd district. See Canady, 21 Idaho 77, 120 P. 830. 
As stated above, the purpose of statutes of limitations is to prevent litigation of stale 
claims. See Wadsworth v. Departmento/Transp., 128 Idaho 439, 442, 915 P.2d 1, 4 (1996); 
Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 838, 475 P.2d 530, 532 (1969). In this case, the sole living 
Commissioner from 1982, Glen Koch, is 80 years old and has no recollection regarding the 
details of the passage of the herd district ordinance. (Evett Aff., ~ 12.) Similarly, the clerk of the 
district court and the commissioner's office from 1982 is now 73 and has no recollection 
regarding the passage of the ordinance. (Evett Aff., ~ 13.) 
There are strong policy reasons supporting statute of limitations provisions for actions 
attacking the validity of an ordinance based upon alleged irregularities in the ordinance's 
passage. At some point a statute has to have finality. If ordinances can be attacked at anytime 
based on procedural irregularities, without limitation as to time, then the door is open to anyone 
to attack any ordinance no matter how old and no matter how much evidence has been lost by 
time. There is no policy rationale supporting turning over a now 25+ year old statute on grounds 
of procedural irregularity. After the passage of so much time, these types of issues are a waste of 
judicial economy and resources. 
Memories have lapsed, witnesses have died, and evidence has possibly been destroyed 
with the passage of time. Under the statute oflimitations, Piercy should have brought his claim 
no later than December 10, 1986. 
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Based on the above, Sutton requests this Court to reconsider Judge Petrie's Judgment 
entered January 21, 2009, and to specifically address the statute oflimitations arguments. In the 
event the Court grants the Motion to Reconsider and considers the merits of the statute of 
limitations arguments, Sutton also requests the Court uphold the 1982 herd district ordinance on 
the grounds that Piercy' s challenge to the 1982 herd district is barred by the application of Idaho 
Code § 5-224. 
B. PIERCY IS ESTOPPED FROM CHALLENGING THE 1982 HERD DISTRICT 
ORDINANCE. 
The Honorable Judge Petrie did not address Sutton's estoppel arguments on the merits. 
The April 30, 2008 Order on Motion to Reconsider precluded Sutton from raising the affirmative 
defense of estoppel. This holding was reaffirmed by the Court during the October 8, 2008, bench 
trial on the validity of the 1982 herd district ordinance. Even though no motion had been 
presented to the Court to preclude the presentation of argument or evidence in support of the 
estoppel arguments, the Judge declined to take argument or evidence on those defenses. Thus, the 
Judgment entered January 21, 2009, did not address whether Piercy was estopped from 
challenging the validity of the 1982 herd district ordinance. 
Sutton requests the Court to reconsider Judge Petrie's April 30, 2008, and January 21, 
2009, decisions to specifically address the estoppel arguments on the merits. Sutton requests the 
opportunity to be able to submit argument and evidence in support of the estoppel defenses so 
that this Court may consider such arguments on the merits. Ultimately, Sutton requests the Court 
uphold the 1982 herd district ordinance on the grounds that Piercy' s challenge to the 1982 herd 
district is barred by estoppel. 
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1. Piercy' s challenge to the 1982 herd district ordinance is barred by the doctrine of 
estoppel by !aches. 
The doctrine of estoppel by !aches is applicable in cases where a party claims that an 
ordinance is invalid because of the means of its enactment. Lachesis a claim founded in equity 
and is a species of estoppel. Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 249, 92 P .3d 492, 499 (2004). Most 
cases in Idaho regarding the application of !aches in the context of a challenge to a law or 
regulation involve municipal annexations. In Alexander v. Trustees of Village of Middleton, 92 
Idaho 823, 452 P .2d 50 (1969), Middleton annexed land owned by plaintiff but did so in 
violation of state law. In that case plaintiff made arguments similar to Piercy in this case: that a 
municipality (in this case a county) derives its authority solely from the state legislature and that 
only annexations (in this case herd districts) complying with the conditions, restrictions, and 
limitations imposed by the state arevalid. Id. at 825, 452 P.2d at 52. 
The Alexander Court cited MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, Vol. 2, § 7.09, 
holding that if the elements of estoppel are present, the owners ofland over which a municipal 
corporation has exercised the powers and functions of government for a significant time will be 
es topped from questioning the location of municipal boundaries. Id. at 826, 452 P .2d at 53. The 
Alexander Court, citing Finucane v. Village of Hayden, 86 Idaho 199, 284 P.2d 236 (1963), with 
approval, noted that this rule is applied even though the municipal boundaries as extended are 
void when by reason oflapse of time municipal authority has been exercised, and there have 
resulted changed conditions involving extensive public and private interests. Id. 
These holdings are based on public policy. Where the parties acquiesce in the action of 
public officials and transact business on the theory that the land is located with the boundaries of 
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the municipality, it is in the interest of the general public that such a rule be applied. Id. 
(citations omitted). 
Lapse of time, while an important element, is not controlling in determining the 
applicability of a !aches defense. Finucane, 86 Idaho at 206, 384 P .2d at 240. "Courts must 
accord due legal regard to all surrounding circumstances, and the acts of the parties in their 
relationship to the property involved in the controversy." Id. (citations omitted). 
In the Alexander case, Idaho Code § 50-303 provided, in pertinent part, that a 
municipality could only annex property "laid off into lots or blocks, containing not more than 
five acres ofland each .... " Alexander, 92 Idaho at 824, 452 P.2d at 51. It was stipulated in the 
case that the plaintiff Alexander's property was larger than five acres and technically was 
annexed in violation of 50-303. Id. at 823, 825, 452 P.2d at 50, 52. ("All parcels of property 
involved herein exceed five acres in size and all are devoted to agricultural uses.") 
In Alexander, more than two years had elapsed from the annexation to the time suit was 
filed. Plaintiffs were notified of the intent to annex and the annexation was accomplished. 
Plaintiffs knew their land would be annexed. Plaintiffs' land benefitted through increased value 
and the elimination of hazardous health conditions. There was a correlative detriment to the 
municipality by expenditures of money to maintain the sewer system to which plaintiffs' property 
was attached following annexation. 
On these facts, the Idaho Supreme Court estopped the appellant in that case from arguing 
that the municipal boundaries were void. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT JENNIFER 
SUTTON'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION- 21 
1092 
Other jurisdictions have had similar holdings. For example, the Court of Appeals of 
Indiana held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that landowners' challenge 
to validity of city ordinance was barred by doctrine oflaches. Simon v. City of Auburn, Ind., Bd. 
a/Zoning Appeals, 519 N.E.2d 205 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). ·In Simon, the Building Commissioner 
of the City of Auburn issued a building permit to Cedar Glen Joint Venture to construct two 
condominiums in the Auburn area. Id. at 206. Both Plaintiffs lived near the site in question and 
brought action against Defendants on the issue of whether under the Indiana Code a city's 
general zoning ordinance is legally valid when it purports to incorporate by reference a zoning 
map but no zoning map is included in the ordinance and no zoning map is on file in the city 
clerk-treasurer's office. Id. 
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 
plaintiffs' claim was barred by the doctrine oflaches. Id. at 215. The Court based its holding on 
the fact that plaintiffs did not initiate an action challenging the legal validity of the ordinance 
until nearly seventeen years after its enactment. Id. Furthermore, the Court held that plaintiffs 
were charged with knowledge of and acquiescence in the content of the zoning ordinance, and to 
allow plaintiffs to prevail would cause prejudice to defendants since defendants had already 
expended significant amounts of money on the development of the property at issue. Id. Lastly, 
the Court reasoned that to invalidate the ordinance would cause chaos, confusion and controversy 
to the City of Auburn, such that would hinder the economic growth and development of the 
entire area covered by the zoning ordinance. Id. 
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Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that prosecutrix was barred from 
challenging the validity of an ordinance that was nine years old. Benequit v. Borough of 
Monmouth Beach, 125 N.J.L. 65, 67-68, 13 A.2d 847, 849 (N.J.1940). In Benequit, the 
prosecutrix was convicted of violating a zoning ordinance. Id. at 84 7. On appeal was the issue 
of whether the ordinance was invalid for the reason that it had not been published in a qualified 
newspaper as required by statute. Id. at 849. 
In Benequit, the Court held that prosecutrix's complaint was barred by !aches. Id. The 
Court reasoned that the ordinance had been in effect for over nine years and that presumably 
citizens had conformed to its provisions. Id. There was also evidence that the prosecutrix knew 
of the ordinance as evidenced by a letter sent to the defendant borough stating that she had 
purchased the property, that it was located in a zone wherein business was prohibited and applied 
'for a special exception to the terms of the zoning ordinance permitting the above mentioned 
premises to be licensed for a first class hotel'. Id. At the time of sending the letter, prosecutrix 
did not attack the validity of the ordinance. Id. The Court held that even assuming that the 
ordinance was not published in a qualified newspaper, such irregularity was merely procedural 
and the prosecutrix under these facts and circumstances was guilty oflaches, which estopped her 
from challenging the validity of the ordinance. Id. 
Although "lapse of time" is not dispositive, in the instant case it should be. In 
determining whether the doctrine oflaches applies, the Court must give "consideration ... to all 
surrounding circumstances and acts of the parties." Henderson v. Smith, 128 Idaho 444, 449, 915 
P.2d 6, 11 (1996) (citations omitted, emphasis added). The time lapse between the enactment of 
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the 1982 herd district ordinance and this action is almost twenty-five years. Piercy has failed to 
show reasonable justification for the delay in challenging the ordinance. Essentially, the passage 
of twenty-five years demonstrates an implied waiver of the right to seek to invalidate the 1982 
herd district ordinance by knowing acquiescence in a condition that had existed for so many 
years. 
The alleged defects, which are primarily technical irregularities, were present and could 
have been discovered and challenged twenty-five years ago, before so many citizens of Canyon 
County had come to rely on the validity of the ordinance. Piercy challenges the ordinance only 
after one of his cattle caused a motor vehicle accident. To invalidate the 1982 herd district 
ordinance accomplishes Piercy' s own individual purposes and would cause prejudice to the 
entire Canyon County community and more particularly, Plaintiffs. 
Piercy challenges an ordinance that has been in effect for 25 years. When the ordinance 
was passed, neither Jennifer Sutton, Erika Rivera, nor Luis Guzman were even born. Glenn 
Koch, one of the commissioners who voted on the ordinance is 80 years old and cannot recall the 
details leading up to the passage of the ordinance. (See Affidavit of Glenn 0. Koch in 
Opposition to Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment previously filed July 20, 2007 
("Koch Aff.").) The other two commissioners who voted on the ordinance are dead. (Id. at if 3.) 
The entirety of Canyon County has followed the "fence in" rule of the herd district, as 
opposed to the "fence out" rule of open range, for 25 years. For 25 years Canyon County 
ranchers have had the responsibility to fence in their livestock to keep their stock off the road and 
off their neighbors' property. Piercy himself admits that all livestock in Canyon County, to his 
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knowledge, are either fenced in or contained by natural geographic barriers, such as rivers. This 
includes his own livestock. 
At the time of the accident there were no "Open Range" warning signs or cattle warning 
signs along the road where the accident happened. (See Affidavit of Jennifer Sutton previously 
filed July 24, 2007, if 5.) Ms. Sutton had seen such signs in other parts ofldaho before the 
accident and understood these signs to indicate that livestock might be in the roadway and that 
she should keep a lookout for cattle. (Id. at if 6.) Jennifer Sutton did not expect any cattle on the 
road the night of this accident (see id. at if 8), a product of the absence of these warning signs and 
the fact that she grew up in an area where ranchers were required by county ordinances to keep 
their cattle fenced in. 
If ever public policy supported the application of estoppel by !aches, this is the case. 
Generations of Canyon County residents, Canyon County governments, and Canyon County law 
enforcement, have assumed the entire county is in a herd district. They have ordered their 
behavior accordingly. It is too late for Piercy, having benefitted from the herd district status of 
Canyon County for 25 years, to now complain about alleged technical defects in the ordinance's 
passage because he finds himself in this unfortunate case. He has had more than enough time to 
challenge herd district status and has not provided any reasonable justification for the delay in 
challenging the ordinance. 
Last, because !aches is an equitable doctrine, the Court is permitted to consider all the 
circumstances surrounding the issues raised by the parties. The Court can take into consideration 
the passage of time, fading of memories, and disappearance of evidence in determining whether 
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it is equitable to uphold the validity of the herd district ordinance. Piercy and Plaintiffs have 
submitted affidavits, two by Glenn Koch (one of the Canyon County Commissioners in 1982) 
and the clerk of the Canyon County District Court in 1982, Bill Straker. Neither can remember 
whether the ordinance was passed pursuant to a petition. (See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment previously filed July 20, 2007, 
at 19.) Neither man can recall the details leading to passage of the ordinance. Two of the county 
commissioners who voted on the 1982 ordinance are dead. (See Koch Aff. at if 3.) 
This is precisely the type of situation !aches is intended to avoid. Time has passed, 
memories have faded, and it is accordingly inequitable to force Guzman and Sutton to defend a 
25-year-old ordinance based on incomplete county records, faded memories, and incomplete 
evidence. Equity firmly supports upholding this herd district under the doctrine of estoppel by 
!aches. 
The Court prevented Sutton from presenting evidence on the estoppel defenses even 
though there was no motion pending seeking to preclude entry of such evidence. Sutton requests 
that she be allowed to submit evidence supporting the estoppel defenses so that this issue may be 
decided on the merits. 
2. Piercy's challenge to the 1982 herd district ordinance is barred by the doctrine of 
estoppel by waiver and/or guasi-estoppel. 
Sutton joins, and incorporates herein by reference, the arguments of Plaintiff as expressed 
on pages 20-23 of Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Piercy's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, filed with this Court on or about July 20, 2007, and the arguments in 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider, filed with this Court on or about 
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November 8, 2007, including the transcript of a hearing before the Honorable Renae I.Hoff, in 
Gazzaway v. E.G. Johnson Farms, Inc., Canyon County Case No. CV07-2141, attached thereto. 
C. THE JUDGMENT ENTERED BY JUDGE PETRIE DATED JANUARY 21, 2009, 
CONTAINS A FACTUAL ERROR WHICH AFFECTS THE SCOPE OF THE 
JUDGMENT. 
In the Judgment entered by Judge Petrie on January 21, 2009, holding the 1982 herd 
district ordinance invalid, the Court stated in its conclusion "[a]ccordingly, the court concludes 
no herd district existed at the location of the horrific accident involving Luis Guzman and 
Jennifer Sutton and Dale Piercy's bull." (Judgment at 12.)(Emphasis added.) The Court also 
ordered, adjudged and decreed that "2. Neither Plaintiff Luiz [sic] Guzman nor Defendant 
Jennifer Sutton may rely upon the existence of a herd district at the location of their involvement 
in a collision with Defendant Dale Piercy's bull in Canyon County in 2005." (Id. at 13.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Court's decision was limited to determining the validity of the 1982 herd district 
ordinance, and did not address the validity of the 1908 herd district. While the bull escaped from 
an area included within the 1982 herd district, the collision occurred in a herd district established 
in 1908. Therefore, the Judgment is incorrect to the extent it is read to invalidate the 1908 herd 
district. Sutton requests that the Court's Judgment be corrected, or clarified, accordingly. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Sutton respectfully requests that this Court grant her Motion for Reconsideration and 
uphold the validity of the 1982 herd district ordinance. Sutton also requests that this Court 
clarify and correct the factual error in the January 21, 2009, Judgment. 
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DATED this $o ll;- day of July 2009. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By: Q_ r.f. (_,,:Jr 
I 
Joshua S. Evett, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ c..kl- day of July 2009, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Timothy C. Walton ~/ U.S. Mail 
Chasan & Walton, LLC Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 1069 Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 83701-1069 Facsimile 
Stephen E. Blackbum _L U.S. Mail 
Blackbum Law, P.C. Hand Delivery 
660 East Franklin Road, Suite 220 Overnight Mail 
Meridian, ID 83642 Facsimile 
RyanB. Peck U.S. Mail 
Saetrum Law Offices v' Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 7425 Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 83707 Facsimile 
Charles L. Saari U.S. Mail 
Canyon County Prosecutor v Hand Delivery 
Canyon County Courthouse Overnight Mail 
1115 Albany Facsimile 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Joshua S. Evett 
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Post Office Box 7425 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J HEIDEMAN, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
LUIS J. GUZMAN, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, and JENNIFER 
SUTTON, individually, 
Defendants. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
CANYON COUNTY, LUIS GUZMAN, 
individually and JENNIFER SUTTON, 
individually, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVOS-4848 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF RY AN B. 
PECK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, Ryan B. Peck, w:ho first being duly sworn Uµon his oath and deposes and 
says as follows: 
1. That I arn a attomey for Saetrum Law Offices, who. represents Defendant Dale 
Piercy, and I make this affidavit of my own personal knowledge; 
2. Affiant attests that attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the 
Judgment on behalf of Dale Piercy. 
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Further this affiaut sayeth naught 
DATED this 6th day of August 2009. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
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On this 6th day of August 2009 before me, Notary Public, personally appeared RYAN B. 
PECK, knovvn or identified to me to be the person whose nam.e is subscribed to the within 
instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day 
and year in this certificate last above written. 
Ot/~~-
Notary Public, State ofldaho 
Residing at ~~ 
My Commission E'.8:~ .?°d;/e.<:vd 
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JUDGMENT-2 
1102 




SAETRUM LAW 0 PAGE 05/05 08/06/2009 16:21 
THIRD DISTRlCT COU 
COUNTY O~ CANYO 
JUDGMENT 
State of Idaho vs. 
Dale W Piercy 
'31367 Hwy95 
Parma 10 83000 
O.L 'It. NONE 
0.0.B.: 1212811948 
CASE #'. CR·20Q5..0007T73.-C 
OF lOAHO 
. CHARGE: CCQ..3..5-17(2)A 31-7141.ivestock At l.atge· 
AMENDED;_ Bond:---~-~ ------
The Defendant, having been fully advised of his/her statutory and con 
0 pleaded guilty. D was found guilty. 
D State moved to dismiss this c11arge. D Charge is dis · 
•itutlo rights, including the right to be represented by counsel, 
a$ found not guilty. 
0 Infraction default entered. 
0 Conviction is entered. D Judgment is withheld. 
JJJOGMl;NT: 
0 The bond is 0 exonerated. q forfei~ed and .case closed. D to be applied to the fine and costs. 
O No Contact Order 0 dismissed. 0 imposed as a term of probation. 
PAYMENTtt. Defendant shall pay immediately, or as provided in payment agreement, as follows: 
$ ____ , which includes fine and court costs. $ , suspended. To be paid 
ill' . Pay $ per to begin . 
U Reimburse for.atty or P.D, $ by I$ per month. 
0 $ restitution to _ . 
Make payments payable to Canyon County Clerk, include case number, and send to Restitution Office, 1115 Albany Street, 
Caldwell, ID 83605. Telephone: 454-7494 All Installment payments are subject to a $2.00 handling fee. Failure to pay 
your fine by the due date may result In your account being turned over to a collect/on agency. 
~ Defendant shall serve days in jail with day$ suspended and credit for , days served. 
Defendant shall report to jail 0 immediately D on . 
0 Work release I work: search granted in all counties and Defendant shall report to jall immediately to make arrangements. 
D Sheriff's Work Detail; days in lieu of . days jail to be cornpleted by and Dlilfenda.nt shall 
report to jail immediately to make arrangements. If the Defendant fails to report to the jail as ordered or at a tirne agreed upon 
with the jail, or fails to satisfactorily perform the Defendant's obligations with the Sheriff Inmate Labor Detail, then the Sheriff 
is ordered and directed to place the Defendant in custody to seNe the Defendant's· jail time that has not been suspended. 
This jail sentence is fJ concurrent D oonsecutive with any jail sentence previously ordered. · 
O VI RIVILE ES suspended for days/months beginning on 
the date of this Judgment. D _ . 
0 D.W.P.: The period of suspension shall commence following the end of any prior period of suspension, disqualification, or 
revocation el(isting at the time of this offense. 
Reinstaternent of driving privileges must be accomplished befo,m you can drive. Apply to: Driver's Seivices, P. 0. Box 71~9, Boise, 
ID 83707-1129. 
fROBATION: The Defendant shall be placed on D supervised 0 unsupervised probation for months. 
During the period of probation, all suspended penalties are subject to Defendant's compliance with all of the above orders and 
the following conditions. The Defendant shall: 
0 if on supervised probation, report to the Misdemeanor Probt:1tion Dept. within five days of this Order and comply with all rules 
and r~porting requirements. 
0 not refuse evidentiary test for alcohol or drugs requested by a peace officer. 
0 keep Court informed in writing of Defendant's current mailing address and telephone number. 
0 not commit a felony or a misdemeanor. D not violate conditions of No Contact Order. 
0 attend 0 N.A. meetings for weeks. 0 A.A. meetings for weeks and provide proof o1 completion 
to the Court by . 
0 not consume alcohol and/or <1ny other mood altering substance unless prescribed by a 
0 not operate any motor vehicle upon a public roadway unless validly licensed and ins 
0 not operate any motor vehicle after having consumed any quantity of alcol10L rlock Device required 
0 perform hours of community service for C.S.A. to be completed by --r---r~---- and pay all community 
seJVice 'fees. 
0 within ___ days enroll in, and then promptly compfete,,.r----::-----,.__.--1---------------
Dated: Signed: . 
Copies to: '/ efen.dant / 0 Defense Attorn&y 0 Mis 
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LUIS J. GUZMAN, individually, 
Plaintitl: 
v. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, and JENNIFER 
SUTTON, individually, 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF:s AND 
CO-DEFENDANT SUTTON'S 
OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT 
PIERCY'S SECOND MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendants. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
CANYON COUNTY, LUIS GUZMAN, 
individually and JENNIFER SUTTON, 
individually, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW the above-entitled Third Party Plaintiff Dale Piercy, by and tlrrough its 
counsel of record, and responds to Plaintiffs and Co~Defendant Sutton's Objections to Third 
Party Plaintiff Piercy's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The factual background was provided in Mr. Piercy's original memorandum. In 
addition, the following facts and procedural background are. relevant due to the objections made 
by Co-Defendant Sutton and Plaintiff Guzman. 
At the time of the accident> Mr. Piercy was cited for violation of Canyon County Code 
§03-05-17. Mr. Piercy contested the citation il1 Canyon County Criminal Case No. 
CR-2005-7773. Mr. Piercy was found not guilty of this offense. (Affidavit of Ryan B. Peck, 
Exhibit A.) 
For purposes of the Mr. Piercy's Second Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Piercy is 
not disputing that the accident occurred within a herd distxict created by an ordinance enacted in · 
1908 or that the 1908 herd district is valid. 
There is also no dispute that there are no cattle guards or fonces enclosing the 1908 herd 
district in particuJar at the border where Wamstad Road crosses over the Boise River. 
II. STANDARD OF ADJUDICA tION 
The standard on summary judgment is set forth in Mr. Piercy)s original memorandum and 
is not in dispute. The objections to Mr. Piercy's Second Motion for Summary Judgment require 
some additional analysis of laws regarding statutory interpretation. 
The construction of a legislative act presents a pure question of law for this Court to decide . 
. Crawford v. Dept. of Corrections, 133 Idaho 633, 635, 991 P.2d 358, 360 (1999). Courts also 
exercise free review over the interpretation of statutes. Adamson v. Blanchard,. 133 Idaho 602> 
605, 990 P.2d 1213, 1216, (1999)(construing Idaho Code § 25-2118 and Idaho Code § 25-2119 
together as they were adopted at the same time.) 
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"Courts are empowered to resolve ambiguities.in statutes by ascertaining and giving effect 
to legislative intent." Easley v. Lee, 111 Idaho 115, 118, 721 P2d 215, 218 (1986) citing: Nainpa 
Lodge No. 1389 v. Smylie, 71 Idaho 212, 229 P.2d 991 (1951). "The act should be construed in.its 
entirety and as a whole far the purpose of ascertaining the legislative intent, and where different 
sections reflect light upon each other they are regarded as in pari materia." Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also held, '"all parts of a stamte should be given meaning,' 
aud the Court 'will construe a statute so that effect is given to its provisions, and no part is rendered 
superfluous or insignificant."' Moreland v. Adams, 143 Idaho 687, 690, 152 P.3d 558, 561 (2007) 
citing: Idaho Cardiology Associates, P.A. v. Idaho Physicians Network, Inc., 141 Idaho 223, 226, 
108 P.3d370, 373 (2005). 
ID. Legal Analysjs 
Mr. Piercy is inunune from liability in this lawsuit because: (1) this Court :ruled that Mr. 
Piercy's bull was being pastured in an open range area; (2) J.C.§ 25-2118 in conjunction with Idaho 
range law 1:1I1d LC.§ 25-2402, create immunity for Mr. Piercy's bull being in the 1908 herd district; 
and (3) Mr. Piercy cannot be held civilly liabl.e under Canyon County Ordinance 03-05-17. 
I. Mr. Piercy's Bull was Being Pastured in an Open Range Area 
Based upon this Court's decision from the trial Oll Mr. Piercy's Amended Declaratory 
Judgm.ent Action the 1982 herd district ordinance was invalid, and therefore, the area upon which 
Mr. Piercy pastured his· bull is open range. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in 
Bifurcated Portion of Trial.) Mr. Piercy is aware that Plaintiff Guzman and Co-Defendant Sutton 
are anempting to revisit this Court's decisjon, but that is a separate motion. (See: Response to 
Motions to Reconsider Prior Court Rulings and Motion for Sanctions) 
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II. Mr. Piercy is Immune from Liability in the 1908 Herd District 
Mr. Piercy is protected from liability by the open range laws and policy of Idaho as 
expressed in Idaho Supreme Court cases and the Idaho Code. 
Idaho has always been a state that follows the 'fence out' rule of open range. Moreland v. 
Adams, 143 Idaho 687, 689; 152 P.3d 558, 560 (2007). The 'fence out' rule places upon 
landovmers the duty to co11struct fences to keep open range cattle from entering the,ir property. Id 
After the enactment of legal fence laws, landowners· in open range areas could hold another 
landowner liable if they enclosed their property in a legal fence. Then, if a cattle ovmer' s livestock 
broke through the fence, the owner of the cattle could be liable to the landowner. 
·1he Idaho Legislature later made it possible for lando'Wllers to impose the 'fence in' n.tle in 
certain areas by creating a herd district. Id. The 'fence in' rule makes it the responsibility of cattle 
owners to enclose their animals. 
The Idaho Legislature enacted LC. § 25-2118 and I.C. § 25-2119 in 1961. These statutes 
were enacted to specifically address the liability of livestock on a highway. Idaho Code § 25-2118 
specifically addresses the liability to an owner regarding cattle upon a highway in an open range 
area. Idaho Code § 25-2119 generally deals with livestock on highways ill herd district areas. 
Neither of these statutes specifically addresses the issue of an open :range cow that wanders into an 
unenclosed herd district. 
Two years later in 1963, the Idaho Legislature filled the gap between LC. § 25-2118 and 
LC. § 25-2119, by enacting a revision to LC. § 25·2402 which "exclude[s] liability for livestock 
roaming into a herd district from open range unless the distric~ is inclosed by a lawful fence." 
Easley v. Lee, 111 Idaho 115, 118; 721 P.2d 215, 218 (1986). The Idaho Supreme Court 
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interpretation of the Idaho Legislature's intent in amending LC_ § 25-2402 is controlling in this 
case. Further, it is supported by the common law of Idaho. Essentially, LC. § 25-2402 as 
amended in 1963 reasse1ts the 'fence out' rule regarding boundaries between herd districts and open 
range. 
Without this rule, the designation of open range becomes meaningless. It is· well settled 
that one of the policies of open range is to save owners of livestock the expense of maintaining 
fences axound their property. If a livestock owner· in open rat1ge were liable for livestock that 
wandered into an adjacent herd district, then the livestock owner would be required to fence the 
border between open range and the herd district area. This would run precisely contrary to the 
longstanding •fence out' rule of open range. 
A herd district neighbor is also required to 'fence out' from open range livestock. The 
amendment of LC.§ 25-2402 in 1963 made it clear that it was the Idaho Legislature's intent that the 
conunon law 'fence out' rule applied whether the neighbor was a single landowner or a herd 
district. The cost to maintain a fence around the herd district is the responsibility of the 
landowners within the herd district as indicated by the provisions of LC. § 25-2402-2408~ which 
allow for the taxing of landowners in a herd district to construct a fence enclosi11g the herd district. 
Co-Defendant Sutton argues that the 1908 herd district is ex.empt from the 'fence out' rnk 
This argument is based upon the idea that the amendment to I.C. § 25-2402 came in 1963, and 
therefore, does not apply to the 190_8 herd district This argument would not only run contrary to 
the long-standing 'fence out' rule of open range, but would make the statutes regarding open range 
meaningles::1. Tue Idaho Supreme Court has held th.at, "'all pruis of a statute should. be given 
meaning,' and the Court 'will construe a statute so that effect is given to its provisions, an.d no part 
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is rendered superfluous or insignificant.'" Moreland v. Adams> 143 Idaho 687, 690, 152 P.3d 558, 
561 (2007) citing: Idaho Cardiology Associates, P.A. v. Idaho Physicians Network, Inc., 141 Idiilio 
223, 226, 108 P.3d 370, 373 (2005). 
Almost all herd districts in Canyon County, and in other collllties in this state, were created 
plior to 1963. This Comi has been provided with all the herd distJ:ict ordinances in Canyon County 
and with the exception of the invalid 1982 ordinance, they were all passed prior to 1963. 
Therefore, if all herd districts created prior to 1963 were· exempt from the 'fence out' mle with 
regard to open range livestock, then all the statutes governing open range would be meaningless. 
Even those livestock owners within open range would have to fence in their livestock or construct 
and maintain a fence around the entire ope11 range area for fear their livestock would roam into a 
herd district that was not created after 1963. This would nullify the open range statutes designed to 
protect owners of livestock in op.en range. 
The Idaho Supreme Cotui in Easley, stated that the intention of the Idaho Legislature was to 
"exclude liability for livestock roaming into a herd district from open range." Easley v. Lee, 111 
Idaho 115, 118, 721 P.2d 215, 218 (1986). Idaho law is designed to maintain the protections of 
open range by enforcing the 'fence out' rule with any landowner in open range or herd district 
bordering open range despite when it was created. 
Ill. Mr. Piercy Cannot be Negligent Per Se under Canyon County Ordinance 03-05-17 
Canyon County Ordinance 03-05-1 7 only provides a criminal penalty and cannot be used 
to support a civil claim of negligence. Canyon County Code 03-05-03, ''Purpose and Authority'', 
states in pertinent part, "This article is also designed to help solve the problems caused by 
'livestock', ... from running at large in the county." Both sections 03-05-17 (2) and (4) state that 
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"it shall be unlawful'' for livestock (s'Ubsection 2) and animals (subsection 4) for animals to be at 
large on county roads, and section 03-05-29 (1) stat~s lb.at ''violations of the provisions of this 
article shall be a misdemeanor and shall be punished as set folth in Idaho Code 18-113 11 • In other 
words, Canyon County has made it a misdemeanor crime to have livestock or other defined animals 
at large on the roads of the county. 
This is a similar approach taken by the Benevvah County Commissioners which was 
discussed in· Benewah County Cattlemen~'\ Ass >i, Inc. v. Board of County Com rs of Benewah 
County, 105 Idaho 209, 668 P.2d 85 (1983). In Benewah County, the county co:nunissioners 
enacted an ordinance which prohibited livestock running at large in the county. As noted by the 
Supreme Court of Idaho, "The ordinance expressly leaves unaffected civil liability arising from 
trespas~ing livestock." Id at 211, 688 P.2d at 87, see also 105 Idaho 213, 214, 688 P.2d 89, 90. 
While agreeing that Canyon County validly exercised its police power to create the above 
sections of its Code, the st.atus of tlils ordmance lS sunilar to that round in Benewah County which 
precluded civil liability for violation of the ordinance. As a result of'the Benewah County decision, 
a livestock oVv11.er could be criminally liable for violation of the county ordinance by allowing his 
livestock to run at large within Benewah County, but would not be civilly liable should th.at 
· livestock be bit by a vehicle and cause damages because the li-vestock was in open range and LC.§ 
25-2118 coupled with LC. § 25-2402 provides complete immunity. Co~Defendant Sutton and 
Plaintiff Guzman cannot rely on the Benewah case for the proposition that Mr. Piercy is negligent 
because state statute specifically provides civil immunity for Mr. Piercy. 
It is the same with the pr~sent case and the above Canyon County Code sections. Canyon 
County has made it a misdemeanor crime to have livestock running at large ·within the county. 
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Piercy resides, there is no civil liability for any damages caused by livestock running at large under 
. sections 25-2118 and 25-2402. 
A Canyon County ordinance camiot place liability upon a person who is specifically free 
from liability under State Statute. It would be absurd to hold that a com1ty has more power than 
the Idaho Legislature .. 
. . 
·Mr. Piercy was cited for violation of Canyon County Ordinance 03-05-17. Mr. Piercy 
contested the charge and was found not guilty. As discussed, there is no civil penalty for a 
violation of this ordinance where a party is provided immunity by Idaho State statute. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Piercy is immune from liability in this lawsuit under Idaho common law, I.C. § 25-2118 
in conjunction with l.C. § 25-2402. Mr. Piercy requests that this Court gran,t summary judgment 
on his behalf. 
DATED this 6th day of August 2009. 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
By 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
C.DYE,DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
LUIS J. GUZMAN, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, and JENNIFER 
SUTTON, individually, 
Defendants. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
CANYON COUNTY, LUIS GUZMAN, 
individually and JENNIFER SUTTON, 
individually, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVOS-4848 
RESPONSE TO MOTIONS TO 
RECONSIDER PRIOR COURT 
RULINGS AND MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS 
COMES NOW the above-entitled Defendant Dale Piercy, by and through its counsel of 
record, and responds to Co-Defendant Sutton's Motion for Reconsideration and the elements of 
Plaintiff Guzman's Objection to Defendant Piercy's Second Motion for Summary Judgment that 
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were essentially a motion to reconsider. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The factual background was provided in Mr. Piercy' s original memorandum in support of 
his Second Motion for Summary Judgment. In addition, the following facts and procedural 
background are relevant due to the motions for reconsideration being asserted. 
This case began as a lawsuit against Mr. Piercy on May 10, 2005. Mr. Piercy raised the 
issue of the validity of the 1982 herd district as an affirmative defense in his Answer filed on June 
20, 2005. Mr. Piercy then pursued the issue of the validity of the 1982 herd district as a motion for 
summary judgment on May 5, 2007. As part of the Court's ruling on Mr. Piercy's motion for 
summary judgment issued October 9, 2007, the Court ordered that Ms. Sutton bring in Canyon 
County as a party in the action. Ms. Sutton complied by filing an Action for Declaratory Relief 
against Canyon County on October 16, 2007. Canyon County filed its Answer on November 8, 
2007, but did not plead a statute of limitations defense. Mr. Guzman did not file any pleading in 
response to the Action for Declaratory Relief. 
Mr. Guzman filed Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider on November 7, 2007. Mr. Guzman 
was seeking to have this Court specifically rule on Mr. Guzman's and Ms. Sutton's arguments 
regarding equitable estoppel, estoppel by laches and quasi-estoppel. Since Mr. Guzman had made 
this a matter a summary judgment in response to Mr. Piercy' s motion for summary judgment this 
was essentially a motion for summary judgment on these issues. 
Mr. Piercy responded by filing Defendant Piercy's Objection to Plaintiff's Motion to 
Reconsider. This motion was supported by subsequent briefing field by Mr. Guzman on March 
26, 2008 and a response by Mr. Piercy on March 28, 2008. This Court ruled by Memorandum 
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Decision filed on April 3, 2008. The Court ruled that Mr. Piercy was not estopped from moving 
forward on the challenge to the 1982 herd district. 
In order to simplify the pleadings the parties entered into and filed a Stipulation to Amend 
Pleadings and Scheduling on September 3, 2008. This stipulation included the following 
provision: "That Canyon County, Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton waive any defenses they may have 
regarding the timing of the filing of Mr. Piercy's Amended Action for Declaratory Relief." 
The Amended Action for Declaratory Relief was filed by Mr. Piercy on September 10, 
2008. Mr. Guzman filed his Answer on September 18, 2008. Mr. Guzman pled a statute. of 
limitations defense as an affirmative defense. Ms. Sutton filed her Answer on September 23, 2008. 
Ms. Guzman pied a statute of limitations defense as an affirmative defense. Canyon County filed 
its Answer on September 24, 2008. Canyon County did not plead a statute of limitations defense. 
A trial was had on October 8, 2008. At the trial, Ms. Sutton attempted to introduce 
evidence regarding the estoppel issues. (R. at 160-168.) Mr. Piercy objected to the evidence 
being introduced based upon the Court's prior ruling on these issues. Id The Court agreed that 
the issue had been determined and the proof Ms. Sutton desired to introduce was not going to 
make a difference. Id 
II. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
Summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56(c) can be granted by a trial court when there are no 
genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct.App.1986). In ruling on 
a motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the 
nonmoving party. All reasonable inferences of fact must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. 
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G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991); Sanders v. 
Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App.1994). Additionally, 
The burden of proving the absence of material facts is upon the moving party. 
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a ge,nuine issue, the burden shifts to the 
nonmoving party to show that a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged element 
of the claim does exist. The nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials contained in the pleadings, but must come forward and produce evidence by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in the rules to set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial (citations omitted). 
Levinger v. Mercy Medical Center, Nampa, 139 Idaho 192, 195, 75 P.3d 1202, 1205 (2003) 
(parenthesis added). The moving party is entitled to judgment when the nonmoving party fails to 
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on 
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Thompson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 
473, 475-76, 50 P.3d 488, 490-91 (2002). 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
This Court should deny Ms. Sutton's and Mr. Guzman's motions to reconsider various 
aspects of the previous Judge's rulings because: (1) they have waived any statute of limitation 
defenses; (2) they are judicially estopped from taking contrary positions; and (3) the estoppel 
claims are without merit. Further, regarding the statute of limitations defenses and certain 
assertions by the other parties, Mr. Piercy requests this Court to grant sanctions against the other 
parties for making frivolous and unfounded arguments. 
A. No Statute of Limitation Bars Mr. Piercy's Claim 
In order to analyze this defense, it is important to pay special attention to the above 
procedural history of this matter. 
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Ms. Sutton spent considerable space in their briefing arguing that Mr. Piercy's declaratory 
action is barred by a statue of limitations. These are precisely the same arguments made by Ms. 
Sutton in her closing arguments to the Court following the trial of this matter. These arguments 
are moot because Canyon County did not raise or argue for a statute of limitations defense. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8( c) states: "In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall 
set forth affirmatively ... statute of limitations .... " Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h) states: "In 
pleading the statute of limitations it is sufficient to state generally that the action is barred, and 
allege with particularity the Session Law of the section of the Idaho Code upon which the pleader 
relies." 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that, "Under the civil rules, compliance with the 
governing statute of limitations is not a requirement for subject matter jurisdiction; rather, the time 
bar of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that may be waived if it is not pleaded by 
the defendant." Anderson v. State, 133 Idaho 788, 791, 992 P.2d 783, 786 (Ct.App. 1999). 
Canyon County waived any statute of limitation defense it had by failing to plead the 
defense in answer to either the Action for Declaratory Relief or the Amended Action for 
Declaratory Relief Canyon County has still not made any argument regarding statute of 
limitations. Therefore, Mr. Guzman's and Ms. Sutton's attempt to raise a last minute statute of 
limitations defense is moot. Any ruling by the Court will bind Canyon County and a ruling that the 
1982 herd district is invalid will be the law in Canyon County. This ruling will, therefore, apply to 
Mr. Guzman's underlying action against Mr. Piercy. 
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1. Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton Waived any Statute of Limitation Defenses 
Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton waived any statute of limitation defense both by agreement of 
the parties and by failing to timely assert the defenses. Neither Mr. Guzman nor Ms. Sutton raised 
statute of limitations arguments prior to impermissibly including them in their Answers to Mr. 
Piercy' s Amended Action for Declaratory Relief. The Action for Declaratory Relief was filed on 
October 16, 2007. The declaratory action was originally filed by Ms. Sutton and she did not raise a 
statute of limitations defense. 
In fact, it was Ms. Sutton that argued in response to our original motion for summary 
judgment that Canyon County was a necessary party and must be joined in this matter. It was 
based upon Ms. Sutton's arguments that the Court ordered Ms. Sutton to join Canyon County. Ms. 
Sutton filed a declaratory action. Ms. Sutton did not raise any statute of limitations defense. 
Similarly, Mr. Guzman did not respond to the Action for Declaratory Relief. This has been 
an issue in the case for over a year and both Ms. Sutton and Mr. Guzman have failed to raise a 
statute of limitations defense. 
Finally, the parties determined that it made better sense to have Mr. Piercy be the Plaintiff in 
the declaratory action. After some discussion, Mr. Piercy agreed that Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton 
could be defendants in the action so that they could appropriately appear at the trial of this matter. 
Partially in exchange for that concession, the attorneys for Ms. Sutton and Mr. Guzman signed the 
stipulation agreeing to waive any defenses that resulted from the timing of the filing of the 
Amended Action for Declaratory Relief. This provision of the stipulation includes any statute of 
limitation defenses. 
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Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton both voluntarily waived any statute of limitations defenses, but 
also waived them through not raising them timely. 
2. The Statute of Limitations Defenses do not Have Merit 
Finally, the statute oflimitation defenses raised by Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton do not have 
merit in that one is inapplicable and the other is not available in this type of case. 
Ms. Sutton raises the defense under LC. § 5-221. This provision is not applicable as Mr. 
Piercy is not making a claim against Canyon County. Mr. Piercy is asking the Court to declare that 
the 1982 herd district ordinance was invalid and void. LC. § 5-221 is clearly a tort claim 
limitation. The one case cited by Ms. Sutton even suggests that this is a tort claims provision. 
Further, Ms. Sutton does not have standing to argue a defense that would only be a defense for 
Canyon County. Canyon County itself has not raised this defense. 
Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton also make a claim under LC. § 5-224. This provision was not 
designed to bar claims that a ordinance is invalid. If one wishing to contest an ordinance only had 
four years until being barred, then the case of Brown v. Board of Education would never have been 
litigated. Also unjust voting laws would have been protected under the guise of claims being stale. 
Further, this is an action that includes proof that the Canyon County Commissioners failed to give 
proper notice to the citizens of Canyon County. This is unlike the Canady case, where the Plaintiff 
had knowledge of the case and its effect prior to the action taking place. The Plaintiff watched as 
the lumber company expended a lot of resources in reliance upon the city's actions. This is not so 
with Mr. Piercy. Canyon County failed to give the required notice and prejudiced Mr. Piercy's 
ability to respond to the proposed action. 
The statute of limitations arguments are moot, waived or not applicable. 
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3. Sanctions Should be Rendered Against Ms. Sutton and Mr. Guzman for Arguing 
These Defenses 
This issue is so clear that it is frivolous to bring this matter to the Court's attention at this 
time. It has wasted several hours of counsel's time to respond to these arguments. Tiris is certain 
where all parties specifically agreed to not raise defenses based upon the timing of the filing of 
Amended Action for Declaratory Relief and yet violated their agreement using up the Court and 
counsel's time on these arguments. 
B. Mr. Piercy is not Estopped from Arguing the Validity of the 1982 Herd District. 
Ms. Sutton and Mr. Guzman make the exact same arguments regarding estoppel by laches, 
quasi-estoppel and equitable estoppel as were presented before Judge Petrie. Tiris Court should 
review the previous briefing by Mr. Piercy in this matter including the Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment filed May 1, 2007 and accompanying affidavits, 
along with the briefing filed on July 9, 2007; July 30, 2007; August 9, 2007; August 23, 2007; 
December 3, 2007 and March 28, 2008. This Court should also closely examine Judge Petrie's 
order on these issues filed April 3, 2008. After all the previously mentioned briefing and Judge 
Petrie' s order, Ms. Sutton and Mr. Guzman are once again trying to revive their estoppel claims. 
As this Court will see, Ms. Sutton and Mr. Guzman have not provided any evidence to support 
certain of the elements of any of these equitable doctrines. 
1. Ms. Sutton and Mr. Guzman Have Failed to Provide Evidence to Support their 
Claim of Estoppel by Laches 
The doctrine of estoppel by !aches does not prevent Defendant Piercy from challenging the 
1982 herd district. In their briefing Ms. Sutton and Mr. Guzman fail to even cite the actual 
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elements of estoppel by !aches. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held: 
Like quasi-estoppel, !aches is an affirmative defense and the party asserting the defense 
has the burden of proof. "Whether or not a party is guilty of !aches is a question of fact. 
(citation omitted). The necessary elements to maintain a defense of !aches are: 
(1) defendant's invasion of plaintiffs rights; (2) delay in asserting plaintiffs rights, 
the plaintiff having had notice and an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of 
knowledge by the defendant that plaintiff would assert his rights; and (4) injury 
or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to plaintiff or the suit 
is not held to be barred. 
Henderson v. Smith, 128 Idaho 444, 449, 915 P.2d 6, 11 (1996). (citation omitted). 
Because the doctrine of !aches is founded in equity, in determining whether the doctrine 
applies, consideration must be given to all surrounding circumstances and acts of the 
parties. (citation omitted). The lapse of time alone is not controlling on whether !aches 
applies. (citation omitted). 
Thomas v. Arkhoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 359, 48 P.3d 1241, 1248 (2002). The 
only evidence provided is that Mr. Guzman, Ms. Rivera, Ms. Sutton and some police officers 
thought that it was illegal for cows to be on the roadway. These beliefs have no bearing on any of 
the elements of !aches. 
First, there must be al). invasion of the rights of the non-moving party by the moving party. 
Mr. Piercy has never asserted that Mr. Guzman or Ms. Sutton invaded any of his rights. The rights 
to a person in open range is immunity from liability when a car collides with their livestock. The 
elements of !aches requires proof of a previous invasion of rights, not an invasion of rights if the 
Court does not grant the relief requested by the non-movmg party. Therefore, Mr. Guzman's and 
Ms. Sutton's claim oflaches violates the first element of a claim oflaches. 
The second element involves a delay in asserting a right. Defendant Piercy's right to 
immunity from liability did not even arise until Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton had the accident 
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involving his animal. Mr. Piercy asserted his right to immunity from liability in his Answer to 
Plaintiffs' Complaint. Mr. Piercy immediately asserted his rights in this matter. Mr. Guzman and 
Ms. Sutton have not provided any evidence to the contrary. 
Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton have also not provided any evidence concerning the third 
element of laches, which requires that they prove that Ms. Sutton and Mr. Guzman had no 
knowledge that Mr. Piercy would assert his rights. Ms. Sutton and Mr. Guzman had knowledge 
from the instigation of this lawsuit that Mr. Piercy was planning to assert his rights. 
Essentially, Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton are relying on the passage of time to base their 
arguments. The Thomas case states that this is not a sole basis for granting this affirmative 
defense. In fact, the Supreme Court of Idaho upheld a Trial Court's ruling to invalidate a 
66-year:..old ordinance. Devil Creek Ranch, Inc. v. Cedar Mesa Reservoir and Canal Co., 123 
Idaho 634, 851 P.2d 348 (1993). This case states that despite evidence that the movant had relied 
on the state of the law for 66 years, was not evidence enough to establish laches. Id at 637. 851 
P.2d 348, 351. 
Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton often make global assertions such as "The entirety of Canyon 
County has followed the "fence in" rule of the herd district ... , for 25 years", and that "Piercy has 
benefitted from herd district status, as his lands have not been subject to depredations from the at 
large cattle of his neighbors." (Defendant Jennifer Sutton's Opposition to Defendant Dale Piercy's 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 14-15.) These assertions, however, are without any evidence. 
Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton have not provided any proof to establish that the doctrine of laches 
should apply. It is simply not applicable in this case. 
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2. Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton Failed to Provide any Evidence to Support Their 
Claims of Equitable or Quasi - Estoppel 
Neither the Mr. Guzman nor Ms. Sutton's memorandums past or present regarding these 
issues set forth the actual elements they must prove in order to establish a defense of quasi-estoppel. 
A cursory look at the elements of estoppel shows Mr. Guzman's and Ms. Sutton's lack of evidence 
to support the defense of quasi-estoppel. The Idaho Supreme Court has held: 
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel "prevents a party from asserting a right, to the detriment 
of another party, which is inconsistent with a position previously taken." (Citation 
omitted). This doctrine applies when: (1) the offending party took a different position 
than his or her original position and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage 
or caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change 
positions; or ( c) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an 
inconsistent position from one he or she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in. 
(Citation omitted). 
Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 138 P.3d 310 (2006). 
The first element requires that a party asserting quasi-estoppel prove that the offending party 
took a contradictory position to that party's current position. The case law cited by Mr. Guzman, 
although much older than the more current Atwood case, states the same requirement. "The 
requirements for proper application of quasi estoppel are, then, that the person against whom it is 
sought to be applied has previously taken an inconsistent position, with knowledge of the facts and 
his rights, to the detriment of the person seeking application of the doctrine." KTVB, Inc. v. Boise 
City, 94 Idaho 279, 282, 486 P.2d 992, 995 (1971). Unless it is established that a party has taken 
a contrary position then they cannot be held barred under the doctrine of quasi-estoppel, despite 
their knowledge of, benefit from or acquiescence in an action. 
The other elements of quasi-estoppel are only relevant if Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton can 
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first prove there is no genuine issue of fact upon whether Mr. Piercy took a contrary position to the 
position he is currently asserting. Mr. Guzman has not provided any real evidence that Mr. Piercy 
either thought that the land in question was a herd district or that he ever took that position. Mr. 
Piercy's second affidavit in support of summary judgment states that he has always thought that the 
land where the bull came from was in open range. This testimony is not contradicted by any other 
testimony. Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton have utterly failed to provide any evidence to prove this 
element of quasi-estoppel. Mr. Piercy has always believed that his pasture was in open range and 
has never contradicted that position. 
The only fact Mr. Guzman can positively assert is that prior to this lawsuit Mr. Piercy did 
not challenge the 1982 ordinances affect upon his land. The Idaho Appellate Court upheld a Trial 
Court's decision that such evidence as stated above was insufficient to apply the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel. Winn v. Eaton, 128 Idaho 670, 675, 917 P.2d 1310, 1315 (Id.App. 1996). The 
Court held that the Defendants asserting equitable estoppel did not meet their burden of proof 
regarding equitable estoppel. Id The Defendants alleged in an easement case that because the 
Plaintiffs lived forty feet behind them and shared a driveway that they were well aware of what 
Defendants were doing in staking out their property. The Defendant also cited that it was only 
after Defendants had completed building their home that Plaintiffs attempted to assert their rights. 
The Court stated that such silence before the trial on the issue is not evidence that Plaintiffs took a 
contrary position prior to the action they were pursuing. Id 
The essence of all Mr. Guzman's and Ms. Sutton's arguments in regard to the present case is 
that Mr. Piercy had not previously challenged the 1982 ordinance. As in Winn, this type of 
evidence is not sufficient to prove that Mr. Piercy ever took a contrary position to what he is 
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currently asserting. Mr. Piercy was not aware prior to this lawsuit that anyone was claiming that 
his land was not open range with regard to cattle or otherwise. 
Further, Mr. Piercy did not gain any benefit from the land purportedly being in a herd 
district. The affect of a herd district is to potentially expose Mr. Piercy to legal liability. Mr. 
Guzman and Ms. Sutton have not provided any evidence to suggest that Mr. Piercy has gained any 
special benefit from the 1982 ordinance, which did not even include cattle as an animal to be 
limited from free roaming. Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton rely on unsupported assertions that Mr. 
Piercy would benefit from his land being in a herd district. 
Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton cite Defendant Piercy's deposition regarding his understanding 
of the state of fencing in Canyon County to support their estoppel arguments. The existence or 
non-existence of fencing is not relevant to the issues of estoppel or whether there is a herd district. 
Neither Mr. Guzman nor Ms. Sutton have provided any evidence to suggest that there would not be 
any fencing in Canyon County if the small area allegedly affected by the 1982 ordinance were open 
range versus a herd district. Cattlemen fence in their livestock whether they are in open range or 
not. 
The affidavits provided by Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton merely state that they thought it 
was illegal to have cows on the road. They do not even assert that they thought a herd district 
existed. These vague statements could just as likely be referring to knowledge of the criminal 
statute not the 1982 ordinance. The reliance of the Plaintiffs in this matter on what they thought 
was the law is not relevant to the elements of quasi-estoppeL The affidavits from the Plaintiffs are 
irrelevant. In short Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that Defendant Piercy should be estopped 
from arguing that the 1982 ordinance did nothing to affect the subject land's open range status. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
·:Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton have not provided any new law or evidence suggesting that 
this Court should review the decisions made by the previous judge. It is a waste of time and 
judicial resources to revisit every argument made during several years of litigation simply because a 
judge retired and Ms. Sutton and :Mr. Guzman want to throw everything out there again. This 
Court has the discretion to simply deny their motion to reconsider and move this litigation forward. 
:Mr. Piercy requests this Court to deny the motions to reconsider. 
DATED this 6th day of August 2009. 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
By 
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PLAINTIFF/DEFENDANT, LUIS 
J. GUZMAN'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
141002/008 
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Comes now Luis J. Guzman, Plaintiff in the above-entitled tort action, and 
Defendant in the above-entitled Declaratory Judgment action, and hereby joins in 
Defendant Jennifer Sutton's Motion for Reconsideration. Specifically, Guzman moves this 
court to reconsider the Order on Motion to Reconsider dated April 30, 2009, and the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in Bifurcated Portion of Trial dated 
January 21, 2009, on the grounds and for the reasons that the same are contrary to the 
law and the facts of this case as set forth more fully in Sutton's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Reconsider, including the cirguments expressed by Guzman in Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defend art Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment filed with 
this Court on or about July 20, 2007, and the arguments in Plaintiffs' Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Reconsider, filed with this Court on or about November 8, 2007, and 
for the reasons specified in Plaintiff Guzman's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant 
Piercy's Second Motion for Summary Judgment filed with this court on or about May 22, 
2009. 
This Motion is based upon the files and records in this action, the evidence 
presented to and cited to the court in th s action and the pleadings filed by the parties in 
this action (including both the pleadings in the under lying tort action and the declaratory 
judgment action). -r---
DATED this I ) day of August, 2009. 
Chasan & Walton, LLC 
Timothy C. Walton, Attorney for 
Plaintiff 
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This is obviously a complicated case. Unfortunately, because of Judge Petrie's departure 
from the bench immediately following issuance of his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment in Bifurcated Portion of Trial (filed January 21, 2009), there was no time to request 
reconsideration. 
In spite of outward appearances, the relief requested by Defendant Sutton is not that 
complicated, and the relief requested certainly does not warrant the imposition of sanctions, 
which Piercy has requested without citation to legal authority. 
Defendant Sutton replies, briefly, as follows, regarding each issue before the Court: 
1. Error in the Judgment 
Piercy has not addressed Defendant Sutton's point that the Judgment entered by the Court 
contains a factual error. The Court stated in its conclusion "[a]ccordingly, the court concludes no 
herd district existed at the location of the horrific accident involving Luis Guzman and Jennifer 
Sutton and Dale Piercy's bull." (Judgment at 12.)(Emphasis added.) The Court also ordered, 
adjudged and decreed that "2. Neither Plaintiff Luiz [sic] Guzman nor Defendant Jennifer 
Sutton may rely upon the existence of a herd district at the location of their involvement in a 
collision with Defendant Dale Piercy's bull in Canyon County in 2005." (Id. at 13.) (Emphasis 
added.) 
The herd district at issue in the declaratory relief action before Judge Petrie was the 1982 
herd district where Piercy's bull was pastured. That is the herd district Judge Petrie struck down. 
(See, e.g., Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in Bifurcated Portion of Trial, pp. 
2-5 (referring to 1982 herd district).) 
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None of the parties dispute, however, that the accident involving Sutton, Guzman, and 
Rivera occurred in the I 908 herd district, which is across the Boise River from the I 982 herd 
district. For the reasons set forth in Sutton's Opposition to Piercy's Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed May 22, 2009, it is critical that the Court correctly identify the 1982 herd district 
(now adjudicated to be open range) from which the bull escaped, and the 1908 herd district (and 
still a herd district) in which the accident occurred. Idaho Code§ 25-2401(1), which was enacted 
in 1963, is not retroactive, and does not vitiate the status of a herd district into which animals 
from open range pass. 
There is no indication in Judge Petrie's decision that he analyzed whether the fact that the 
accident occurred in the 1908 herd district - which remains valid to this day- has any bearing on 
the case. 
This Court must correct the factual inaccuracies in the Judgment. Defendant Sutton also 
requests that the Court analyze whether the fact that the accident occurred in the I 908 herd 
district changes the outcome of the case. While it very well may not, it will be immeasurably 
important to the parties for the purpose of evaluating the case for further handling, including an 
appeal. 
2. Defendant Sutton Requests that this Court Permit Her to Submit Evidence on her 
Estoppel by Waiver and Quasi Estoppel Defenses 
Defendant Sutton's point regarding these defenses is simply that she ought to be allowed 
the opportunity to submit evidence supporting these defenses in a declaratory relief setting. (See 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant Jennifer Sutton's Motion for Reconsideration, p. 26 
(requesting that this Court allow her to present evidence supporting these defenses).) Judge 
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Petrie did not allow Sutton to present evidence supporting these defenses at the declaratory relief 
hearing. Sutton sought to call as a witness Paul Axness, a Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance 
adjuster who handled claims against Piercy in 2001 relating to an accident between some of 
Piercy's cattle and another car. Mr. Axness's phone notes documented conversations with Piercy 
which indicated that Mr. Axness was told by Piercy that his land was located within a herd 
district. Judge Petrie did not accept an offer of proof from counsel for Guzman on the issue. 
While Judge Petrie gave his reasons for not taking evidence, there was no motion pending by 
Piercy on the defenses. Judge Petrie believed that he had already dismissed these defenses in the 
course of considering Piercy's motion for summary judgment filed in 2007. 
A review of the record, however, indicates that Piercy never moved to dismiss these 
defenses, and that Judge Petrie did not follow the proper procedural steps to dismiss the defenses 
sua sponte. 
Sutton raised the estoppel by waiver and quasi estoppel defenses in response to Piercy' s 
motion for summary judgment. (See Defendant Jennifer Sutton's Opposition to Defendant Dale 
Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed July 24, 2007.) Sutton did not file a cross-motion 
for summary judgment. In late August, 2007, Piercy filed his Reply to Plaintiffs' and Co-
Defendant's Responding Memorandums and Motion to Strike Co-Defendant's Supplemental 
Brief, but did not request summary judgment on the affirmative defenses of estoppel by waiver 
and quasi-estoppel. 
In its written decision on Piercy's motion for summary judgment, Judge Petrie did not 
analyze the estoppel by waiver or quasi estoppel defenses. (See Order Denying Defendant 
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Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment, Joining Canyon County, and Holding All Other 
Motions in Abeyance until the Herd District's Validity is Resolved, dated October 9, 2007.) 
Plaintiff Guzman then filed a motion for reconsideration so that the Court could address these 
defenses. (See Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, dated March 27, 2008.) 
The Court issued its Order on Motion to Reconsider on April 30, 2008. Importantly, the 
Court noted ''that based upon the record presented thus far, neither quasi estoppel or !aches 
apply in this matter." (Order on Motion to Reconsider, p. 1 (emphasis added).) At the end of the 
decision the Court noted it "denies the assertion of the doctrine of quasi estoppel and the doctrine 
oflaches against Defendant Piercy's attempt to invalidate Canyon County's Herd District 
ordinances." (Id., p. 20.) 
At the declaratory relief hearing of August 8, 2008, the Court indicated it had dismissed 
these defenses. (See Transcript, p. 162, IL 1-2.) There was, however, no motion ever pending 
that requested dismissal of these defenses, and the Court's April 30, 2008 Order on Motion to 
Reconsider was only based upon the record presented thus far, implying that the Court would 
consider additional evidence if presented. (While it is clear, in reviewing the transcript from the 
declaratory relief action, that the Court did not intend to consider additional evidence, the order 
on the motion for reconsideration nevertheless gave that impression, hence Sutton's decision to 
call Paul Axness as a witness in the declaratory relief hearing.) 
While Sutton certainly understands that this Court's decision may be the same as Judge 
Petrie's regarding these defenses, Sutton requests merely the opportunity to present additional 
evidence supporting these defenses so that the record can be complete for any potential appeal. 
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3. The Court Should Analyze the Statue of Limitations Defense 
The problem with Judge Petrie's decision following the declaratory relief hearing is that it 
did not analyze the statute of limitations defense raised by Sutton and Guzman. The decision is 
silent on the defense. We do not know if Judge Petrie thought the defense was waived, or had no 
merit, or if he even considered it. This issue is as much about process as it is about anything, as 
if the declaratory relief decision is appealed then it will be imperative for Sutton and Guzman to 
understand the Court's reasoning for either accepting or rejecting this particular defense. (It will 
also, assumably, be important for the Idaho Supreme Court to understand the Court's decision.) 
The stipulation between the parties providing that "Canyon County, Mr. Guzman and Ms. 
Sutton waive any defenses they may have regarding the timing of the filing of Mr. Piercy's 
Amended Action for Declaratory Relief' was not intended to waive affirmative defenses based 
on the statute oflirnitations. The purpose of that language was limited to the context of what the 
stipulation sought to accomplish, which was to permit the filing of an amended action for 
declaratoryrelieflate in the case, and avoid the time limitations found in IRCP 15(a) for 
amendments to pleadings. Counsel for Sutton did not intend to waive the statute oflimitations 
defense by agreeing not to object to the timing of Piercy1s filing of an amended declaratory relief 
action. It is impossible for that to have been the purpose of this language in the stipulation, since 
at no time before that date had the parties discussed the statute of limitations defense because of 
the procedural posture of the case, i.e., the parties were misaligned after Judge Petrie ordered 
Sutton, rather than Piercy, to file a declaratory relief action, when it was Piercy that was 
challenging the 1982 herd district, not Sutton. There was no opportunity, until Piercy filed his 
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amended declaratory relief action in September, 2008, to assert this affirmative defense, since 
the district court put Sutton in the position of the plaintiff in the declaratory relief action. 
Sutton merely asks for this Court's decision on the statute oflimitations defense, because 
presently, should this case proceed on appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court is not going to know why 
Judge Petrie did not address the defense or what he thought of the defense. This case is now this 
Court's. Accordingly, Sutton asks the Court to analyze this issue. 
4. Sanctions 
Piercy's request for sanctions fails for a number of reasons. First, the request does not set 
forth a rule or case under which sanctions would be appropriate. This motion does not meet the 
particularity requirement ofIRCP 7(b )(1 ). Second, and relating to the first, it is impossible for 
Sutton to respond because she does not know under which rule Piercy requests sanctions. Third, 
there is no dispute that the accident in this case did not happen in the 1982 herd district Judge 
Petrie struck down, but happened instead in the 1908 herd district, which is still valid. The 
judgment as written erroneously states that the accident happened in the 1982 herd district. It 
must be corrected and the case analyzed in light of where the accident actually occurred. Fourth, 
there is no dispute that Piercy never moved to dismiss the affirmative defenses on which Judge 
Petrie refused to take evidence at the declaratory relief action. Sutton merely asks to submit the 
evidence she wished to submit at the declaratory relief proceeding. 
Sutton's arguments are all in good faith and taken largely with an eye on the appeal that is 
likely to occur in this case. The record should be complete, as should the Court's analysis on 
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each applicable defense raised by the parties so that the Idaho Supreme Court can decide the 
basis of this Court's decisions. 
DATED this jJf_ day of August, 2009. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By:_Q_e-_>v{_&_..-t_,_( fr ______ _ 
Joshua S. Evett, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant Jennifer Sutton 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .i11l:_ day of August, 2009, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Timothy C. Walton 
Chasan & Walton, LLC 
P.O. Box 1069 
Boise, ID 83701-1069 
Stephen E. Blackbum 
Blackbum Law, P.C. 
660 East Franklin Road, Suite 220 
Meridian, ID 83642 
RyanB. Peck 
Saetrum Law Offices 
P .0. Box 7425 
Boise, ID 83 707 
John T. Bujak 
Carlton R. Ericson 
Canyon County Deputy Prosecutor 
Canyon County Cow;thouse 
1115 Albany 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
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__ Overnight Mail 
~Facsimile 
JoshuaS. Evett 
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CANYON COUNTY CLER ~ 
C. DOCKINS, DePUTY ~ ~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 






DALE PIERCY, individually, and ) 
JENNIFER SUTTON, individually ) 
Defendants. ) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~) 






CANYON COUNTY, LUIS GUZMAN, ) 
individually and JENNIFER SUTTON, ) 
individually ) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. CV - 2005-4848-C 
ORDER ON MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
This is a civil action. On October 13, 2009, the court heard oral argument on 
Jennifer Sutton and Luis Guzman's Motions for Reconsideration. Sutton was represented 
by Josh Evett. Also present and presenting arguments were Timothy Walton for Luis 
Guzman, Ryan Peck for Dale Piercy and Carlton Ericson for Canyon County. 
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Facts and Procedure 
The following is a summary of the procedural history of this case relevant to 
Sutton's pending motion to reconsider. This action was initiated by Complaint filed May 
5, 2005. An Amended Complaint was filed on May 19, 2005 and a Second Amended 
Complaint was filed on August 30, 2005. This case was originally assigned to the 
Honorable James C. Morfitt. 
On February 2, 2007, this case was reassigned to the Honorable Gordon W. Petrie 
as part of a redistribution of the existing caseloads of the other district judges in the Third 
Judicial District to the new district court position. 
On May 2, 2007, Piercy filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with supporting 
affidavits. The parties filed responsive pleadings with supporting documents and 
presented oral arguments on September 6, 2007. On October 9, 2007, Judge Petrie 
entered an Order Denying Defendant Percy's (sic) Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Joining Canyon County, and Holding all Other Motions in Abeyance Until the Herd 
District's Validity is Resolved. 
In response to Judge Petrie's October 9, 2007 Order, Sutton filed an Action for 
Declaratory Judgment on October 15, 2007. Canyon County responded by filing its 
Answer on November 8, 2007. 
Rivera and Guzman responded to Judge Petrie's October 9, 2007 Order by filing a 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider on November 8, 2007. In their Motion to Reconsider, 
Rivera and Guzman asked the court to reconsider its order allowing Piercy to challenge 
the validity of Canyon County's 1982 herd district ordinance and specifically requested 
the court to consider whether the doctrines of estoppel and estoppel by laches precluded 
ORDER ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER - 2 
1142 
Piercy from challenging the validity of the 1982 herd district ordinance. Sutton filed a 
Response and Joinder in Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider on November 27, 2007. Piercy 
filed an Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider on December 3, 2007. 
Judge Petrie issued an Order on Motion to Reconsider on April 30, 2008. 1 The 
Order was issued without further oral argument on the matter, although all parties had 
submitted written argument on the issue prior to the entry of Judge Petrie's decision. In 
his Order on Motion to Reconsider, Judge Petrie analyzed the doctrines of quasi-estoppel 
and estoppel by laches and ruled that neither theory was applicable to this action, denied 
the motion for reconsideration, and affirmed his belief that it was time for Canyon 
County to "become decisively engaged in this litigation" by participating in a bifurcated 
"mini trial" regarding the validity of the 1982 herd district. 
On June 25, 2008, Piercy filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief which 
essentially re-aligned the parties to properly reflect the party asserting the challenge to 
Canyon County's herd district. The parties filed a Stipulation to Amend Pleadings and 
Scheduling on September 4, 2008 and Piercy filed an Amended Action for Declaratory 
Relief on September 11, 2008. Guzman's Answer filed September 19, 2008 asserted the 
affirmative defenses of estoppel by laches, equitable estoppel, and statute of limitations. 
Sutton's Answer filed September 23, 2008 asserted the affirmative defenses of estoppel 
by laches, estoppel by waiver and/or equitable estoppel, as well as a statute of limitations 
defense. Canyon County filed its Answer on September 24, 2008 which included an 
assertion of an affirmative defense based on the presumption of the validity of a herd 
1 The motion had been scheduled for oral argument on December 6, 2007 but was vacated. In February 
2008, the court was instructed that settlement was reached between Plaintiff Erika Rivera and the 
Defendants but that Plaintiff Guzman was continuing to pursue his claims. As discovery continued 
between Canyon County and the various parties, Guzman then renewed the Motion to Reconsider. 
ORDER ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER - 3 
1143 
district as set forth in Idaho Code§ 31-857. 
On October 8, 2008 Judge Petrie heard the bifurcated bench trial also referred to 
as a "mini-trial" regarding the validity of the 1982 herd district. A review of pages 161-
167 of the transcript of that hearing reflects that Mr. Evett and Mr. Walton attempted to 
introduce evidence from an insurai1ce adjustor related to their asserted affirmative 
defenses of estoppel and !aches. Judge Petrie declined the parties' request to present this 
evidence during the "mini-trial." The parties submitted written closing arguments and 
post-trial briefs following the "mini-trial". Sutton's closing brief included argument on 
the statute of limitation affirmative defense. 
On January 21, 2009, the Judge Petrie issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment in Bifurcated Portion of Trial. In this order, Judge Petrie concluded 
that the 1982 Canyon County herd district was invalid and void. On page 13 of the 
Order, Judge Petrie specifically ordered that "2. Neither Plaintiff Luiz Guzman nor 
Defendant Jennifer Sutton may rely upon the existence of a herd district at the location of 
their involvement in a collision with Defendant Dale Piercy' s bull in Canyon County in 
2005." 
Canyon County, Sutton, and Guzman all filed a Notice of Appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court following the entry of the court's order. That appeal was eventually 
dismissed by the Idaho Supreme Court because Judge Petrie's order was not a final order 
or judgment and not subject to appeal absent an IRCP 54(b) certification. Judge Petrie 
retired and in April of2009, this court was assigned the responsibility of presiding over 
this matter. 
Piercy filed a Second Motion for Summary Judgment on May 5, 2009 and on July 
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30, 2009 Sutton filed the Motion for Reconsideration which is the subject of this order. 
Erica Lynn Rivera's claims have been resolved and she is no longer a party to this action. 
The remaining Plaintiff, Luis J. Guzman filed a Motion for Reconsideration on August 
11, 2009. Oral argument on the pending Motions for Reconsideration was presented to 
the court October 13, 2009. Oral argument on the Motion for SUITuu.ary Judgment has 
been delayed pending the outcome of this court's decision on the Motions for 
Reconsideration. 
Motion for Reconsideration 
1. The stipulated correction to the January 21, 2009 Order 
The first issue the court will address on the pending motion for reconsideration is 
Sutton's request that this court correct an alleged factual error set forth in Judge Petrie's 
January 21, 2009 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT 
IN BIFURCATED PORTION OF TRIAL. Specifically, Sutton argues that the following 
language set forth on page 13 of the Order is factually incorrect: "2. Neither Plaintiff Luiz 
Guzman nor Defendant Jennifer Sutton may rely upon the existence of a herd district at 
the location of their involvement in a collision with Defendant Dale Piercy's bull in 
Canyon County in 2005." 
There are two distinct herd districts relevant to the location of the accident that is 
the basis of this action. The first herd district was created in 1908. The second herd 
district was purportedly created in 1982. The parties stipulated during their oral 
argument before this court that the collision that is the basis of this lawsuit actually 
occurred within the geographic confines of the unchallenged 1908 Canyon County herd 
district while the bull that was struck had escaped from a parcel of Piercy' s real property 
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located within the geographic confines of the 1982 herd district declared invalid by Judge 
Petrie's January 21, 2009 Order. 
The validity of the 1908 herd district was never at issue during the "mini trial" 
and therefore the validity of the herd district applicable to the precise location of the 
collision was not an issue considered by Judge Petrie. The paragraph designated as 
number two located on page thirteen of Judge Petrie's January 21, 2009 Order is factually 
inaccurate and to the extent it reflects a legal conclusion it is also inaccurate. The motion 
to reconsider that portion of the January 21, 2009 order is granted. 
Judge Petrie's January 21, 2009 order is amended to reflect that the actual 
collision between the motor vehicle and the bull occurred within the geographic confines 
of the 1908 herd district which has not been challenged or declared invalid in this action 
and that the bull that was struck escaped from a parcel of Piercy's land located within the 
confines of the challenged 1982 herd district. The validity of the 1982 Canyon County 
herd district is subject to this court's further consideration as more particularly described 
below. 
2. Statute of Limitations Issue 
In her Motion for Reconsideration, Sutton argues that Piercy's attack on the 
validity of the 1982 herd district should be barred by the statute oflimitations found in 
Idaho Code 5-224. Sutton's motion provides a detailed argument as to the applicable law 
and the facts of this case, however, at oral argument the issue presented to the court was 
whether or not Sutton should be allowed to raise the statute of limitations issue and have 
it decided by this court prior to completion of the case. 
Piercy argues that Sutton and Guzman specifically waived any statute of 
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limitations defense in the stipulation signed by the parties on September 4, 2008 and that 
Canyon County, the proper party to assert such a defense, did not raise that defense. 
Sutton and Guzman disagree with the representation that they waived the right to assert 
this defense. 
After careful review of the record in this case, including the January 21, 2009 
Order, this court finds that the statute oflimitations argument has not been fully 
considered and decided by the court. This court is concerned with the need to establish 
and preserve a complete record on the issues presented in this case for appellate purposes. 
The court is also concerned with its ability to properly decide the issue with the 
information currently before it due to the disagreement between the parties as to the 
intent of the stipulation and the right of the parties to assert this defense. 
The court will allow the parties to submit argument on the issue of the parties' 
right to assert the statute of limitations defense, as well as to submit argument on whether 
the statute of limitations asserted should be applied to this action. The court is aware that 
this will further extend the length of this case and delay final determination of Guzman's 
claims but feels it is necessary in order to protect the rights of all the parties to this 
litigation and to further ensure that all issues have been carefully and thoughtfully 
addressed by the trial court before the matter is subjected to appellant court review. 
3. Estoppel Issues 
As with the statute of limitations issue described above, Sutton's motion on the 
estoppel issues addresses the applicable legal authority and facts of the case, however, the 
parties limited their discussion to whether or not this issue should be given one last shot 
at consideration in light of factual evidence that was not allowed to be presented during 
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the October 8, 2008 "mini-trial". 
This court has carefully considered the procedural history of this issue in this case 
and Judge Petrie's prior decisions, including his decision to exclude evidence on this 
issue offered by Sutton during the October 8, 2008 "mini-trial." The court has also 
reviewed the legal authority and in light of the representations of counsel of the evidence 
that was being offered during the "mini trial" on the estoppel issue, this court finds that it 
is in the interest of justice and the parties to this action for this court to consider the 
proffered evidence and make a final determination of the applicability of the estoppel 
doctrine to Piercy's assertion that the 1982 herd district is invalid. 
This court is again mindful of the delay this order may cause to the final 
determination of the issues in this case, but is equally mindful of its responsibility to 
carefully and fully consider and resolve all issues that need to be addressed before the 
appellate courts are asked to do the same. 
Conclusion and Order 
Sutton and Guzman's Motion to Reconsider is granted as follows: 
I. The record of this court is corrected to reflect that the collision that is the basis 
of this lawsuit actually occurred within the geographic confines of the unchallenged 1908 
Canyon County herd district while the bull that was struck had escaped from a parcel of 
Piercy's real property located within the geographic confines of the 1982 herd district 
declared invalid by Judge Petrie's January 21, 2009 Order. 
2. Sutton will be allowed to present evidence from the insurance adjuster in 
support of her argument that the estoppel doctrine should be considered by the court in 
determining Piercy' s assertion that the 1982 herd district is not valid. The court is not 
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aware of any other evidence being offered by the parties on this issue. The parties are 
ordered to contact the court's secretary within ten days of this order to schedule a hearing 
for the presentation of the evidence from the insurance adjuster or the parties can agree to 
submit the evidence in the form of a stipulated affidavit or offer of proof in lieu of a court 
hearing. 
3. The parties shall contact the court's secretary within ten days of this order to 
schedule a date certain for oral arguments on the validity of the 1982 Canyon County 
herd district in light of the asserted statute of limitations and estoppel defenses. The court 
encourages the parties to stipulate to a scheduling order for any additional briefing on 
those issues. If the parties cannot stipulate to a briefing schedule, they are to schedule a 
telephone conference with the court for its direction on a briefing schedule. The court 
asks the parties to reiterate procedural histories, claims, arguments, and legal authority on 
the matters at issue in the briefing due to the extensive history of this case (sixteen 
volumes) that preceded its assignment to this court. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on 1 day of December, 2009, s/he served a true and correct copy of 
the original of the foregoing ORDER ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER on the following individuals 
in the manner described: 
• upon counsel for plaintiff: 
Timothy Walton 
Attorney at Law 
P.O.Box 1069 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Stephen E. Blackburn 
Attorney at Law 
660 E. Franklin Road, Ste. 255 
Meridian, Idaho 83642 
• upon counsel for defendant (Jennifer Sutton): 
Joshua S. Evett 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
• and upon counsel for defendant(Dale W. Piercy): 
Rodney R. Saetrum 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
• and upon counsel for counsel for defendant (Canyon County): 
John T. Bujak 
Attorney at Law 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
and/or whens/he deposited each a copy of the foregoing ORDER in the U.S. Mail with sufficient 
postage to individuals at the addresses listed above. 
WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the Court 
By:~CA~r2o~~Yi;t/7~· 
Deputy Clerk of the Court 
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Timothy C. Walton ISB #2170 
CHASAN & VVAL TON LLC 
Park Center Pointe 
1459 Tyrell Lane 
Post Office Box 1069 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1069 
Telephone: (208) 345-3760 
Facsimile: (208) 345-0288 
Stephen E. Blackburn ISB #6717 
BLACKBURN LAW, P.C. 
660 E. Franklin Rd., Suite 255 
Meridian, Idaho 83642 
Telephone: (208) 898-3442 
Facsimile: (208) 898-9443 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Luis J. Guzman 
11.3d A.k E 
MAY 2 6 2010 
D 
P.M. 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J HEIDEMAN, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
LUIS J. GUZMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE W. PIERCY, individually and 
JENNIFER SUTTON individually, 
Defendants. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CANYON COUNTY, LUIS GUZMAN, 


























Case No: CV05-4848 
PLAINTIFF/DEFENDANT, LUIS 
J. GUZMAN'S MOTIONS FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Plaintiff/Defendant, Luis J. Guzman's Motion for Reconsideration and Motions to Dismiss - Page -1-
1151 
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COMES NOW the above-captioned plaintiff/defendant Guzman and hereby moves 
this court to dismiss defendant Piercy's Eighth defense contained in his Answer to 
Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint which defense alleges that Dale Piercy is entitled to 
the protection of Idaho's open range statutes, and the immunities provided therein. Plaintiff 
also requests that the court reverse Judge Petrie's ruling in this case, entered January 21, 
2008, finding that the 1982 herd district (which herd district includes the lands where 
defendant Piercy's bull was pastured) was invalid. 
This motion is based upon Guzman's Memorandum In Support of Guzman's 
Motions for Reconsideration and Motion to Dismiss, including the legislative amendment 
effective July 1, 2009, to Idaho Code Section 31-857. 
-t-..--
DATED this~ day of May, 2010. 
Chasan & Walton, LLC 
Timothy C. Walton, Attorney for . 
Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2f~ay, 2010, a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing document was served upon by: 
Joshua S. Evett 
Elam & Burke 
251 E. Front St., No. 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701-1539 
Attorneys for Jennifer Sutton 
Ryan Peck 
Rodney R. Saetrum 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 7425 
Boise, ID 83707 
Attorneys for Dale W. Piercy 
Carl Ericson 
Canyon County Prosecutor's Office 
1115 Aibany St. 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Attorney for Canyon County 
Stephen E. Blackburn ISB #6717 
BLACKBURN LAW, P.C. 
660 E. Franklin Rd., Suite 220 
Meridian, Idaho 83642 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff 
~.Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Courier 
D Facsimile to (208) 384-5844 
~.Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Courier 
D Facsimile to (208) 336-0448 
~ail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Co.urier 
D Facsimile to (208) 455-5955 
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